Online Auction Markets Before and During the Lockdown

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Francisco Alvarez ◽  
Alfredo Garcia-Hiernaux ◽  
Marcello Sartarelli
Keyword(s):  
Online Auction ◽  
Auction Markets

Efficiency Considerations in Online Auction Markets

2007 ◽  
Vol 17 (4) ◽  
pp. 311-328 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ram D. Gopal ◽  
Y. Alex Tung ◽  
Andrew B. Whinston
Keyword(s):  
Online Auction ◽  
Auction Markets

Detecting Behavioral Biases in Mixed Human-Proxy Online Auction Markets

2013 ◽  
Vol 4 (4) ◽  
pp. 60-79
Author(s):  
Roumen Vragov
Keyword(s):  
Theoretical Model ◽  
Human Behavior ◽  
Software Agents ◽  
Online Auction ◽  
Electronic Market ◽  
Auction Markets ◽  
Behavioral Biases ◽  
Bid Price

Currently many auction websites directly or indirectly provide support for the use of automated proxies or agents. Buyers can use proxies to monitor auctions and bid at the appropriate time and with the appropriate bid price, sellers can use proxies to set prices or negotiate deals. Proxy complexity varies, however most proxies first require some input on the part of the human trader and then perform the trading task autonomously. This paper proposes and tests a theoretical model of human behavior that can be used to detect behavioral biases in electronic market environments populated by humans and software agents. The paper also quantifies the effect of these biases on individual and business profits.

scholarly journals Sniping and Squatting in Auction Markets

2009 ◽  
Vol 1 (2) ◽  
pp. 68-94 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jeffrey C Ely ◽  
Tanjim Hossain
Keyword(s):  
Field Experiment ◽  
Real World ◽  
World Market ◽  
Online Auction ◽  
Auction Markets ◽  
Bidding Strategies ◽  
Late Bidding

We conducted a field experiment to test the benefit from late bidding (sniping) in online auction markets. We compared sniping to early bidding (squatting) in auctions for newly-released DVDs on eBay. Sniping led to a statistically significant increase in our average surplus. However, this improvement was small. The two bidding strategies resulted in a variety of other qualitative differences in the outcomes of auctions. We show that a model of multiple concurrent auctions, in which our opponents are naïve or incremental bidders as identified in the lab, explain the results well. Our findings illustrate how the overall impact of naïveté, and the benefit from sniping observed in the lab, may be substantially attenuated in real-world market settings. (JEL D44)

Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document