scholarly journals Probability weighting explains Independence Axiom violations of Expected Utility Theory in monkeys

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Wolfram Schultz
Keyword(s):  
Expected Utility ◽  
Utility Theory ◽  
Expected Utility Theory ◽  
Independence Axiom ◽  
Probability Weighting

scholarly journals Probability weighting explains Independence Axiom violations of Expected Utility Theory in monkeys

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Simone Ferrari-Toniolo ◽  
Leo Chi U Seak ◽  
Wolfram Schultz
Keyword(s):  
Expected Utility ◽  
Utility Theory ◽  
Expected Utility Theory ◽  
Risky Choice ◽  
Independence Axiom ◽  
Probability Weighting ◽  
Preference Reversals ◽  
Risky Decision ◽  
Linear Discriminant ◽  
Better Than

Expected Utility Theory (EUT) provides axioms for maximizing utility in risky choice. The independence axiom (IA) is its most demanding axiom: preferences between two options should not change when altering both options equally by mixing them with a common gamble. We tested common consequence (CC) and common ratio (CR) violations of the IA in thousands of stochastic choice over several months using a large variety of binary option sets. Three monkeys showed few outright Preference Reversals (8%) but substantial graded Preference Changes (46%) between the initial preferred gamble and the corresponding altered gamble. Linear Discriminant Analysis (LDA) indicated that gamble probabilities predicted most Preference Changes in CC (72%) and CR (87%) tests. The Akaike Information Criterion indicated that probability weighting within Cumulative Prospect Theory (CPT) explained choices better than models using Expected Value (EV) or EUT. Fitting by utility and probability weighting functions of CPT resulted in nonlinear and non-parallel indifference curves (IC) in the Marschak-Machina triangle and suggested IA non-compliance of models using EV or EUT. Indeed, CPT models predicted Preference Changes better than EV and EUT models. Indifference points in out-of-sample tests were closer to CPT-estimated ICs than EV and EUT ICs. Finally, while the few outright Preference Reversals may reflect the long experience of our monkeys, their more graded Preference Changes corresponded to those reported for humans. In benefitting from the wide testing possibilities in monkeys, our stringent axiomatic tests contribute critical information about risky decision-making and serves as basis for investigating neuronal decision mechanisms.

scholarly journals Violations of coalescing in parametric utility measurement

2020 ◽  
Vol 89 (4) ◽  
pp. 471-501
Author(s):  
Andreas Glöckner ◽  
Baiba Renerte ◽  
Ulrich Schmidt
Keyword(s):  
Expected Utility ◽  
Choice Experiment ◽  
Utility Theory ◽  
Expected Utility Theory ◽  
Empirical Literature ◽  
Probability Weighting ◽  
Weighting Functions ◽  
Majority Consensus ◽  
Split Form ◽  
Analyze Data

Abstract The majority consensus in the empirical literature is that probability weighting functions are typically inverse-S shaped, that is, people tend to overweight small and underweight large probabilities. A separate stream of literature has reported event-splitting effects (also called violations of coalescing) and shown that they can explain violations of expected utility. This leads to the questions whether (1) the observed shape of weighting functions is a mere consequence of the coalesced presentation and, more generally, whether (2) preference elicitation should rely on presenting lotteries in a canonical split form instead of the commonly used coalesced form. We analyze data from a binary choice experiment where all lottery pairs are presented in both split and coalesced forms. Our results show that the presentation in a split form leads to a better fit of expected utility theory and to probability weighting functions that are closer to linear. We thus provide some evidence that the extent of probability weighting is not an ingrained feature, but rather a result of processing difficulties.

scholarly journals Weak* Axiom of Independence and the Non-Expected Utility Theory

2012 ◽  
Vol 4 (1) ◽  
pp. 67-75
Author(s):  
Tapan Biswas
Keyword(s):  
Expected Utility ◽  
Utility Theory ◽  
Expected Utility Theory ◽  
Point Of View ◽  
Independence Axiom ◽  
Weak Version ◽  
Von Neumann ◽  
The Mean ◽  
Mean Variance ◽  
Weak Axiom

The axiomatic foundation of the expected utility theory (which states that given a set of uncertain prospects individuals pick up the prospect which yields the highest expected utility) was first laid down by Von Neumann and Morgenstern (1947). This axiom has come under severe criticisms in recent years. A large number of experiments have shown that in making decisions involving uncertain prospects people frequently violate the independence axiom. In this paper we shall consider the problem of choice under uncertainty from a wider point of view and we shall examine the nature of the restriction imposed by the axiom of independence. We shall use the mean-variance utility function to prove our point. Then we shall consider a weak version of the independence axiom namely the weak* axiom of independence. This is the point of departure from the expected utility theory to the realm of the non-expected utility theory. The weak* axiom allows aversion to pure uncertainty and, in the context of the mean-variance utility theory, it is compatible with utility being an increasing function of expected returns at all levels.

Alternative Expected Utility Theory

2008 ◽  
Author(s):  
Moawia Alghalith
Keyword(s):  
Expected Utility ◽  
Utility Theory ◽  
Expected Utility Theory

scholarly journals Cumulative Prospect Theory Version with Fuzzy Values of Outcome Estimates

Risks ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 9 (4) ◽  
pp. 72
Author(s):  
Oleg Uzhga-Rebrov ◽  
Peter Grabusts
Keyword(s):  
Prospect Theory ◽  
Expected Utility ◽  
Utility Theory ◽  
Expected Utility Theory ◽  
Cumulative Prospect Theory ◽  
Development History ◽  
Decisions Under Risk ◽  
History Of ◽  
Main Factors ◽  
Theoretical Foundations

Choosing solutions under risk and uncertainty requires the consideration of several factors. One of the main factors in choosing a solution is modeling the decision maker’s attitude to risk. The expected utility theory was the first approach that allowed to correctly model various nuances of the attitude to risk. Further research in this area has led to the emergence of even more effective approaches to solving this problem. Currently, the most developed theory of choice with respect to decisions under risk conditions is the cumulative prospect theory. This paper presents the development history of various extensions of the original expected utility theory, and the analysis of the main properties of the cumulative prospect theory. The main result of this work is a fuzzy version of the prospect theory, which allows handling fuzzy values of the decisions (prospects). The paper presents the theoretical foundations of the proposed version, an illustrative practical example, and conclusions based on the results obtained.

Norm-Endorsement Utilitarianism and the Nature of Utility

1996 ◽  
Vol 12 (2) ◽  
pp. 165-182 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jonathan Baron
Keyword(s):  
Expected Utility ◽  
Utility Theory ◽  
Expected Utility Theory ◽  
Interpersonal Comparison ◽  
Moral Norms ◽  
Moral Principles ◽  
Future Goals ◽  
Equal Consideration

In this article, I shall suggest an approach to the justification of normative moral principles which leads, I think, to utilitarianism. The approach is based on asking what moral norms we would each endorse if we had no prior moral commitments. I argue that we would endorse norms that lead to the satisfaction of all our nonmoral values or goals. The same approach leads to a view of utility as consisting of those goals that we would want satisfied. In the second half of the article, I examine the implication of this view for several issues about the nature of utility, such as the use of past and future goals. The argument for utilitarianism is not completed here. The rest of it requires a defense of expected-utility theory, of interpersonal comparison, and of equal consideration (see Baron, 1993; Broome, 1991).

Housing Market Search Behavior and Expected Utility Theory: 1. Measuring Preferences for Housing

1982 ◽  
Vol 14 (5) ◽  
pp. 681-698 ◽  
Author(s):  
T R Smith ◽  
W A V Clark
Keyword(s):  
Los Angeles ◽  
Housing Market ◽  
Expected Utility ◽  
Utility Theory ◽  
House Price ◽  
Expected Utility Theory ◽  
Utility Functions ◽  
Future Search ◽  
Space Construction ◽  
Market Search

This is the first of two papers examining housing market search in a Los Angeles market. In this paper, we derive and analyze utility functions for housing for each individual in two groups of subjects. The utility functions are derived from an experimental setting, in which house price, floor space, construction quality, and neighborhood quality are varied. The functions are found to be essentially compatible with a linear model. They are used to predict the ratings of real houses and the ratings of the expected value of future search. These ratings are compared with actual ratings obtained from subjects during search. The results suggest that the actual or predicted ratings may be employed in a direct test of a simple expected utility theory of search, and further research along these lines appears justified.

Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document