Pair-Efficient Reallocation of Indivisible Objects

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ozgun Ekici
Keyword(s):  
2004 ◽  
Author(s):  
Herbert Hamers ◽  
Flip Klijn ◽  
Marco Slikker ◽  
Bas van Velzen

1988 ◽  
Vol 16 (2) ◽  
pp. 145-158 ◽  
Author(s):  
Stephen Demko ◽  
Theodore P. Hill

IEEE Access ◽  
2017 ◽  
Vol 5 ◽  
pp. 22880-22891 ◽  
Author(s):  
Wei Huang ◽  
Lei Zhang ◽  
Yu Huang ◽  
Jian Lou

Author(s):  
Bettina Klaus ◽  
Alexandru Nichifor

AbstractWe adapt a set of mechanisms introduced by Klaus and Nichifor (Econ Theory 70:665–684, 2020), serial dictatorship mechanisms with (individual) reservation prices, to the allocation of heterogeneous indivisible objects, e.g., specialist clinic appointments. We show how the characterization of serial dictatorship mechanisms with reservation prices for homogeneous indivisible objects (Klaus and Nichifor 2020, Theorem 1) can be adapted to the allocation of heterogeneous indivisible objects by adding neutrality: mechanism $$\varphi $$ φ satisfies minimal tradability, individual rationality, strategy-proofness, consistency, independence of unallocated objects, neutrality, and non wasteful tie-breaking if and only if there exists a reservation price vector r and a priority ordering $$\succ $$ ≻ such that $$\varphi $$ φ is a serial dictatorship mechanism with reservation prices based on r and $$\succ $$ ≻ .


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