Noise Increases Anchoring Effects

We introduce a theoretical framework distinguishing between anchoring effects, anchoring bias, and judgmental noise: Anchoring effects require anchoring bias, but noise modulates their size. We tested this framework by manipulating stimulus magnitudes. As magnitudes increase, psychophysical noise due to scalar variability widens the perceived range of plausible values for the stimulus. This increased noise, in turn, increases the influence of anchoring bias on judgments. In 11 preregistered experiments ( N = 3,552 adults), anchoring effects increased with stimulus magnitude for point estimates of familiar and novel stimuli (e.g., reservation prices for hotels and donuts, counts in dot arrays). Comparisons of relevant and irrelevant anchors showed that noise itself did not produce anchoring effects. Noise amplified anchoring bias. Our findings identify a stimulus feature predicting the size and replicability of anchoring effects—stimulus magnitude. More broadly, we show how to use psychophysical noise to test relationships between bias and noise in judgment under uncertainty.

Asymmetric Patterns of Demand-Supply Mismatch in Real Estate

As expectations change, we may observe asymmetry in responses of economic agents over various phases of the economic cycles. In this paper, we analyze both demand and supply side information to understand the dynamics of price determination in the real estate market and examine the relationship between expectation parameters and demand-supply mismatch. Our hypothesis builds on the possibility that investors’ call for action in terms of their buy/sell decision and adjustment in reservation prices may provide valuable insights into impending demand-supply imbalances in the market. We study several real estate sectors to inform our analysis. The timeframe of our analysis (1995–2010) allows us to observe market dynamics over several economic cycles. We test our hypothesis variously using several measures of market activity within a structural panel VAR framework. Our analysis suggests that investors’ attitude may have substantial and statistically significant feedback effects in price determination. These results indicate noticeable asymmetry in responses during the boom, normal and recessionary periods.

Serial dictatorship mechanisms with reservation prices: heterogeneous objects

We adapt a set of mechanisms introduced by Klaus and Nichifor (Econ Theory 70:665–684, 2020), serial dictatorship mechanisms with (individual) reservation prices, to the allocation of heterogeneous indivisible objects, e.g., specialist clinic appointments. We show how the characterization of serial dictatorship mechanisms with reservation prices for homogeneous indivisible objects (Klaus and Nichifor 2020, Theorem 1) can be adapted to the allocation of heterogeneous indivisible objects by adding neutrality: mechanism $$\varphi $$ φ satisfies minimal tradability, individual rationality, strategy-proofness, consistency, independence of unallocated objects, neutrality, and non wasteful tie-breaking if and only if there exists a reservation price vector r and a priority ordering $$\succ $$ ≻ such that $$\varphi $$ φ is a serial dictatorship mechanism with reservation prices based on r and $$\succ $$ ≻ .

Discounts and Deadlines in Consumer Search

We present a new equilibrium search model where consumers initially search among discount opportunities, but are willing to pay more as a deadline approaches, eventually turning to full-price sellers. The model predicts equilibrium price dispersion and rationalizes discount and full-price sellers coexisting without relying on ex ante heterogeneity. We apply the model to online retail sales via auctions and posted prices, where failed attempts to purchase reveal consumers' reservation prices. We find robust evidence supporting the theory. We quantify dynamic search frictions arising from deadlines and show how, with deadline-constrained buyers, seemingly neutral platform fee increases can cause large market shifts. (JEL D11, D44, D83, L81)

A novel institution: the Zollverein and the origins of the customs union

The Zollverein, the outcome of sequential negotiations between Prussia and other sovereign German states in 1834, was the first international customs union, the template for modern ones such as the European Union. This paper applies a bargaining model to analyse the logic behind the creation of this novel institutional form and the choice of sequential rather than multilateral negotiations. The existence of negative coalition externalities, the effects of new coalitions on non-participants, led the agenda setter, Prussia, to choose sequential over multilateral negotiations as that lowered the membership reservation prices of the other states involved. Institutionally, the features of a customs union structure provided a higher payoff for the agenda setter than capturing the welfare gains from the differential tariff setting in a free trade agreement, explaining the emergence of this novel institutional structure on an international scale.