scholarly journals Serial dictatorship mechanisms with reservation prices: heterogeneous objects

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Bettina Klaus ◽  
Alexandru Nichifor
Keyword(s):  
Econ Theory ◽  
Reservation Price ◽  
Price Vector ◽  
Heterogeneous Objects ◽  
Indivisible Objects ◽  
Reservation Prices ◽  
Priority Ordering ◽  
Serial Dictatorship ◽  
Strategy Proofness

AbstractWe adapt a set of mechanisms introduced by Klaus and Nichifor (Econ Theory 70:665–684, 2020), serial dictatorship mechanisms with (individual) reservation prices, to the allocation of heterogeneous indivisible objects, e.g., specialist clinic appointments. We show how the characterization of serial dictatorship mechanisms with reservation prices for homogeneous indivisible objects (Klaus and Nichifor 2020, Theorem 1) can be adapted to the allocation of heterogeneous indivisible objects by adding neutrality: mechanism $$\varphi $$ φ satisfies minimal tradability, individual rationality, strategy-proofness, consistency, independence of unallocated objects, neutrality, and non wasteful tie-breaking if and only if there exists a reservation price vector r and a priority ordering $$\succ $$ ≻ such that $$\varphi $$ φ is a serial dictatorship mechanism with reservation prices based on r and $$\succ $$ ≻ .

Assessing the Effect of Information on the Reservation Price for Champagne: What are Consumers Actually Paying for?

2006 ◽  
Vol 1 (1) ◽  
pp. 75-88 ◽  
Author(s):  
Pierre Combris ◽  
Christine Lange ◽  
Sylvie Issanchou
Keyword(s):  
Willingness To Pay ◽  
Detailed Analysis ◽  
Sensory Information ◽  
Jel Classification ◽  
Reservation Price ◽  
Vickrey Auctions ◽  
Individual Behaviors ◽  
Reservation Prices ◽  
Large Heterogeneity

AbstractTwo series of Vickrey auctions have been performed to assess the effect of packaging information (bottle and label) on the reservation prices of ordinary consumers for five brut non-vintage Champagnes. As in other studies on wine tasting, packaging information is found to explain much more of the variation in willingness to pay than sensory information. Participants are unable, or unwilling, to put different values on the Champagnes after blind tasting, but significant differences in reservation prices appear when labels are disclosed. Detailed analysis of choices reveals a large heterogeneity in individual behaviors and valuations of the Champagnes included in this study. (JEL Classification: C91, D12)

The concept of market value in thin markets and its implications for international accounting rules (IFRS)

2019 ◽  
Vol 37 (3) ◽  
pp. 301-310 ◽  
Author(s):  
Hans Lind ◽  
Bo Nordlund
Keyword(s):  
Balance Sheet ◽  
Market Value ◽  
Reservation Price ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Current Accounting ◽  
Thin Markets ◽  
Thin Market ◽  
Reservation Prices ◽  
Accounting Rules ◽  
Conceptual Paper

Purpose The purpose of this paper is to discuss how the concepts market value (MV) and exit price should be interpreted in thin markets and how accounting rules may need to change to take this into account. Design/methodology/approach This is a conceptual paper using hypothetical examples as a base for the conclusions. Findings In a thin market, actors can have rather different reservation prices. The price will then be set through bargaining and the agreed price could be considerable above the reservation price of the actor with the second highest reservation price. The exit price should then be below what the MV was before the transaction and below the entry price, and according to the current accounting rules, the value in the balance sheet should then be below the price paid. The authors’ experience is, however, that this rarely happens in practice. Research limitations/implications The limitation of the paper is that it is a conceptual paper and not based a systematic empirical study of accounting practices. Practical implications The results of the paper indicate that there is a need to revise the current accounting rules. Possible changes are discussed. Originality/value As far as the authors know, this is the first paper that looks at problems in the current value concepts related to differences in reservation prices in thin markets.

A characterization of possibility domains under Pareto optimality and group strategy-proofness

2019 ◽  
Vol 183 ◽  
pp. 108567
Author(s):  
Madhuparna Karmokar ◽  
Souvik Roy ◽  
Ton Storcken
Keyword(s):  
Pareto Optimality ◽  
Group Strategy ◽  
Strategy Proofness

scholarly journals Bidding Behaviors in eBay Auctions: Secret Reservation Price and Endogenous Entry

2011 ◽  
Vol 3 (5) ◽  
pp. 326-331
Author(s):  
Feng Jiao
Keyword(s):  
Reservation Price ◽  
Endogenous Entry ◽  
Luxury Goods ◽  
Reservation Prices ◽  
Optimal Bidding ◽  
Ebay Auctions

This paper analyzes the secret reservation price in eBay auctions. Under the assumptions of secret and public reservation price, the bidders choose the optimal bidding function and the seller selects equilibrium reservation price. This model argues that the choice of secret reservation price is rational for the seller, as they can generate higher revenue in certain conditions. It predicts that, under endogenous entry, secret reservation price leads to higher revenue since it attracts more bidders to the auction. This effect is more noticeable for luxury goods. However, secret and public reservation prices generate identical revenue for the seller if entry is exogenous. Furthermore, the results are supported by numerous recent empirical works.

scholarly journals Implications of the reservation price strategy on the optimal harvest decision and production of nontimber goods in an even-aged forest stand

2019 ◽  
pp. 287-296
Author(s):  
Andres Susaeta ◽  
Peichen Gong ◽  
Damian Adams
Keyword(s):  
Carbon Sequestration ◽  
Longleaf Pine ◽  
Pinus Palustris ◽  
Poor Quality ◽  
Planting Density ◽  
Reservation Price ◽  
Price Strategy ◽  
Water Production ◽  
Reservation Prices ◽  
Harvest Strategy

This study analyzes the effects of adopting an adaptive harvest strategy in even-aged forest management under timber price uncertainty on the production of nontimber goods. We use the reservation price strategy (“harvest when the observed timber prices are higher than the reservation prices”) on a longleaf pine (Pinus palustris Mill.) stand and employ the Faustmann–Hartman model as a benchmark. We assume that a longleaf pine stand can be managed for timber production, water production, carbon sequestration, and pine straw raking, depending on the planting density. Our results indicate that the reservation price strategy leads to longer expected harvest age when planting density is high. The reservation price strategy does not lead to increases in water production and carbon sequestration with low planting density. With high planting density, the reservation price strategy leads to increases in the amount of in situ carbon sequestered by 14.4–24.7 Mg·ha–1. Our findings suggest that managing longleaf pine forests in good- or poor-quality sites is a profitable alternative and enables water production and carbon sequestration.

A Strategy-Proofness Characterization of Plurality Rule

2016 ◽  
Vol 18 (4) ◽  
pp. 610-623 ◽  
Author(s):  
DONALD E. CAMPBELL ◽  
JERRY S. KELLY
Keyword(s):  
Plurality Rule ◽  
Strategy Proofness

scholarly journals Strategy-proof mechanism design with non-quasi-linear preferences: ex-post revenue maximization for an arbitrary number of objects

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ryosuke Sakai ◽  
Shigehiro Serizawa
Keyword(s):  
Arbitrary Number ◽  
Econ Theory ◽  
Equal Treatment ◽  
Revenue Maximization ◽  
Object Allocation ◽  
Ex Post ◽  
Monetary Transfers ◽  
Strategy Proof ◽  
Equal Treatment Of Equals ◽  
Strategy Proofness

AbstractWe consider the multi-object allocation problem with monetary transfers where each agent obtains at most one object (unit-demand). We focus on allocation mechanisms satisfying individual rationality, non-wastefulness, equal treatment of equals, and strategy-proofness. Extending the result of Kazumura et al. (J Econ Theory 188:105036, 2020b), we show that for an arbitrary number of agents and objects, the minimum price Walrasian is the unique ex-post revenue maximizing mechanism among the mechanisms satisfying no subsidy in addition to the four properties, and that no subsidy in this result can be replaced by no bankruptcy on the positive income effect domain.

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