Does Institutional Investor Influence on Executive Compensation Increase Firm Value?

2006 ◽  
Author(s):  
Gavin Smith ◽  
Peter L. Swan ◽  
David R. Gallagher
Keyword(s):  
Executive Compensation ◽  
Firm Value ◽  
Institutional Investor

Institutional Investor Preferences and Firm Value

2008 ◽  
Author(s):  
Gwinyai Utete
Keyword(s):  
Firm Value ◽  
Institutional Investor

Who Monitors the Monitor? The Effect of Board Independence on Executive Compensation and Firm Value

2008 ◽  
Vol 21 (3) ◽  
pp. 1371-1401 ◽  
Author(s):  
Praveen Kumar ◽  
K. Sivaramakrishnan
Keyword(s):  
Executive Compensation ◽  
Firm Value ◽  
Board Independence

scholarly journals Say on Pay Laws, Executive Compensation, CEO Pay Slice, and Firm Value Around the World

2014 ◽  
Vol 2014 (1084r) ◽  
pp. 1-56
Author(s):  
Ricardo Correa ◽  
◽  
Ugur Lel
Keyword(s):  
Executive Compensation ◽  
Firm Value ◽  
Say On Pay ◽  
The World ◽  
Ceo Pay

scholarly journals Institutional Investor Preferences and Executive Compensation

2013 ◽  
Author(s):  
Joseph A. McCahery ◽  
Zacharias Sautner
Keyword(s):  
Executive Compensation ◽  
Institutional Investor

scholarly journals The impact of hedge fund activism on target firm performance, executive compensation and executive wealth

2017 ◽  
Vol 6 (3) ◽  
pp. 14-28 ◽  
Author(s):  
Andrew Carrothers
Keyword(s):  
Firm Performance ◽  
Executive Compensation ◽  
Firm Value ◽  
Hedge Fund ◽  
Share Price ◽  
Target Firm ◽  
Increased Risk ◽  
Target Firms ◽  
Hedge Fund Activism ◽  
The Impact

This paper examines the relationship between hedge fund activism and target firm performance, executive compensation, and executive wealth. It introduces a theoretical framework that describes the activism process as a sequence of discrete decisions. The methodology uses regression analysis on a matched sample based on firm size, industry, and market-to-book ratio. All regressions control for industry and year fixed effects. Schedule 13D Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) filings are the source for the statistical sample of hedge fund target firms. I supplement that data with target firm financial, operating, and share price information from the CRSP-COMPUSTAT merged database. Activist hedge funds target undervalued or underperforming firms with high profitability and cash flows. They do not avoid firms with powerful CEOs. Leverage, executive compensation, pay for performance and CEO turnover increase at target firms after the arrival of the activist hedge fund. Target firm executives’ wealth is more sensitive to changes in share price after hedge fund activism events suggesting that the executive team experiences changes to their compensation structure that provides incentive to take action to improve returns to shareholders. The top executives reap rewards for increasing firm value but not for increased risk taking.

Do Executive Compensation Contracts Maximize Firm Value? Evidence from a Quasi-Natural Experiment

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Menachem (Meni) Abudy ◽  
Dan Amiram ◽  
Oded Rozenbaum ◽  
Efrat Shust
Keyword(s):  
Executive Compensation ◽  
Firm Value ◽  
Natural Experiment ◽  
Compensation Contracts

Voluntary disclosure, excess executive compensation, and firm value

2015 ◽  
Vol 32 ◽  
pp. 64-90 ◽  
Author(s):  
Huimin Chung ◽  
William Q. Judge ◽  
Yi-Hua Li
Keyword(s):  
Executive Compensation ◽  
Voluntary Disclosure ◽  
Firm Value

scholarly journals Institutional Investor Preferences and Executive Compensation

2011 ◽  
Author(s):  
Joseph A. McCahery ◽  
Zacharias Sautner
Keyword(s):  
Executive Compensation ◽  
Institutional Investor
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