Bidder Support in Multi-item Multi-unit Continuous Combinatorial Auctions: A Unifying Theoretical Framework

Combinatorial auctions have seen limited applications in large-scale consumer-oriented marketplaces, partly due to the substantial complexity to keep track of auction status and formulate informed bidding strategies. We study the bidder support problem for the general multi-item multi-unit (MIMU) combinatorial auctions, where multiple heterogeneous items are being auctioned and multiple homogeneous units are available for each item. Under two prevalent bidding languages (OR bidding and XOR bidding), we derive theoretical results and design efficient algorithmic procedures to calculate important bidder support information, such as the winning bids of an auction and the minimum bidding value for a bid to win an auction either immediately or potentially in the future. Our results unify the theoretical insights on bidder support problem for different bidding languages as well as different special cases of general MIMU auctions, namely the single-item multi-unit (SIMU) auctions and the multi-item single-unit (MISU) auctions. We also consider auctions with additional bidding constraints, including batch-based combinatorial auctions and hierarchical combinatorial auctions, as well as the combinatorial reverse auctions, all of which have relevant practical applications (e.g., industrial procurements). Our results can be readily extended to solve the bidder support problems in these auction mechanisms.

Modern Auction Mechanisms for the Media Market

Online advertising is one of the most dynamically developing forms of advertising in the Polish market. This paper aims to review existing auction mechanisms for pricing and selling online advertisements. The analysis of the available solutions, including their advantages and disadvantages, such as usefulness in determining the advertisers’ willingness to pay, allows for the indication of practical recommendations for the use of specific auction mechanisms for the media market in Poland. The presented solutions can be considered an alternative to the traditional method of concluding purchase/selling transactions of advertising space

Evaluating Auction Mechanisms for the Preservation of Cost-Aware Digital Objects under Constrained Digital Preservation Budgets

Digital preservation is a field of research focused on designing strategies for maintaining digital objects accessible for general use in the coming years. Out of the many approaches to digital preservation, the present research article is a continuation work of a previously published article containing a proposal for a novel object-centered paradigm to address the digital preservation problem where digital objects share part of the responsibility for self-preservation. In the new framework, the behavior of digital objects is modeled to find the best preservation strategy. The results presented in the current article add a new economic constraint to the object behavior. Now, differently from the previous paper, migrations, copies and updates are not free to use, but subject to budget limitations to ensure the economic sustainability of the whole preservation system, forcing the now-called cost-aware digital objects for efficient management of available budget. The presented approach compares two auction-based mechanisms, a multi-unit auction and a combinatorial auction, with a simple direct purchase strategy as possible efficient behaviors for budget management. TiM, a simulated environment for running distributed digital ecosystems, is used to perform the experiments. The simulated results map the relation between the studied purchase models with the sustained quality level of digital objects, as a measure of its accessibility, together with its budget management capabilities. About the results, the best performance corresponds to the combinatorial auction model. The results are a good approach to deal with the digital preservation problem from a sustainable point of view and open the door to future implementations with other purchase strategies.

Privacy preserving divisible double auction with a hybridized TEE-blockchain system

Double auction mechanisms have been designed to trade a variety of divisible resources (e.g., electricity, mobile data, and cloud resources) among distributed agents. In such divisible double auction, all the agents (both buyers and sellers) are expected to submit their bid profiles, and dynamically achieve the best responses. In practice, these agents may not trust each other without a market mediator. Fortunately, smart contract is extensively used to ensure digital agreement among mutually distrustful agents. The consensus protocol helps the smart contract execution on the blockchain to ensure strong integrity and availability. However, severe privacy risks would emerge in the divisible double auction since all the agents should disclose their sensitive data such as the bid profiles (i.e., bid amount and prices in different iterations) to other agents for resource allocation and such data are replicated on all the nodes in the network. Furthermore, the consensus requirements will bring a huge burden for the blockchain, which impacts the overall performance. To address these concerns, we propose a hybridized TEE-Blockchain system (system and auction mechanism co-design) to privately execute the divisible double auction. The designed hybridized system ensures privacy, honesty and high efficiency among distributed agents. The bid profiles are sealed for optimally allocating divisible resources while ensuring truthfulness with a Nash Equilibrium. Finally, we conduct experiments and empirical studies to validate the system and auction performance using two real-world applications.

Strategic Reasoning in Automated Mechanism Design

Mechanism Design aims at defining mechanisms that satisfy a predefined set of properties, and Auction Mechanisms are of foremost importance. Core properties of mechanisms, such as strategy-proofness or budget-balance, involve: (i) complex strategic concepts such as Nash equilibria, (ii) quantitative aspects such as utilities, and often (iii) imperfect information,with agents’ private valuations. We demonstrate that Strategy Logic provides a formal framework fit to model mechanisms, express such properties, and verify them. To do so, we consider a quantitative and epistemic variant of Strategy Logic. We first show how to express the implementation of social choice functions. Second, we show how fundamental mechanism properties can be expressed as logical formulas,and thus evaluated by model checking. Finally, we prove that model checking for this particular variant of Strategy Logic can be done in polynomial space.

Emerging Methods of Auction Design in Social Networks

In recent years, a new branch of auction models called diffusion auction has extended the traditional auction into social network scenarios. The diffusion auction models the auction as a networked market whose nodes are potential customers and whose edges are the relations between these customers. The diffusion auction mechanism can incentivize buyers to not only submit a truthful bid, but also further invite their surrounding neighbors to participate into the auction. It can convene more participants than traditional auction mechanisms, which leads to better optimizations of different key aspects, such as social welfare, seller’s revenue, amount of redistributed money and so on. The diffusion auctions have recently attracted a discrete interest in the algorithmic game theory and market design communities. This survey summarizes the current progress of diffusion auctions.