scholarly journals Philosophical Practice in the Light of the “War of the Sexes”

2021 ◽  
Vol 36 (1) ◽  
pp. 83-108
Author(s):  
Vesna Stanković Pejnović
Keyword(s):  
Philosophical Practice

Prema Nietzscheovu mišljenju, temeljni je problem između muškarca i žene duboko ukorijenjen u negiranju antagonizma među njima. Muškarac vjeruje da njihov odnos mora biti vječna neprijateljska napetost i neizbježna nepravda. Nietzsche tvrdi da mora postojati rangirajući poredak u kojem je skaliranje vezano za aktivnosti uzimanja, nakupljanja i postajanja boljim zadobivajući moć i nadilazeći uža tumačenja. Ovo rangiranje ne dopušta istovjetnost i ravnopravnost, što su znakovi plitkoće instinkta i gubitka identiteta. Nietzsche podržava različitost i slavi drugotnost. Uspijevanje pojedinca nikada ne može biti ometano pojmom jednakih odnosa. Nietzsche je uvjeren da su ljudi drugačiji i zagovara agon (borba moći) kao model kulturnih i političkih odnosa. Budući da se jednakost ljudskih bića mora sastojati od jednakog iznosa istog svojstva, Nietzsche tu jednakost vidi kao predstavljenu u općoj volji za moć. Nadalje, rodna je razlika također društveno konstruiran način bivanja. To je kreacija muške slike o tome kako bi svijet trebao izgledati. Ako se uključi u terapijski pristup, ova nam perspektiva može baciti novo svjetlo na moguće intervencijske metode u psihoterapiji i filoterapiji podjednako. Spol i spolni odnosi mogu biti izlučeni kao ključan problem koji prevladava u jezgri motivacije za traženje profesionalne terapijske pomoći (psihoterapija), bez obzira na to koji se terapijski pristup u takvoj praksi koristi. Tema je to koja nije dovoljno vukla iz Nietzscheove tradicije. Cilj je rada ponuditi argumente za to da se Nietzscheova perspektiva na »rat spolova« postavi kao produktivan kontekst za psihoterapijsku intervenciju i filozofijsko savjetovanje.

Will training and philosophical practice

2005 ◽  
Vol 1 (1) ◽  
pp. 23-32
Author(s):  
Michael Grosso
Keyword(s):  
Philosophical Practice

Intuitions

2016 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jonathan M. Weinberg
Keyword(s):  
Philosophical Methodology ◽  
Philosophical Practice ◽  
Sources Of Error ◽  
Key Aspects

This article examines the philosophical methodology of intuitions beginning with an argument developed by Max Deutsch and Herman Cappelen over the descriptive adequacy of what Cappelen calls “methodological rationalism”, and their own preferred view, “intuition nihilism”. Based on inadequacies in both accounts, it offers a descriptive take on intuition-deploying philosophical practice today via what it calls “Protean Crypto-Rationalism”. It then describes the epistemic profile of the appeal to intuition, listing four key aspects of the basic shape of intuition-deploying philosophical practice: primacy of cases, flexibility of report format, freedom of stipulation, and interpretation-hungry. It also considers several sources of error for intuitions featured in at least the informal methodological lore of philosophy, namely: misconstruals, modal confusions, pragmatics/semantics confusion, and “tin ear”. Finally, it explores the problem of methodological ignorance and inferential demand, particularly the typical practices of philosophical inference that operate on the premises delivered by appeal to intuitions.

scholarly journals Against a Sequestered Philosophy

Dialogue ◽  
2018 ◽  
Vol 57 (2) ◽  
pp. 443-464
Author(s):  
EYJA M. BRYNJARSDÓTTIR
Keyword(s):  
Analytic Philosophy ◽  
Western World ◽  
Contributing Factors ◽  
Philosophical Practice ◽  
Intellectual Humility ◽  
Philosophical Thought

This paper argues that philosophical practice in the Western world, in particular analytic philosophy, suffers from problems that contribute to its lack of diversity in two senses: the exclusion of women and minorities, and a narrow choice of subjects and methods. This is not fruitful for philosophical exchange and the flourishing of philosophical thought. Three contributing factors are covered: a flawed execution when instilling intellectual humility; the gaslighting of women in philosophy; and an overemphasis on a narrow conception of intelligence. The conclusion calls for a more humane and socially aware practice of philosophy.

On hating and despising legal philosophy

2021 ◽  
Vol 46 (1) ◽  
pp. 29-50
Author(s):  
Jesse Wall
Keyword(s):  
Subject Matter ◽  
Legal Theory ◽  
Critical Distance ◽  
Legal Philosophy ◽  
Philosophical Practice ◽  
Current Form ◽  
Philosophical Inquiry ◽  
Cry For Help ◽  
The Subject ◽  
Legal Theorist

This article is a cry for help. It is a search for some possible view of legal philosophy that does not render it either intrinsically useless or useless in its current form. In this article I focus on two methodological hallmarks of contemporary anglophone legal philosophy. The first is the Archimedean way in which the legal theorist places a critical distance between him- or herself and the subject matter of the philosophical inquiry. The second is the introverted way in which the accuracy of any given legal theory is confined to the theorist’s own puzzles, concerns, controversies, and preoccupations. Whilst I consider those who have turned against these methodological commitments and called for an anti-Archimedean or extroverted approach to legal theory, I explain how those who accept both commitments adopt a very modest view of the helpfulness of legal philosophy. I then consider whether, contrary to the modest view, if we accept both commitments, then whatever is true in legal philosophy will always be trivially true, irrelevant, or inconsequential, for any non-philosophical practice or non-philosophical inquiry about the law. The value of this article, I hope, lies in its refutation.

Against ‘Dissolute Mirth’

2021 ◽  
pp. 85-118
Author(s):  
Ross Carroll
Keyword(s):  
David Hume ◽  
The Self ◽  
Self Control ◽  
Philosophical Practice

This chapter turns to David Hume and to reactions to Shaftesbury's experiment in Scotland. To many of his early critics, it appeared that Hume had followed Shaftesbury in making ridicule central to his philosophical practice, particularly when it came to religion. Even today, several commentators agree that Hume either deliberately sought to provoke laughter in his readers or simply lacked the self-control necessary to keep his own derision hidden. The chapter complicates this picture by revealing Hume's ambivalence towards the Shaftesburian programme. If good humour was a virtue for Hume, it was one that could conceal worse vices. And while he indulged his taste for ridicule frequently, he also harboured Hobbesian doubts about its capacity to distort debate and sow discord.

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