scholarly journals A transsumptio e o uso de enigmas como "saída" para um discurso sobre o divino em De docta ignorantia (1440) de Nicolau de Cusa [The transsumptio and the use of puzzles as a "way out" for a discourse on divine in Nicholas of Cusa's De docta ignorantia (1440)]

2017 ◽  
Vol 24 (43) ◽  
pp. 43
Author(s):  
Klédson Tiago Alves de Souza ◽  
José Teixeira Neto

Este artigo traz traços de uma importante discussão dentro do contexto da filosofia de Nicolau de Cusa, a saber, a discussão sobre o conceito de transsumptio e o uso de enigmas como uma saída para um discurso acerca do princípio primeiro, isto é, Deus. O objetivo é mostrar como esta perspectiva enigmática ou simbólica aparece na filosofia cusana, especialmente nas três obras que se propõe a discutir este trabalho: De docta ignorantia (1440), De visione dei (1453) e De non aliud (1462).[This article brings out traces of an important discussion in the context of the philosophy of Nicholas of Cusa, i.e. the discussion about the concept of transsumptio and the use of puzzles as a way out for a discourse on the first principle, that is, God. The objective is to show how this enigmatic or symbolic perspective appears in the Cusan philosophy especially in the three works that this work proposes to discuss: De docta ignorantia (1440), De visione dei (1453) and De non aliud (1462).]

Author(s):  
Ursula Coope

The Neoplatonists have a perfectionist view of freedom: an entity is free to the extent that it succeeds in making itself good. Free entities are wholly in control of themselves: they are self-determining, self-constituting, and self-knowing. Neoplatonist philosophers argue that such freedom is only possible for nonbodily things. The human soul is free insofar as it rises above bodily things and engages in intellection, but when it turns its desires to bodily things, it is drawn under the sway of fate and becomes enslaved. This book discusses this notion of freedom, and its relation to questions about responsibility. It explains the important role of notions of self-reflexivity in Neoplatonist accounts of both freedom and responsibility. Part I sets out the puzzles Neoplatonist philosophers face about freedom and responsibility and explains how these puzzles arise from earlier discussions. Part II looks at the metaphysical underpinnings of the Neoplatonist notion of freedom (concentrating especially on the views of Plotinus and Proclus). In what sense (if any) is the ultimate first principle of everything (the One) free? If everything else is under this ultimate first principle, how can anything other than the One be free? What is the connection between freedom and nonbodiliness? Part III looks at questions about responsibility, arising from this perfectionist view of freedom. Why are human beings responsible for their behaviour, in a way that other animals are not? If we are enslaved when we act viciously, how can we be to blame for our vicious actions and choices?


Author(s):  
Richard Oosterhoff

Lefèvre described his own mathematical turn as a kind of conversion. This chapter explains what motivated his turn to mathematics, considering the place of mathematics in fifteenth-century Paris in relation to court politics and Lefèvre’s own connections to Italian humanists. But more importantly, Lefèvre’s attitude to learning and the propaedeutic value of mathematics drew on the context of late medieval spiritual reform, with its emphasis on conversion and care of the soul. In particular, Lefèvre’s turn to university reform seems to have responded to the works of Ramon Lull, alongside the devotio moderna and Nicholas of Cusa, which he printed in important collections. With such influences, Lefèvre chose the university as the site for intellectual reform.


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