Abstract
With 194 members, INTERPOL is the most influential actor in matters of transnational policing. Regrettably, the organisation is vulnerable against cases of misuse. Certain states manage to exploit the tools of the organisation, to persecute and track political dissidents or non-aligned members of the media outside their borders. As such, INTERPOL has become a prime example on how non-democratic countries can exert their influence and expand their reach well beyond their domestic jurisdictions via their participation in international organisations. Not wanting to allow the proliferation of criminal havens in certain regions, the organisation has opted to connect with and bring together as many police forces of different states as possible. Evidently, such connections are created with little or no consideration of the state of criminal justice systems and forms of government of the countries involved, as well as any subsequent risks. Such a complex state of affairs demands a thorough reflection on whether it is acceptable to compromise between the need for security and the rights of individuals and procedural justice. The issue has vast legal and practical ramifications, and it is ultimately a question pertaining to the realm of global constitutionalism. Does INTERPOL have the legal authority to be in charge of finding a balance between security and procedural justice? If so, on what legal basis, and to what extent?
Balancing International Police Cooperation: INTERPOL and the Undesirable Trade-off Between Rights of Individuals and Global Security
