The 2016 Presidential Election in the United States and the Resurgence of “American Nationalism” in Foreign Policy Decision-making

2016 ◽  
Vol 14 (2) ◽  
pp. 11-24
Author(s):  
James Seroka
2020 ◽  
Vol 7 (1) ◽  
pp. 144-175
Author(s):  
Wildan Ilmanuarif Shafar ◽  
Dian Mutmainah

Since 2015 the United States has been a signatory of the historic nuclear agreement with Iran known formally as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), which was also agreed by other P5+1 countries. JCPOA is the achievement of the U.S. and other P5+1 countries' negotiations with Iran regarding the limitation of Iran's nuclear program. JCPOA is also known to be the vital instrument to reduce Iran's capabilities regarding its aggressive behavior and malign activities, creating destabilization in the Middle East. However, in 2018 the United States government decided to withdraw its participation from the JCPOA. As we know, this decision had an impact on Iran's behavior, which several times violated the contents of the JCPOA agreement even though they did not leave the agreement. We are also witnessing the impact of this decision increase the conflict between the US and Iran in recent years. This research aims to explain the rationale of the U.S. decision to withdraw from the JCPOA nuclear agreement with Iran in 2018. This research using the foreign policy decision-making framework model by Charles W. Kegley and Gregory A. Raymond. This concept focuses on explaining factors of foreign policy decision-making in three sources of analysis and the process of foreign policy-making based on rational choice.


Geosul ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 35 (77) ◽  
pp. 258-269
Author(s):  
Maurício Santoro

Since 2009 China has been Brazil´s biggest trade partner, and its important ally. However, the nationalist right that won the 2018 elections has a critical perspective of the country. This paper maps the views on China held by the new Brazilian government, both in terms of the economic arguments (protectionism of industry, fear of Chinese control of infrastructure and natural resources) and political concerns (the desire for a diplomatic rapprochement with the United States and anti-communism hostility towards Beijing). The paper claims that these positions are important for foreign policy decision-making and that they complicate relations with China, but that is also necessary to take into account more moderate views from other groups in the administration.


1985 ◽  
Vol 15 (1) ◽  
pp. 117-123 ◽  
Author(s):  
Steve Smith

Irving Janis's work on groupthink has attracted considerable attention from those who seek to explain foreign-policy decision making. The basic argument – that excessiveesprit de corpsand amiability restrict the critical faculties of small decision-making groups, thereby leading to foreign-policy fiascos – is both an appealing and a stimulating one. In addition, it is also an argument that is capable of being tested against empirical evidence. Thus, Frank Heller has suggested that groupthink may be very useful in explaining British policy during the Falklands Crisis. The purpose of this note is to indicate the utility of the notion of groupthink in explaining one recent foreign-policy fiasco, the attempt by the United States to rescue its hostages in Tehran.


1980 ◽  
Vol 6 (3) ◽  
pp. 278-303 ◽  
Author(s):  
Naomi Black

It is now twenty years since Richard Snyder and two associates published a monograph presenting their “framework” for studying international relations as foreign policy decision-making. The basic assumptions of this approach have become an indispensable part of the study of international relations. No-one would now think of ignoring the important processes by which groups of leaders formulate and choose among policy alternatives. Yet the approach itself has been relegated to subsections of surveys of the field, or dismissive footnotes. Although James Rosenau's influential anthology, International Relations and Foreign Policy, still retains three “decision-making” selections in its most recent edition, Rosenau himself pronounced a respectful epitaph for this approach some years ago. Glenn Paige's initial, massive study of the United States' intervention in Korea has had no successors.


Author(s):  
Jessica D. Blankshain

The study of foreign policy decision-making seeks to understand how states formulate and enact foreign policy. It views foreign policy as a series of decisions made by particular actors using specific decision-making processes. The origins of this focus on decision-making are generally traced to the 1950s and 1960s, with the literature increasing in complexity and diversity of approaches in more recent decades. Foreign policy decision-making is situated within foreign policy analysis (a subfield of international relations subfield), which applies theories and methods from an array of disciplines—political science, public administration, economics, psychology, sociology—to understand how states make foreign policy, and how these policies translate into geopolitical outcomes. The literature on foreign policy decision-making is often subdivided based on assumptions about the process by which actors make foreign policy decisions—primarily falling into rational and nonrational decision-making; about who is assumed to make the decision—states, individuals, groups, or organizations; and about the influences believed to be most important in affecting those decisions—international factors, domestic political factors, interpersonal dynamics, etc. While much of the literature focuses on foreign policy decision-making in the United States, there have been attempts to apply models developed in the US context to other states, as well as to generate generalizable theories about foreign policy decision-making that apply to certain types of states.


Author(s):  
Akan Malici

Syria is in tatters. A brutal dictator, vicious terrorist groups, and a raging civil war have led to the death of hundreds of thousands and the displacement of millions. Given the ongoing Syrian conflict, President Barack Obama’s rather restrained foreign policy toward the Bashar al-Assad regime has been described as “feckless,” “flawed,” and “clueless.” In August 2012, however, President Obama issued a strong warning when he famously said the “red line” for the United States in terms of stepping up a military offensive would be if “we started seeing a whole bunch of chemical weapons moving around or being utilized.” Beginning in 2013, the Damascus regime did utilize chemical weapons against the Syrian people, perhaps most shockingly in August in the Ghouta suburbs of Damascus. Yet President Obama ultimately held back from intervening militarily, and his decision has since received strong and persistent criticism. After retiring from his post as secretary of defense, Robert Gates judged the president’s decision a “serious mistake.” It allowed the tragedy to continue and American credibility to be hurt. The president himself, however, disagreed. About the decision not to act militarily he said later: “I’m very proud of this moment.” He was convinced that the United States could not successfully affect the situation and that he had kept the country out of another quagmire. It is indeed the case that good decisions can avoid wars or win them while bad decisions can start wars or lose them, and these consequences are just one reason why the study of foreign policy mistakes is so important. Yet it can, of course, not be the case that an evaluation of foreign policy decisions is rendered to the subjective eyes of the beholder. Instead, what is needed is an objective framework by which to identify and analyze foreign policy mistakes. Foreign policy mistakes are procedural errors concerning the diagnostic or the prescriptive level of the foreign policy decision-making task. They can be mistakes of omission or commission and can occur in regard to a threat or to an opportunity. Of special importance is the question how foreign policy mistakes can be avoided. This question can be answered through a decision-making framework defined by (a) the level of information a leader can have about a foreign policy challenge and (b) the potential consequences of a decision. Because many, if not most, challenges with respect to questions of international security are “ill-defined,” the myopic strategy of disjointed incrementalism is ideal. It avoids mistakes by making reversible (disjointed) and relatively small (incremental) moves away from the status quo. In the case of Syria, President Obama followed a strategy of disjointed incrementalism. He could not rely on much certain or reliable information regarding the situation and correctly understood that a military engagement could have potentially very adverse consequences in terms of casualties and a general escalation of the situation. Contrary to often repeated judgments that his decision not to engage militarily was a mistake, it is the case that he indeed avoided a mistake.


2021 ◽  
pp. 106591292110138
Author(s):  
Jonathan W. Keller ◽  
Yi Edward Yang ◽  
Patrick James

Scholars of foreign policy decision-making have argued that international interactions ultimately are grounded in people acting singly or in groups. Unfortunately, data limitations prevent many of these crucial foreign policy decision-making theories from being rigorously tested and systematically compared with theories from alternative perspectives. A promising approach to remedying this deficiency is the addition of decision-making variables to existing, large- N data sets. In this study, we coded a series of foreign policy decision-making variables for all U.S. cases in the International Crisis Behavior (ICB) data set, and examined how these decision-making variables compared with structural factors in shaping crisis outcomes. The results reveal that when controlling for structural factors such as conflict setting and power discrepancy, foreign policy decision-making variables related to leaders’ traits, advisory structure, and the political context shaped the severity and centrality of violence employed by the United States. We conclude that including decision-making variables alongside structural variables will enhance the quality of data analysis in the areas of conflict studies and foreign policy analysis.


2020 ◽  
Vol 16 (4) ◽  
pp. 515-531 ◽  
Author(s):  
Tapio Raunio ◽  
Wolfgang Wagner

Abstract The positions of political parties in various foreign policy questions and how such ideological stances matter in foreign and security policy decision-making remain largely unexplored beyond the specific case of the United States. Reviewing the “state of the art” in foreign policy analysis and comparative politics, this introductory article discusses the changing nature of both international politics and party systems and cleavages in Europe and beyond. It puts forward reasons why we should see different patterns of coalitions and party behavior in security policy, on the one hand, and in international trade and foreign aid, on the other hand. The articles in this Special Issue have been deliberately chosen to capture different elements of “partyness,” from analyzing party positions to actual behavior by legislatures and governments to transnational party networks. Our main argument is that there are genuine ideological differences between political parties and that the impact of these competing ideologies is also discernible in foreign policy decision-making.


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