scholarly journals A GAME-THEORETIC APPROACH TO THE CHOICE OF UNION-OLIGOPOLY BARGAINING AGENDA

2018 ◽  
Vol 77 (305) ◽  
pp. 97
Author(s):  
Domenico Buccella ◽  
Luciano Fanti
Keyword(s):  
Mixed Duopoly ◽  
Limited Area ◽  
Theoretic Approach ◽  
Asymmetric Equilibria ◽  
Game Theoretic ◽  
Stage Game ◽  
Pure Strategies ◽  
Efficient Bargaining ◽  
Game Theoretic Approach ◽  
Selection Of

<p align="center"><strong>ABSTRACT</strong><strong></strong></p><p>This paper investigates the selection of the bargaining agenda in a unionized industry with decentralized negotiations for different competition modes. The firms choose the agenda (right-to-manage, RTM, <em>versus</em> efficient bargaining, EB), considering alternative timing of the bargaining game in the case of mixed duopoly. In fact, the EB (RTM) firm can be either Stackelberg wage follower (leader) or Stackelberg output leader (follower). A two-stage game is developed in which the typology as well as the timing of the negotiations is endogenous. It is shown that, in pure strategies, no equilibria arise for a wide set of the parameters’ space while RTM appears as the unique equilibrium agenda for a different combination of the parameters; moreover, multiple, asymmetric equilibria emerge in a limited area of the parameters’ space. These results are in sharp contrast to the received literature in which EB can arise as an industry bargaining institution in equilibrium.</p><p align="center"> </p><p align="center">UN ENFOQUE DE TEORÍA DE JUEGOS PARA LA SELECCIÓN DE LA AGENDA DE NEGOCIACIÓN DEL OLIGOPOLIO SINDICAL</p><p align="center"><strong> </strong><strong>RESUMEN</strong></p>Este artículo investiga la selección de la agenda de negociación en una industria sindicalizada con negociaciones descentralizadas para diferentes modos de competencia. Las empresas eligen la agenda (negociación con derecho de administrar, NDA, frente a negociación eficiente, NE) considerando casos alternativos de la sucesión de eventos en el juego de negociación con duopolio mixto. De hecho, la empresa NE (NDA) puede ser seguidora de salarios Stackelberg (líder) o líder de cantidades Stackelberg (seguidora). Se desarrolla un juego de dos etapas en el que la tipología y el momento de las negociaciones son endógenos. Se muestra que en estrategias puras no surgen equilibrios para un amplio conjunto del espacio de los parámetros, mientras que NDA aparece como la agenda de equilibrio única para una combinación diferente de los parámetros; además, los equilibrios múltiples y asimétricos emergen en un área limitada del espacio de los parámetros. Estos resultados contrastan con la literatura existente, en la que NE puede surgir como una institución de negociación de la industria en equilibrio.

scholarly journals Two-stage game-theoretic approach to supplier evaluation, selection and order assignment

2020 ◽  
Vol 0 (0) ◽  
pp. 0-0
Author(s):  
Jonas C.P. Yu ◽  
Hui Ming Wee ◽  
Schnell Jeng ◽  
Yosef Daryanto
Keyword(s):  
Supplier Evaluation ◽  
Theoretic Approach ◽  
Two Stage ◽  
Game Theoretic ◽  
Stage Game ◽  
Order Assignment ◽  
Game Theoretic Approach

scholarly journals On the Strategic Choice of Union-Oligopoly Bargaining Agenda: Further Results

2015 ◽  
Vol 2015 ◽  
pp. 1-7 ◽  
Author(s):  
Domenico Buccella ◽  
Luciano Fanti
Keyword(s):  
Market Competition ◽  
Strategic Choice ◽  
Complex Interaction ◽  
Mixed Duopoly ◽  
Potential Entrant ◽  
Asymmetric Equilibria ◽  
Nash Strategies ◽  
Stage 1 ◽  
Efficient Bargaining ◽  
Selection Of

This paper revisits the strategic selection of the bargaining agenda in a unionized industry with potential entry and decentralized negotiations for different competition modes. The incumbent chooses Right-to-Manage (RTM) or Efficient Bargaining (EB) considering two scenarios: (1) the agenda is imposed to the (potential) entrant (committed bargaining) and (2) the entrant can flexibly choose the agenda (flexible bargaining). In the mixed duopoly, the timing of the game is as follows: at stage 1, the EB firm bargains over wage and employment with its union, while the RTM firm bargains over the wage; at stage 2, the RTM firm chooses employment. This paper shows that the strategic selection of the agenda strongly depends on the interaction between the degree of market competition, the union’s power, and the convergence or divergence between parties on the agenda’s choice. This complex interaction leads to a very rich set of equilibrium outcomes, including multiple and even (as regards the union’s preferences on the agenda) asymmetric equilibria. Compared with alternative timings in the literature, this specification leads to substantial differences with flexible bargaining: EB emerges as equilibrium in Nash strategies for a noticeably increased set of cases.

A Dynamic Equilibrium Pricing Model: A Game Theoretic Approach to Modelling Conventions' Room Rates

1996 ◽  
Vol 2 (3) ◽  
pp. 251-263 ◽  
Author(s):  
Zvi Schwartz
Keyword(s):  
Dynamic Equilibrium ◽  
Relative Size ◽  
Theoretic Approach ◽  
Credible Commitment ◽  
Equilibrium Pricing ◽  
Strategic Behaviour ◽  
Price Optimization ◽  
Game Theoretic ◽  
Pure Strategies ◽  
Game Theoretic Approach

Utilizing the theoretical framework of game theory, this study provides an economic model to describe the process of determining a convention's room rates. It provides a method to infer simultaneously the room rate and the number of rooms allocated at each price level. This approach exploits information both on consumers' utilities and expectations, and on the hotel's perceptions of its markets. Equilibria in pure strategies are derived for various combinations of the market segments' relative size, supply demand ratios, and levels of willingness to pay. The study extends the existing literature on price optimization in hotels by including the customers as active participants in this strategic behaviour framework. The model demonstrates that the effectiveness of price optimization depends on the validity of the assumptions one makes about the segments' characteristics. The model identifies the market conditions under which yield management (allocation of rooms to room rates) maximizes the hotel's revenue. It shows the importance of a credible commitment by the hotel to maintain high room rates as time draws closer to the date of stay and shows how discounts can be used effectively to segment the market.

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