scholarly journals International Law and its Application: Biodiversity and International Obligations Derived from Natural Genetic Resources in Costa Rica

Author(s):  
Sergio Peña-Neira

La distribución de los beneficios derivados de la utilización de los recursos naturales genéticos es uno de los principales problemas abordados por el Convenio sobre la Diversidad Biológica, aun cuando la obligación de los Estados miembros a adoptar medidas legales, administrativas y de política con respecto a su aplicación a nivel nacional, porque todos los Estados miembros (países en desarrollo y desarrollados) deben cumplir con el principio pacta sunt servanda. El no respetar esta obligación de derecho internacional derivada de un tratado internacional resulta en una violación de las obligaciones internacionales. Es posible encontrar un ejemplo de tal aplicación. Este artículo se centra en la interpretación del artículo 15. 7 de la Convención sobre la Diversidad Biológica para aplicar esta obligación internacional a derechos y obligaciones legales internos, para cumplir con la obligación y el segundo paso, la aplicación de esta normativa legal nacional en el territorio de un Estado, Costa Rica.

2011 ◽  
Vol 60 (1) ◽  
pp. 125-165 ◽  
Author(s):  
Israel de Jesús Butler

AbstractThe continuous transfer of authority from the national sphere to inter-governmental organizations gives rise to an increasing risk that States may be mandated by their obligations under these organizations to take measures that are inconsistent with their obligations under International Human Rights Law. Drawing on the approaches of various international, regional and national jurisdictions, this article explores two possible models for restructuring International Law that could ensure that human rights obligations remain effective. The ‘international constitutional’ approach would ensure that human rights are enshrined within the ‘constitutional’ instruments of IGOs, preventing incompatible rules from emerging. The ‘parochial’ approach would ensure that human rights as protected at the national or regional level would take precedence over conflicting international obligations.


2020 ◽  
Vol 2020 (2020) ◽  
pp. 186-202
Author(s):  
Ion GÂLEA ◽  

The study examines possible defences that States could invoke in order to justify or excuse measures designed to respond to the COVID-19 crisis, which prima facie might not be in conformity with certain international obligations. The study examines only defences available in general international law – beside certain exceptions that might be provided by the clauses of the respective treaties. Two grounds for suspending international obligations, stemming from the law of treaties – impossibility of performance and rebus sic stantibus – and three circumstances precluding wrongfulness, stemming from the law of international responsibility – force majeure, distress and state of necessity – are subject to examination. The study argues that, even if “common sense” might draw the public opinion towards the plausibility of invoking force majeure, impossibility of performance or fundamental change of circumstances, such a conclusion does not reflect general international law. In reality, the “best candidate” as a justification or excuse is distress, while the “second best candidate” might be represented by the state of necessity.


Author(s):  
Chan Anayansy Rojas ◽  
París Mauricio

This chapter assesses Costa Rican perspectives on the Hague Principles. Costa Rica does not have a systematic and codified system that regulates conflicts of law, usually known in Costa Rica as private international law (PIL). Instead, the main sources of PIL in Costa Rica are: (i) international treaties; (ii) the Civil Code, the Code of Civil Procedures, and other domestic laws; and (iii) the Law on International Commercial Arbitration. In general, Costa Rica’s private international law regime, applicable to international commercial contracts, allows for parties to select the law of their choice as long as it does not breach public policy or harm a third party’s interest. According to Article 5 of the Organizational Law of the Judiciary, courts cannot excuse themselves from exercising their authority or from ruling in matters of their competence for lack of a rule to apply and they must do so in accordance with the written and unwritten rules. Unwritten rules refer to the general principles of law, usages and practices, and case law, according to the hierarchical order of their legal sources. Such rules serve to interpret, integrate, and delimit the field of application of law. Therefore, the local courts have limited themselves to only apply domestic law and have consequently restrained themselves from applying the Hague Principles or other soft law instruments as a persuasive authority source.


2020 ◽  
Vol 32 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-27
Author(s):  
Azadeh Dastyari ◽  
Daniel Ghezelbash

Abstract Austria and Italy have recently proposed that processing the protection claims of asylum seekers attempting to cross the Mediterranean should take place aboard government vessels at sea. Shipboard processing of asylum claims is not a novel idea. The policy has been used for many years by the governments of the United States and Australia. This article examines the relevant international law, as well as State practice and domestic jurisprudence in the United States and Australia, to explore whether shipboard processing complies with international refugee and human rights law. It concludes that, while it may be theoretically possible for shipboard processing to comply with international law, there are significant practical impediments to carrying out shipboard processing in a manner that is compliant with the international obligations of States. Current practices in the United States and Australia fall short of what is required. Nor is there any indication that the Austrian/Italian proposal would contain the required safeguards. It is argued that this is by design. The appeal of shipboard processing for governments is that it allows them to dispense with the safeguards that asylum seekers would be entitled to if processed on land. Best practice is for all persons interdicted or rescued at sea to be transferred to a location on land where they have access to effective status determination procedures and are protected from refoulement and unlawful detention.


2019 ◽  
Vol 30 (2) ◽  
pp. 391-414
Author(s):  
Miles Jackson

Abstract It is widely believed that international law imposes no general prohibition on instigation – no general prohibition on states inducing, inciting or procuring other states to breach their international obligations. The absence of a prohibition on instigation stands in contrast to the now entrenched prohibition on the provision of assistance to another state that facilitates an internationally wrongful act. In this article, I argue that the orthodox position on instigation is incorrect. I argue that a prohibition on instigation is founded on a general principle of law, as envisaged in Article 38(1)(c) of the Statute of the International Court of Justice, and that it would be appropriate to transpose that general principle to the international legal system. To sustain this argument, I first construct a representative set of domestic jurisdictions for comparative analysis. Second, through a brief comparative survey, I assess whether in each of these domestic jurisdictions it is wrongful, in one way or another, for an actor to instigate another to commit an act that it would be wrongful for it to do itself. And, third, I argue that the transposition of this principle from domestic law to international law is conceptually and normatively appropriate.


2019 ◽  
Vol 9 (1) ◽  
pp. 37-54 ◽  
Author(s):  
Anna-Julia Saiger

AbstractDomestic courts enjoy generous attention in international political and legal climate change literature. As a result of the reluctance of national governments to pursue climate protection measures, courts are called on to enforce international climate goals. This article assesses two domestic climate change cases (the Thabametsi Case and the Vienna Airport Case) in the light of Anthea Roberts’ functional understanding of the role of domestic courts in international law. It argues that domestic courts play a pivotal role in linking international obligations of conduct with national obligations of result. This role depends on domestic contexts and, therefore, requires a comparative approach.


2020 ◽  
Vol 33 (4) ◽  
pp. 933-951
Author(s):  
Maiko Meguro

AbstractLitigation has presented itself as a serious means to vindicate normative commitments about climate change by forcing governments to review their policy priorities. Today, the use of such litigation is not limited to the domestic arena. International law now provides the new principal avenue for such litigation. Two litigation strategies stand out: obligations strategy and rights strategy. Obligations strategy consists of bestowing an erga omnes character to existing obligations regarding the protection of the global environment, thereby providing standing for a non-injured party before international courts. Rights strategy, on the other hand, significantly increases in practice. It consists in the invocation, before national and international courts, of remedies for environmental damages through the legal categories of human rights law.This article sheds light on the potential and limits of these litigation strategies in international law. The argument builds on the specific evolution in the legal architecture of international obligations under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). The current structure of the UNFCCC now makes it substantially impossible to bring a claim against individual states regarding their specific measures against climate change. The article, by referring to the history of drafting which produced the specific structure, questions the ability of these litigation strategies to remedy the lack of international consensus and to accommodate the technical intricacy of how to turn normative commitments into actual action for climate change.


2017 ◽  
Vol 30 (2) ◽  
pp. 259-285 ◽  
Author(s):  
Thomas Bustamante

This paper replies to the criticisms raised by Eric Scarffe and Thomas Christiano against Dworkin’s philosophy of international law. While the former argues that Dworkin’s philosophy of international law boils down into some form of political realism, the latter upholds that Dworkin’s attempt to ground the legitimacy of international law on the states’ duty to improve their own legitimacy is insufficient to establish a solid foundation for international obligations. In my response to these critics, I hold that they are based on an uncharitable and implausible reading of Dworkin’s theory of international law, since Dworkin’s theses about the law, whether we are considering “municipal” or “international” law, only make sense if they are understood in an interpretive way. This is, I submit, the only way to avoid turning Dworkin’s assumption of the “unity of value” into an implausible metaphysical theory of natural law. Once we adopt Dworkin’s interpretive attitude, it becomes clear that the route taken by Dworkin in “A New Philosophy for International Law” was the only route that remained available for his interpretive account of political legitimacy and the foundations of law.


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