Some arguments that the mental logic theory needs to clarify to continue being an alternative to the mental models theory

Undoubtedly, the mental models theory has become an important theory in cognitive science. This theory can predict and explain most of the experimental results that the literature of that field shows. This fact can lead one to think that human mental processes are essentially semantic and that the syntactic approaches can no longer be held. In this way, in this paper, I try to analyze a framework based on formal rules, the mental logic theory, which also seems consistent with the experimental results, and review some of the reasons that its proponents often give in order to prove that it is worth continuing to consider it as an explicative alternative to the mental models theory. However, I show that such reasons can be questioned from the mental models theory and that, therefore, they need to be explained in a clearer way.

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Pseudo-conditionals and causal assertibles in Stoic logic

Principia an international journal of epistemology ◽

10.5007/808-1711.2016v20n3p417 ◽

2017 ◽

Vol 20 (3) ◽

pp. 417

Author(s):

Miguel López-Astorga

Keyword(s):

Cognitive Science ◽

Mental Models ◽

Semantic Analysis ◽

Methodological Tool ◽

Conditional Perfection ◽

Stoic Logic ◽

Mental Models Theory

http://dx.doi.org/ 10.5007/1808-1711.2016v20n3p417The Stoics not only analyzed sentences showing to be clear conditionals. They also reviewed other kinds of sentences related to the conditional that are not exactly conditionals, for example, the pseudo-conditionals and the causal assertibles. In this paper, I try to argue that the Stoic account of such sentences reveals that certain problematic issues that contemporary cognitive science is concerned with, such as the ways the conditionals can be expressed or the pragmatic phenomenon of the conditional perfection, were already studied by the Stoics, and that they even gave their solutions to those problems. To do that, I resort to the semantic analysis of models usually made by the mental models theory, and use it as a methodological tool.

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The Problems of the Mental Logic with the Double Negation: The Necessity of a Semantic Approach

Studies in Logic, Grammar and Rhetoric ◽

10.1515/slgr-2016-0037 ◽

2016 ◽

Vol 46 (1) ◽

pp. 143-153

Author(s):

Miguel López-Astorga

Keyword(s):

Mental Models ◽

Human Mind ◽

Human Reasoning ◽

Double Negation ◽

Semantic Approach ◽

Cognitive Theories ◽

Ancient Times ◽

Syntactic Theories ◽

Mental Logic ◽

Mental Models Theory

Abstract The double negation has always been considered by the logical systems from ancient times to the present. In fact, that is an issue that the current syntactic theories studying human reasoning, for example, the mental logic theory, address today. However, in this paper, I claim that, in the case of some languages such as Spanish, the double negation causes problems for the cognitive theories mainly based on formal schemata and supporting the idea of a universal syntax of thought in the human mind. Thus, I propose that, given those problems, semantic frameworks such as that of the mental models theory seem to be more appropriate for explaining the human inferential activity.

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Mental Logic and the Denials of Conjunctions and Disjunctions

Trans/Form/Ação ◽

10.1590/s0101-31732016000100007 ◽

2016 ◽

Vol 39 (1) ◽

pp. 119-138 ◽

Cited By ~ 1

Author(s):

Miguel López-Astorga

Keyword(s):

Mental Models ◽

Mental Logic ◽

Mental Models Theory

ABSTRACT: The mental models theory predicts that, while conjunctions are easier than disjunctions for individuals, when denied, conjunctions are harder than disjunctions. Khemlani, Orenes, and Johnson-Laird proved that this prediction is correct in their work of 2014. In this paper, I analyze their results in order to check whether or not they really affect the mental logic theory. My conclusion is that, although Khemlani et al.'s study provides important findings, such findings do not necessarily lead to questioning or to rejecting the mental logic theory.

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There Can be a Syntax of Thought Related to Logical Forms

Mediterranean Journal of Social Sciences ◽

10.5901/mjss.2017.v8n1p270 ◽

2017 ◽

Vol 8 (1) ◽

pp. 270-278

Author(s):

Miguel López-Astorga

Keyword(s):

Cognitive Science ◽

Mental Models ◽

Human Mind ◽

Axiomatic System ◽

Science Literature ◽

Basic Framework ◽

The Way ◽

Mental Models Theory

Abstract Nowadays, a very important theory, the mental models theory, is demonstrating that it is able to explain most of the results in reasoning experiments reported by the cognitive science literature. However, this has a consequence. The mental models theory is mainly focused on content and meaning, and its theses can lead to reject the idea that syntax plays a role in the human mind and that reasoning is logical. But, in this paper, I try to show that it is possible to accept the basic framework of the mental models theory and, at the same time, to continue to claim that there are syntactic and formal logical processes coherent with the way our mind works. To do that, I argue that, even accepting that the mental models theory describes correctly the processes why certain combinations of possibilities are detected, it can be stated that the relationships between such combinations indicated by the theory are consistent with, for example, the modal axiomatic system K.

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Analytic Sentences, Cognition, and Language: Some Links between Current Theories

Studies About Languages ◽

10.5755/j01.sal.0.35.23516 ◽

2019 ◽

pp. 61-69

Author(s):

Miguel López-Astorga

Keyword(s):

Mental Models ◽

Probability Logic ◽

Mental Logic ◽

The Way ◽

Mental Models Theory

This paper tries to explore possible relations and differences between three kinds of contemporary theories about cognition and language: the approaches supporting the idea that there is a mental logic, the mental models theory, and the frameworks based upon probability logic. That exploration is made here by means of the analytic sentences and the revision of the way each of those types of theories can deal with them. The conclusions seem to show that the three kinds of theories address such sentences in a similar manner, which can mean that there can be more links between them than thought.

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Against Philo’s interpretation of conditional. The case of Aristotle´s thesis

Agora papeles de Filosofía ◽

10.15304/ag.35.2.2542 ◽

2016 ◽

Vol 35 (2) ◽

Author(s):

Miguel López-Astorga

Keyword(s):

Mental Models ◽

Propositional Variable ◽

Conditional Perfection ◽

Mental Logic ◽

Mental Models Theory

There is an Aristotelian thesis that can be considered controversial. That is the thesis related to a denied conditional with only one propositional variable and in which, in addition, one of its clauses is also denied. While the thesis is not a tautology, people tend to accept it as true. Pfeifer’s approach can account for this fact. However, I try to show that this problem can also be explained from other alternative frameworks, in particular, from that of the mental models theory, that of López-Astorga based on the pragmatic phenomenon of conditional perfection, and that of the mental logic theory. Likewise, I indicate the difficulties regarding Aristotle’s thesis of the mental models theory and López-Astorga’s proposal, and conclude that the account of the mental logic theory is the strongest alternative to Pfeifer’s explanation and that what is clearly obvious is that conditional should not be materially interpreted.http://dx.doi.org/10.15304/ag.35.2.2542

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