Anticipatory Breach of Contract as Excuse for Non-Performance

1901 ◽  
Vol 15 (4) ◽  
pp. 306
Author(s):  
Ewan McKendrick

This chapter begins with a definition of ‘breach of contract’ and then outlines the circumstances in which a breach of contract gives to the innocent party a right to terminate further performance of the contract. These include breach of a condition and breach of an intermediate term where the consequences of the breach are sufficiently serious. The chapter also considers the problems that can arise in deciding the status of a term which has not been classified by the parties as a condition, a warranty, or an intermediate term. It examines termination clauses and the significance attached to the good faith of the party who is alleged to have repudiated the contract. The chapter includes a brief comparison of English law with the Vienna Convention and with the Principles of European Contract Law, and also addresses the question of whether an innocent party is obligated to exercise its right to terminate further performance of the contract, and considers the loss of the right to terminate. It concludes with a discussion of the law of anticipatory breach of contract.


2021 ◽  
pp. 392-400
Author(s):  
Paul S. Davies

This chapter examines the doctrine of anticipatory breach, which occurs where, before the time comes for A to perform their part of the contract, A declares that A is not going to do so. This repudiation of the contractual obligation is itself a breach of contract. The innocent party may choose to either accept or reject an anticipatory breach. If they accept, the contract is terminated and the innocent party can sue for damages immediately. If the anticipatory breach is rejected, then the contract remains on foot. If the innocent party elects not to accept the breach and to keep the contract alive, then they may proceed to perform their side of the bargain and sue for the contract price. However, it appears that this action for the agreed sum, or action in debt, may not succeed if the innocent party had no ‘legitimate interest’ in taking such steps.


1981 ◽  
Vol 40 (1) ◽  
pp. 83-107
Author(s):  
Francis Dawson

Law students soon learn that the law of anticipatory breach of contract is difficult. Foaled from dubious antecedents, it has been the subject of continuous academic criticism. The main theoretical objections to the doctrine are well known. How is one to explain how a promise can be broken before the time for its performance has arrived? And why should the question whether a repudiation amounts to a breach turn on the conduct or assent of the innocent party?


2007 ◽  
Vol 66 (3) ◽  
pp. 574-604
Author(s):  
Qiao Liu

The doctrine of anticipatory breach was officially first established in a famous 1853 case, enabling a party to a contract to terminate it and sue for damages immediately after the other party refused to fulfil its part, despite the fact that the time stipulated for the latter's performance had not arrived. The doctrine has since been employed by counsel as a vehicle to justify a premature termination of contract in numerous legal battles. It was perhaps with the confidence in such vast general judicial experience that Lord Wilberforce once declared that the rules determining the existence of an anticipatory breach constituted “one of the more perspicuous branches of the law of contract”. With due respect, however, his Lordship seemed to be too optimistic on that occasion. When one takes a closer look at decided cases, it is hard to resist the conclusion that this area of law is still plagued with inconsistency, uncertainty and incoherence. Where the existence of an anticipatory breach of contract is in dispute, the courts have been applying two distinct approaches to fact patterns of the same nature. A major cause for this disparity is the courts' failure to realise in some cases that the cases they are dealing with are anticipatory breach cases and should be subjected to a uniform test. This cognitive failure is largely attributable to the fact that, although the term “anticipatory breach” itself was criticised on several occasions, little has been done to illuminate the very nature of an anticipatory breach of contract and what distinguishes it from what we normally conceive of as a breach of contract, namely an “actual breach” of contract. Another cause of the disparity of the courts' approaches is perhaps English law's case-to-case, piecemeal methodology. Pragmatic though this methodology may be, it is sometimes necessary to amass the fragmented pieces and fit them into a clear and stable conceptual structure, thereby bringing the law to a higher level of generalisation. It is the purpose of this article to propose a general legal test for all types of anticipatory breach on the basis of an exposition of its nature and hopefully to bring order, rationality and unity to this chaotic area of law.


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