New Technologies and the Public Interest

Leonardo ◽  
1996 ◽  
Vol 29 (3) ◽  
pp. 248
Author(s):  
Ernest L. Boyer
Author(s):  
Jonathan M. Barnett

For more than a decade, U.S. courts, legislators, and antitrust regulators have sought to weaken IP protections in technology markets. An organizational approach to IP analysis raises doubts about whether this policy trajectory is consistent with the public interest in supporting both the innovation and the implementation of new technologies. The economics, history, and politics of the U.S. patent system support the view that weak-IP regimes induce an organizational bias by favoring firms that operate under integrated and platform-based business models for monetizing R&D, which raises an implicit barrier to entry by smaller R&D-specialized entities that rely on patents to enter into contractual transactions to execute the commercialization functions required to reach market. Weakening IP protections can protect large incumbents against the competitive threat posed by smaller entrants that often produce the most dramatic forms of technological innovation.


Author(s):  
Zahra Meghani

AbstractThis paper argues that regulatory agencies have a responsibility to further the public interest when they determine the conditions under which new technological products may be commercialized. As a case study, this paper analyzes the US 9th Circuit Court’s ruling on the efforts of the US Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to regulate an herbicide meant for use with seed that are genetically modified to be tolerant of the chemical. Using that case, it is argued that when regulatory agencies evaluate new technological products, they have an obligation to draw on data, analyses, and evaluations from a variety of credible epistemic sources, and not rely solely or even primarily on the technology developer. Otherwise, they create conditions for their own domination and that of the polity by the technology developer. Moreover, in the interest of advancing the public interest, regulatory agencies must evaluate new technologies in a substantively and procedurally unbiased manner.


2020 ◽  
Vol 11 (2) ◽  
pp. 115-132 ◽  
Author(s):  
Justin Schlosberg ◽  
Des Freedman

This article sets out the emergent challenges and opportunities for developing effective and ‘future proof’ policy for regulating media plurality. This analysis is carried out against the backdrop of UK authorities’ 2018 public interest test of the proposed merger between 21st Century Fox and Sky, and the latest data on the UK media ownership landscape. That merger review established important precedents for plurality reform, particularly in its acknowledgement that digital intermediaries are not an inherently pluralizing force and that regulatory intervention is needed to prevent concentrations of agenda power, especially at the level of wholesale newsgathering. The article goes on to critically examine the existing regulatory approach to considerations of whether media mergers are in the public interest, especially in the light of mounting evidence of intensifying consolidation within and across news platforms. This article argues that effective plurality reform must start with new legislation that sets out indicative thresholds and detailed guidance on the meaning of plurality sufficiency. This will enable a proper assessment of plurality outside merger activity and could serve as the basis for periodic reviews, enabling regulators to respond effectively to the challenge of new technologies and dynamic market conditions. We also address problems in the plurality measurement framework developed by Ofcom, namely, the inclusion of digital intermediaries as news ‘sources’ in data collection and analysis. In light of findings from the Fox/Sky merger review, a more effective approach would be to reallocate consumption attributed to major intermediaries based on analysis of the actual news sources consumed via those platforms. Far from privileging intermediaries, this approach will provide a more robust basis on which to bring them into the fold of plurality regulation, namely, through the development of plurality standards for algorithm governance. Such an approach also reflects a new reality in which the interplay of gatekeeping and agenda power between traditional media and intermediaries is not a zero-sum game, amidst growing evidence that major intermediaries are serving to consolidate rather than diversify the news offer in favour of incumbent and mostly legacy publishers.


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