scholarly journals A Note on Group Strategy-Proof Decision Schemes

Econometrica ◽  
1979 ◽  
Vol 47 (3) ◽  
pp. 637 ◽  
Author(s):  
Salvador Barbera
Keyword(s):  
Group Strategy ◽  
Strategy Proof

Strategy‐proof and group strategy‐proof stable mechanisms: An equivalence

2019 ◽  
Vol 16 (3) ◽  
pp. 349-354 ◽  
Author(s):  
Antonio Romero‐Medina ◽  
Matteo Triossi
Keyword(s):  
Group Strategy ◽  
Strategy Proof

scholarly journals On group strategy-proof mechanisms for a many-to-one matching model

2004 ◽  
Vol 33 (1) ◽  
pp. 115-128 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ruth Martínez ◽  
Jordi Massó ◽  
Alejdanro Neme ◽  
Jorge Oviedo
Keyword(s):  
Matching Model ◽  
Group Strategy ◽  
Strategy Proof

scholarly journals Two-sided strategy-proofness in many-to-many matching markets

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Antonio Romero-Medina ◽  
Matteo Triossi
Keyword(s):  
Minimal Condition ◽  
Matching Markets ◽  
Stable Matchings ◽  
Group Strategy ◽  
Proof Rule ◽  
Stable Mechanism ◽  
Strategy Proof ◽  
Strategy Proofness

Abstract We study the existence of group strategy-proof stable rules in many-to-many matching markets under responsiveness of agents’ preferences. We show that when firms have acyclical preferences over workers the set of stable matchings is a singleton, and the worker-optimal stable mechanism is a stable and group strategy-proof rule for firms and workers. Furthermore, acyclicity is the minimal condition guaranteeing the existence of stable and strategy-proof mechanisms in many-to-many matching markets.

Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document