Constitutional Law in 1927–1928: The Constitutional Decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States in the October Term, 1927

1929 ◽  
Vol 23 (1) ◽  
pp. 78-101 ◽  
Author(s):  
Robert E. Cushman
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Supreme Court ◽  
Common Sense ◽  
Democratic Party ◽  
Separation Of Powers ◽  
The United States ◽  
Legislative Power ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
Constitutional Decisions ◽  
The Cost

A protective tariff is constitutional. While most of us—Democratic party platforms to the contrary notwithstanding—had suspected that this was true, the Supreme Court, curiously enough, never passed on the question until its decision in Hampton v. United States. In that case the plaintiffs attacked the validity of the Tariff Act of 1922 on two grounds. In the first place, the so-called flexible tariff provision embodied in Section 315 was alleged to authorize an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power to the President. That section provides, in substance, that when the President, upon investigation, finds that differences in the cost of production here and abroad of articles produced in this country are not equalized by the tariff duties fixed by the act, he shall thereupon fix such new rates as will equalize these differences. The Court had no difficulty in rejecting this contention under the authority of Field v. Clark, in which the reciprocity sections of the Tariff Act of 1890 were sustained. Chief Justice Taft, speaking for a unanimous Court, reviews the general theory of the separation of powers and the doctrine that legislative power may not be delegated. He emphasizes, however, that each department may properly call upon the others for assistance “so far as the action invoked shall not be an assumption of the constitutional field of action of another branch.” The scope and character of this assistance, furthermore, “must be fixed according to common sense and the inherent necessities of the governmental coördination.”

Constitutional Law in 1936–37: The Constitutional Decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States in the October Term, 1936

1938 ◽  
Vol 32 (2) ◽  
pp. 278-310 ◽  
Author(s):  
Robert E. Cushman
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Supreme Court ◽  
Minimum Wage ◽  
New Deal ◽  
Constitutional Law ◽  
Political History ◽  
The United States ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
Constitutional Decisions

The 1936 term of the Supreme Court will probably be rated a notable one. This is due both to the Court's own work, and to certain extraneous occurrences which could hardly fail to have some impact upon it. In any attempt to evaluate the work of this term, one should bear in mind the following facts: First, a month after the Court convened President Roosevelt was reëlected by one of the most impressive popular and electoral majorities in our political history. Second, in February the President submitted to Congress his proposal for the reorganization of the Supreme Court, including the enlargement of its membership by the addition, up to fifteen, of a new justice for every one remaining on the Court beyond the age of seventy. This proposal aroused violent opposition, the debates on it continued for many months, and ultimately the plan was defeated largely through the efforts of the President's own party. The discussions on this proposal were going on during much of the time in which the Court was sitting. Third, in every case in which New Deal laws were attacked, they were held valid. These results were accomplished in many instances by five-to-four margins, and in the Minimum Wage Case by a five-to-four reversal of a previous five-to-three decision.

Constitutional Law in 1947–48: The Constitutional Decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States in the October Term, 1947

1949 ◽  
Vol 43 (2) ◽  
pp. 275-308
Author(s):  
David Fellman
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Supreme Court ◽  
Constitutional Law ◽  
The United States ◽  
Chief Justice ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
Constitutional Decisions

There were no changes in the personnel of the Court during the 1947 term. The former Chief Justice, Charles Evans Hughes, Avho had retired from the Court on July 1, 1941, died on August 27, 1948. Justice Hughes had served on the Court from May 2, 1910, to June 10, 1916, and was appointed Chief Justice on February 13,1930, succeeding William Howard Taft. In characteristic fashion, the justices filed during the 1947 term a very large number of dissenting and concurring opinions liberally salted with spirited and often bitter judicial invective.

Constitutional Law in 1937–1938: The Constitutional Decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States in the October Term, 1937

1939 ◽  
Vol 33 (2) ◽  
pp. 234-266
Author(s):  
Robert E. Cushman
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Supreme Court ◽  
Constitutional Law ◽  
The United States ◽  
Substantial Part ◽  
Public Comment ◽  
Solicitor General ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
Prior Service ◽  
Constitutional Decisions

During the 1937 term, the Supreme Court underwent the first changes in its personnel since Mr. Justice Cardozo succeeded Mr. Justice Holmes in March, 1932. On June 1, 1937, Mr. Justice Van Devanter retired and was succeeded at the opening of the new term in October by Mr. Justice Black. On January 18, 1938, Mr. Justice Sutherland retired and was succeeded on January 31 by Mr. Justice Reed. During a substantial part of the term, Mr. Justice Cardozo was absent on account of illness, and his death occurred July 9, 1938. Mr. Justice Black, whose appointment had attracted much public comment, threw himself into the work of the Court with unusual vigor. During the term, he wrote the opinion of the Court in fifteen cases. He dissented in fourteen cases, in nine of which he wrote dissenting opinions. He concurred without substantial opinion in eleven cases, and wrote a concurring opinion in one other case. Mr. Justice Reed participated less actively, first because of the lateness of his appointment, and second because his prior service as Solicitor-General of the United States disqualified him from sitting in a considerable number of cases. These changes in the membership of the Court have altered the almost even division on the bench between the so-called conservatives and the so-called liberals. Without attempting to speculate as to the course of future decisions, it is significant that the irreconcilably conservative block of justices, consisting of Justices Van Devanter, Sutherland, McReynolds, and Butler, has been broken up.

Constitutional Law in 1944–45: The Constitutional Decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States in the October Term, 1944

1946 ◽  
Vol 40 (2) ◽  
pp. 231-255
Author(s):  
Robert E. Cushman
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Supreme Court ◽  
Constitutional Law ◽  
The United States ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
Constitutional Decisions

The membership of the Supreme Court did not change during the 1944 term, but Mr. Justice Roberts resigned in July after the term had ended. Divisions in the Court were as numerous and as difficult to classify as before. Four justices dissented in twenty-seven cases, while three justices dissented in sixteen cases. The Court seems to be moving toward the old practice of the pre-Marshall period by which the justices wrote seriatim opinions. There is a depressing increase in the number of cases in which three, four, and even five justices feel impelled to write separate opinions.

Constitutional Law in 1938–1939: The Constitutional Decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States in the October Term, 1938

1940 ◽  
Vol 34 (2) ◽  
pp. 249-283 ◽  
Author(s):  
Robert E. Cushman
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Supreme Court ◽  
Constitutional Law ◽  
Recent Trend ◽  
The United States ◽  
Present Survey ◽  
Judicial Decisions ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
Constitutional Decisions ◽  
Constitutional System

The 1938 term of the Supreme Court brought substantial changes in its personnel. Mr. Justice Cardozo died on January 9, 1938. He was succeeded by Mr. Justice Frankfurter, who took office on January 30, 1939. On February 13, 1939, Mr. Justice Brandeis retired, and on April 17 Mr. Justice Douglas was appointed to fill his place. By the end of the term, therefore, four justices appointed by President Roosevelt had taken office. It is too early to appraise the results of these appointments upon the decisions and doctrines of the Court. One statement may be made, however, which throws some light upon the recent trend of judicial decisions. In preparing the present survey of the Court's decisions, some sixty cases were examined, all but one or two of them turning upon constitutional issues. In these sixty-odd cases, Mr. Justice McReynolds and Mr. Justice Butler, the two remaining members of the conservative “old guard,” dissented together twenty-five times. In several instances they were joined in dissent by Mr. Justice Roberts, and once or twice by the Chief Justice. In the main, however, they stood alone against a compact majority of six or seven justices. With the death of Mr. Justice Butler in the fall of 1939, Mr. Justice McReynolds stands like the boy on the burning deck amidst what obviously appears to him to be the imminent destruction of the old constitutional system.

Constitutional Law in 1941–1942: The Constitutional Decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States in the October Term, 1941

1943 ◽  
Vol 37 (2) ◽  
pp. 263-289
Author(s):  
Robert E. Cushman
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
New York ◽  
South Carolina ◽  
Supreme Court ◽  
Constitutional Law ◽  
Attorney General ◽  
The United States ◽  
Chief Justice ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
Constitutional Decisions

The vacancies on the Supreme Court caused by the retirement of Mr. Justice McReynolds and Chief Justice Hughes were filled by President Roosevelt during the summer of 1941. When the Court convened in October, Mr. Justice Stone, originally appointed by President Coolidge, became Chief Justice. Chief Justice White was the only other associate justice to be promoted to the Chief Justiceship. Senator James F. Byrnes of South Carolina, and Attorney General Robert H. Jackson of New York took their seats as associate justices. Thus seven justices have been placed on the Court by President Roosevelt. Any idea, however, that these Roosevelt appointees conform to any uniform pattern of thought is belied by the fact that in the 75 cases in the 1941 term turning on important questions of either constitutional law or federal statutory construction, there were dissents in 36, and 23 of these dissents were by either three or four justices. No act of Congress has been declared unconstitutional since May, 1936, when the Municipal Bankruptcy Act was held invalid. Since 1937, the Court has overruled 20 previous decisions, mentioning them by name, while it has modified or qualified a number of others.

Constitutional Law in 1939–1940: The Constitutional Decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States in the October Term, 1939

1941 ◽  
Vol 35 (2) ◽  
pp. 250-283
Author(s):  
Robert E. Cushman
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Supreme Court ◽  
Constitutional Law ◽  
Attorney General ◽  
The United States ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
Younger Men ◽  
Constitutional Decisions ◽  
To Come

During the 1939 term, President Roosevelt made his fifth appointment to the Supreme Court. Mr. Justice Butler died on November 16, 1939. Attorney-General Frank Murphy was appointed to this vacancy and took his seat on February 5, 1940. Presidents Lincoln and Taft also appointed five members of the Court; only President Washington and President Jackson appointed more than five. By his policy of choosing younger men, President Roosevelt reduced the average age of the members of the Court from seventy-two to sixty-one in less than three years. This change is important because it brings to the work of the Court younger and more vigorous men; it is also important because it extends the President's influence, through his appointment of justices, over a much longer period of time. It seems probable that we shall have a “Roosevelt Court” for many years to come.

Constitutional Law in 1924–1925: The Constitutional Decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States in the October Term, 1924

1926 ◽  
Vol 20 (1) ◽  
pp. 80-106
Author(s):  
Robert E. Cushman
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Supreme Court ◽  
Motor Vehicle ◽  
The United States ◽  
Motor Vehicle Theft ◽  
National Authority ◽  
Commerce Clause ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
Constitutional Decisions ◽  
Foreign Commerce

The decisions arising under the commerce clause of the Constitution during the 1924 term of the Supreme Court did not involve any striking extension of national authority in that field. There was no case approaching in significance the Recapture Clause Case decided in the previous term. However, the reinforcement of a familiar principle through a striking application of it, or the lucid and pungent expression of an old doctrine, lends some significance to several cases which otherwise have no far-reaching importance.In the case of Brooks v. United States the court sustained the constitutionality of the National Motor Vehicle Theft Act of 1919. The act subjected to heavy penalties any one who transported or caused to be transported in interstate or foreign commerce any motor vehicle, knowing it to have been stolen, and any one who, with the same guilty knowledge, “shall receive, conceal, store, barter, sell, or dispose of any motor vehicle, moving as, or which is a part of, or which constitutes interstate or foreign commerce.” It is certainly no surprise to learn from the opinion of Chief Justice Taft that the power to regulate commerce which is broad enough to enable Congress to bar from interstate transportation lottery tickets, diseased cattle, adulterated food, prize-fight films, and the like, and to penalize the interstate transportation of women for immoral purposes, is a power which can likewise be used to punish those who abuse the privileges of interstate and foreign commerce by using them in the furtherance of larceny or the disposal of stolen goods.

Constitutional Law in 1917–1918. I: The Constitutional Decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States in the October Term, 1917

1919 ◽  
Vol 13 (1) ◽  
pp. 47-77
Author(s):  
Thomas Reed Powell
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Supreme Court ◽  
Child Labor ◽  
Constitutional Law ◽  
Labor Law ◽  
The United States ◽  
Majority Opinion ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
Constitutional Decisions ◽  
Foreign Commerce

The federal Child Labor Law was declared unconstitutional in Hammer v. Dagenhart by a vote of five to four. It forbade the transportation in interstate or foreign commerce of the product of any mine or quarry “in which within thirty days prior to the time of the removal of such product therefrom children under the age of sixteen years have been employed or permitted to work,” with similar prohibitions covering the products of mills and factories in which children under fourteen were employed or children under sixteen were employed more than eight hours a day. The majority opinion misinterpreted the statute and assumed that it permitted goods “to be freely shipped after thirty days from the time of their removal from the factory,” whereas it permitted only the shipment of stock on hand thirty days after children had ceased to be employed. The law was so framed as to avoid the necessity of proof that children coöperated in the making of specific articles produced in a factory in which children were employed, and yet to remove any ban on shipment from an establishment which for thirty days had employed only adult labor.

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