An Investigation of the Executive Agencies of the United States Government

1939 ◽  
Vol 33 (1) ◽  
pp. 60-66
Author(s):  
Lloyd M. Short

The preliminary report of the select committee of the United States Senate appointed to investigate the executive agencies of the government with a view to coordination, under authority of Senate Resolution 217, 74th Congress, passed February 24, 1936, was presented to the Senate by Senator Harry F. Byrd, chairman, on August 16, 1937. Except for a brief introduction by Senator Byrd, in which he states that his committee has reached no final conclusions and that it expects to continue its investigations, the document is given over entirely to the report prepared for the committee by the Brookings Institution. Dr. Moulton, president of the Institution, explains in a letter of transmittal the contractual arrangements under which the report was prepared and lists the staff members, regular and special, who participated in its preparation.

Slavic Review ◽  
1969 ◽  
Vol 28 (2) ◽  
pp. 276-288 ◽  
Author(s):  
Benjamin M. Weissman

In March 1921 Lenin predicted, “If there is a harvest, everybody will hunger a little and the government will be saved. Otherwise, since we cannot take anything from people who do not have the means to satisfy their own hunger, the government will perish.“ By early summer, Russia was in the grip of one of the worst famines in its history. Lenin's gloomy forecast, however, was never put to the test. At almost the last moment, substantial help in the form of food, clothing, and medical supplies arrived from a most unexpected source —U.S. Secretary of Commerce Herbert Hoover.Hoover undertook the relief of Soviet Russia not as an official representative of the United States government but as the head of a private agency —the American Relief Administration (A.R.A.).


Author(s):  
Christian Leuprecht

This chapter reviews the member organizations of the United States Intelligence Community, the strategic environment that has informed intelligence and accountability in the United States, including scandals as a key driver of innovation, and the current and future threat environment as seen by the United States. The chapter examines the US intelligence accountability architecture: the House of Representative Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court, the Inspectors General, the Government Accountability Office, the Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Office, and the President’s Intelligence Advisory Board. The sheer number and complexity of accountability bodies in the US gives rise to inefficiencies, ineffectiveness, and duplication. The accountability system is replete with gaps and vulnerabilities: partisanship, collective-action problems, resource allocation, and inconsistent quality of review in congressional accountability; GAO’s limited authority to review the USIC and sensitive operations; the adequacy of the FISA court in adequately protecting the rights of Americans; and Presidential discretion in appointing and removing IGs. These issues have implications not just for the United States, but for allies, partners as well as regional and global stability.


1965 ◽  
Vol 19 (1) ◽  
pp. 81-96

The Security Council held two meetings (1140th and 1141st) on August 5 and 7, 1964, to discuss a complaint of the United States government against the government of North Vietnam, which was expressed in a letter dated August 4, 1964, from the permanent representative of the United States addressed to the President of the Security Council. At the outset of the 1140th meeting on August 5, 1964, Mr. Morozov (Soviet Union) explained that he had requested the postponement of the meeting until August 6 to permit his delegation to receive necessary instructions from its government. With regard to this request, Mr. Stevenson (United States) pointed out that the UN Charter explicitly called for immediate reporting to the Council of measures taken by Members in the exercise of their right of self-defense. If the Council wished to adjourn after hearing the statement of the United States delegation, Mr. Stevenson had no objection. Mr. Hajek (Czechoslovakia) also opposed convening the meeting on August 5 on the grounds that Council members did not possess all the facts and views of the parties. To deliberate on the question on the basis of one version would not, he felt, serve the interests of the Council. Moreover, he did not feel that the circumstances constituted an emergency: The United States did not appear to be immediately threatened.


1961 ◽  
Vol 15 (2) ◽  
pp. 272-279 ◽  

From its 921st through its 923d meetings the Security Council considered the complaint of the government of Cuba that the United States was planning direct military intervention in Cuba.Mr. Wadsworth, the representative of the United States and the first speaker, deplored the fact that because of continued provocation over nearly a two-year period the United States had been forced to break diplomatic relations with Cuba, and denied as false propaganda the Cuban charges that the United States was contemplating a military attack on Cuba. Mr. Roa, the Cuban representative, stated in his opening remarks that Cuba considered the Security Council the proper organ before which to bring its case, and that his country opposed any effort to transfer the examination of its claim to the Council of the Organization of American States. He charged, inter alia: 1) that United States materials had been air-lifted to counter-revolutionary groups in the Cuban mountains; 2) that United States Embassy officials had been engaged in espionage and in conspiracy with counterrevolutionary elements; 3) that false and harmful propaganda against Cuba was being broadcast from the United States, with the support of the United States government; 4) that mercenaries were being trained at Guantanamo Naval Base, with a view to launching a number of small military expeditions against different points of the island; and 5) that destroyers had been placed on the alert in Key West, ninety miles from Cuba. The ultimate objective of these movements, Mr. Roa added, was a military invasion of his country.


1916 ◽  
Vol 10 (2) ◽  
pp. 271-289 ◽  
Author(s):  
Charles R. Pierce

If, for the moment, we can conceive of Uncle Sam as being Andrew Carnegie, of Carnegie's millions as unimproved real estate, and of Carnegie's intention to die poor, as Uncle Sam's liberal land policy, we can perhaps best picture to ourselves the public land administration in the United States in a nutshell. The government, like Carnegie, is unloading its vast wealth in a manner calculated to do the most good, and it is guarding itself continuously, although often futilely, from being imposed upon and cheated. The ownership of the public domain by the United States is of the highest possible title. There is no one to dispute the government's absolute ownership of it. There are no taxes to pay. The government is subject to no obligation to dispose of its land. It can keep or dispose of the land as it chooses.In 1789 the United States government started as owner of practically all of the Northwest Territory. Later it acquired, what some geographers call the Southwest Territory, by further cession from the States. By purchase, discovery, annexation and conquest the United States acquired further holdings, so that with the exception of Texas and private holdings the government's fee simple title in the public domain extended from the thirteen colonies to the Gulf of Mexico, and from the Atlantic Ocean on the east coast of Florida to the Pacific and the Arctic Oceans.


Author(s):  
Chris Yogerst

In September of 1941, a handful of isolationist senators set out to tarnish Hollywood for war-mongering. The United States was largely divided on the possibility of entering the European War, yet the immigrant moguls in Hollywood were acutely aware of the conditions in Europe. After Kristallnacht (the Night of Broken Glass), the gloves came off. Warner Bros. released the first directly anti-Nazi film in 1939 with Confessions of a Nazi Spy. Other studios followed with films such as The Mortal Storm (MGM), Man Hunt (Fox), The Man I Married (Fox), and The Great Dictator (United Artists). While these films represented a small percentage of Hollywood’s output, senators took aim at the Jews in Hollywood who were supposedly “agitating us for war” and launched an investigation that resulted in Senate Resolution 152. The resolution was aimed at both radio and movies that “have been extensively used for propaganda purposes designed to influence the public mind in the direction of participation in the European war.” When the Senate approved a subcommittee to investigate the intentions of these films, studio bosses were ready and willing to stand up against the government to defend their beloved industry. What followed was a complete embarrassment of the United States Senate and a large victory for Hollywood as well as freedom of speech.


Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document