Consular Immunities: the Kasenkina Case (U.S.–U.S.S.R.)

1949 ◽  
Vol 43 (1) ◽  
pp. 37-56
Author(s):  
Lawrence Preuss
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Soviet Union ◽  
The United States ◽  
Legal Issues ◽  
Soviet Government ◽  
Legal Principles ◽  
The Soviet Union ◽  
Legal Case ◽  
The Status

The recent Kasenkina and Samarin affairs, which led to a breach of consular relations between the United States and the Soviet Union, have raised a number of legal issues relating to the status of foreign consular officials. The legal principles involved, however, have been beclouded by widespread misunderstanding of the nature and scope of consular privileges and immunities, by obviously baseless charges made by the Soviet Government against that of the United States, and by the apparent reluctance of the latter to press to its fullest extent a sound legal case.

Council of Foreign Ministers

1951 ◽  
Vol 5 (1) ◽  
pp. 227-229
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
United Kingdom ◽  
Soviet Union ◽  
German Economy ◽  
The United States ◽  
Soviet Government ◽  
The United Kingdom ◽  
The Soviet Union ◽  
The Creation ◽  
Foreign Ministers

Proposed Meeting of the Council: Meeting in Prague on October 20 and 21, 1950, the foreign ministers of Albania, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Hungary, Rumania, eastern Germany and the Soviet Union issued a statement in reply to the communiqué on Germany released on September 19 by the foreign ministers of France, the United Kingdom and the United States. Charging that the position of the three western governments was merely a screen to conceal the aggressive objectives of the North Atlantic Treaty and that the creation of mobile police formations was nothing less than the reconstitution of a German army, the eight foreign ministers stated that they considered as urgent 1) the publication by the three western powers and the Soviet Union of a statement of their intent to refuse to permit German rearmament and of their unswerving determination to create a united peace-loving German state; 2) the removal of all restrictions hindering the development of the peaceful German economy and the prevention of a resurgence of German war potential; 3) the conclusion of a German treaty and the withdrawal of all occupation forces within one year of its conclusion; and 4) the creation of an all-German constituent council to prepare for a provisional German government. The text of the communiqué was communicated to the United Kingdom, the United States and France under cover of a Soviet note on November 3. Stating that the Prague declaration possessed “the greatest significance for the cause of assuring international peace and security” and touched the “fundamental national interests of the peoples of Europe,” the Soviet government proposed the convening of the Council of Foreign Ministers „for consideration of the question of fulfillment of the Potsdam agreement regarding demilitarization of Germany.”

The Soviet Union and World Peace

1946 ◽  
Vol 8 (4) ◽  
pp. 456-474
Author(s):  
N. S. Timasheff
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Foreign Policy ◽  
Soviet Union ◽  
International Relations ◽  
The United States ◽  
Mutual Understanding ◽  
World Peace ◽  
Soviet Government ◽  
The Soviet Union ◽  
Post War

On the two victory days, military action on the fronts stopped. But peace did not return, nor does anyone know when it will. Peace is not simply absence of military .ction. It is a state of international relations corresponding to “periods of normalcy” in the internal affairs of a nation. Peace exists, when these relations are dominated by good will, mutual understanding and friendly cooperation.The post-war world longs for peace. But there is no peace because, among the sovereign states, there is one which acts against peace. This is the Soviet Union. Is it, however, certain that the foreign policy of the Soviets is aggressive? Is it not true that, in Moscow, aggressiveness is ascribed to the United States and to the alleged Western bloc headed by it?In March, 1946, Professor E. Tarle, an authoritative spokesman of the Soviet government, placed in opposition “the old imperialistic concept of international relations” practiced by London and Washington and “the Soviet conception which is based on respect for the rights of the peoples and their real independence.”

The Structure of Great Power Politics, 1963–75

2012 ◽  
Author(s):  
Marc Trachtenberg
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Soviet Union ◽  
Nuclear Power ◽  
The United States ◽  
The Soviet Union ◽  
Fundamental Goal ◽  
The Status ◽  
Great Power Politics ◽  
The Cold War ◽  
Political Understanding

This chapter details events that occurred from 1963 to 1975. John F. Kennedy's most fundamental goal as president of the United States was to reach a political understanding with the Soviet Union based on the following principle: America and Russia were both very great powers and therefore needed to respect each other's most fundamental interests. The United States was thus prepared, for its part, to recognize the USSR's special position in eastern Europe. America would also see to it that West Germany would not become a nuclear power. In exchange, the Soviets would have to accept the status quo in central Europe, especially in Berlin. If a settlement of that sort could be worked out, the great problem that lay at the heart of the Cold War would be resolved. However, to reach a settlement based on those principles, Kennedy had to get both the USSR and his own allies in Europe to accept this sort of arrangement.

Armand Hammer, Lenin, and the First American Concession in Soviet Russia

Slavic Review ◽  
1981 ◽  
Vol 40 (3) ◽  
pp. 355-365 ◽  
Author(s):  
Philip S. Gillette
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Soviet Union ◽  
National Security ◽  
The United States ◽  
Soviet Government ◽  
Personal Relations ◽  
The Soviet Union ◽  
New Interpretation ◽  
Soviet Russia ◽  
American Trade

In 1921 a young American doctor named Armand Hammer went to Russia, met Lenin, and undertook the first American concession in Soviet Russia. Interest in this episode has been heightened by the fact that fifty years later Armand Hammer, as chairman of the Occidental Petroleum Corporation, forged new commercial links between the United States and the Soviet Union. This article provides a new interpretation of Hammer’s meeting with Lenin and his receipt of the first American concession granted by the Soviet government. It throws light on how Soviet national security objectives and personal relations can influence Soviet government decisions on American trade.

Paradoxes ofOstpolitik: Revisiting the Moscow and Warsaw Treaties, 1970

2016 ◽  
Vol 49 (3-4) ◽  
pp. 409-440
Author(s):  
William Glenn Gray
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
World War Ii ◽  
Soviet Union ◽  
The United States ◽  
Political Polarization ◽  
World War ◽  
The Soviet Union ◽  
The Status ◽  
Ethnic Germans ◽  
To Come

AbstractThis article reexamines the diplomacy of Willy Brandt’sOstpolitik, focusing on two landmark achievements in 1970: the Moscow Treaty in August, and the Warsaw Treaty in December. On the basis of declassified US and German documentation, it argues that envoy Egon Bahr’s unconventional approach resulted in a poorly negotiated treaty with the Soviet Union that failed to address vital problems such as the status of Berlin. The outcome deepened political polarization at home and proved disconcerting to many West German allies; it also forced the four World War II victors—Britain, France, the United States, and the Soviet Union—to save Brandt’sOstpolitikby grinding out an agreement on access to Berlin. By contrast, West German negotiations in Warsaw yielded a treaty more in line with West German expectations, though the results proved sorely disappointing to the Polish leadership. Disagreements over restitution payments (repacked as government credits) and the emigration of ethnic Germans would bedevil German-Polish relations for years to come. Bonn’sOstpolitikthus had a harder edge than the famous image of Brandt kneeling in Warsaw would suggest.

Conclusion

2020 ◽  
pp. 263-284
Author(s):  
Kevin Riehle
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Soviet Union ◽  
National Security ◽  
The United States ◽  
Policy Changes ◽  
Soviet Government ◽  
The Soviet Union ◽  
Perception Of Threat ◽  
The Stability

Several lessons emerge from these defectors’ revelations. First, the motivations of defectors changed based on the circumstances around them, which reflected Soviet policy changes. Those policy changes, such as purges and increased domestic repression, were often at the foundation of defector’s motivations. Second, vetting standards for Soviet personnel assigned to sensitive national security positions fluctuated, depending on the stability in the Soviet government and the level of urgency for hiring new personnel. When the Soviet Union was stable, it had the luxury of enforcing strict standards. When the Soviet Union needed a lot of people fast—such as during purges or wartime—it did not vet them as thoroughly. Finally, the Soviet perception of threat evolved, beginning with Great Britain as the primary threat in the early Soviet era, and joined by Germany after 1933, although Stalin never abandoned hope for an accommodation with Hitler. However, even before Germany was defeated in 1945, Soviet intelligence began targeting its wartime allies. By the late 1940s, when the United States assumed the role of the leader of the democratic world, the label “main enemy” was coined and applied to the United States, which stuck for the rest of the Soviet era.

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