A Comparison of Posted-Offer and Double-Auction Pricing Institutions

1984 ◽  
Vol 51 (4) ◽  
pp. 595-614 ◽  
Author(s):  
J. Ketcham ◽  
V. L. Smith ◽  
A. W. Williams

1991 ◽  
pp. 295-314
Author(s):  
Jon Ketcham ◽  
Arlington W. Williams


2015 ◽  
Vol 9 (1) ◽  
pp. 68-86
Author(s):  
Levent Celik ◽  
Esen Onur

This paper studies the coexistence of two competing mechanisms in the same market, where one follows the posted-offer rule and the other one incorporates a double-auction mechanism. We explore this coexistence within a sports betting example in which bettors are free to choose between a bookie (posted-offer market) and a betting exchange. Our findings imply that i) bettors' risk aversion parameter is instrumental in whether these two mechanisms coexist or not, ii) most bettors are strictly better off, and none is worse off, when they have access to both of these competing mechanisms rather than just one, and iii) these results hold even when we allow the bookie to make a positive profit instead of following a zero expected profit pricing rule.





2017 ◽  
Vol 46 (6) ◽  
pp. 899-925 ◽  
Author(s):  
James C. Cox ◽  
Mark Rider ◽  
Astha Sen

According to economic theory, the incidence of a unit tax is independent of the statutory assignment of the liability to pay the tax. However, the theory is silent on the possible effects of market institutions on tax incidence. We report data from an experiment designed to address two questions. Is tax incidence independent of the assignment of the liability to pay tax to sellers or to buyers? Is tax incidence independent of market institutions? We conduct laboratory experiments with double auction (DA) and posted offer (PO) markets. Based on the results of nonparametric and parametric tests of prices generated by laboratory markets, we conclude that the answer to both questions is “no.” We report that observed differences from liability-side equivalence are statistically significant and economically meaningful. We also report that the incidence of the same tax differs between DA and PO markets with the same demand and supply schedules.





2010 ◽  
Vol 29 (12) ◽  
pp. 3231-3234 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sheng-feng CHEN ◽  
Cheng-jian WEI


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