A Comparison of Posted-Offer and Double-Auction Pricing Institutions

1984 ◽  
Vol 51 (4) ◽  
pp. 595-614 ◽  
Author(s):  
J. Ketcham ◽  
V. L. Smith ◽  
A. W. Williams
Keyword(s):  
Double Auction ◽  
Posted Offer ◽  
Auction Pricing

A Comparison of Posted-Offer and Double-Auction Pricing Institutions

1991 ◽  
pp. 295-314
Author(s):  
Jon Ketcham ◽  
Arlington W. Williams
Keyword(s):  
Double Auction ◽  
Posted Offer ◽  
Auction Pricing

Determination of Odds in Prediction Markets: Coexistence of Posted-offer and Double-auction Designs

2015 ◽  
Vol 9 (1) ◽  
pp. 68-86
Author(s):  
Levent Celik ◽  
Esen Onur
Keyword(s):  
Risk Aversion ◽  
Expected Profit ◽  
Sports Betting ◽  
The Other ◽  
Double Auction ◽  
Prediction Markets ◽  
Auction Mechanism ◽  
Pricing Rule ◽  
Posted Offer

This paper studies the coexistence of two competing mechanisms in the same market, where one follows the posted-offer rule and the other one incorporates a double-auction mechanism. We explore this coexistence within a sports betting example in which bettors are free to choose between a bookie (posted-offer market) and a betting exchange. Our findings imply that i) bettors' risk aversion parameter is instrumental in whether these two mechanisms coexist or not, ii) most bettors are strictly better off, and none is worse off, when they have access to both of these competing mechanisms rather than just one, and iii) these results hold even when we allow the bookie to make a positive profit instead of following a zero expected profit pricing rule.

scholarly journals Market power and efficiency in a computational electricity market with discriminatory double-auction pricing

2001 ◽  
Vol 5 (5) ◽  
pp. 504-523 ◽  
Author(s):  
J. Nicolaisen ◽  
V. Petrov ◽  
L. Tesfatsion
Keyword(s):  
Market Power ◽  
Electricity Market ◽  
Double Auction ◽  
Auction Pricing

Tax Incidence

2017 ◽  
Vol 46 (6) ◽  
pp. 899-925 ◽  
Author(s):  
James C. Cox ◽  
Mark Rider ◽  
Astha Sen
Keyword(s):  
Economic Theory ◽  
Laboratory Experiments ◽  
Tax Incidence ◽  
Double Auction ◽  
Market Institutions ◽  
Unit Tax ◽  
Demand And Supply ◽  
Report Data ◽  
Posted Offer

According to economic theory, the incidence of a unit tax is independent of the statutory assignment of the liability to pay the tax. However, the theory is silent on the possible effects of market institutions on tax incidence. We report data from an experiment designed to address two questions. Is tax incidence independent of the assignment of the liability to pay tax to sellers or to buyers? Is tax incidence independent of market institutions? We conduct laboratory experiments with double auction (DA) and posted offer (PO) markets. Based on the results of nonparametric and parametric tests of prices generated by laboratory markets, we conclude that the answer to both questions is “no.” We report that observed differences from liability-side equivalence are statistically significant and economically meaningful. We also report that the incidence of the same tax differs between DA and PO markets with the same demand and supply schedules.

Optimizing the Placement of Interconnected R&D Based on Double Auction

2019 ◽  
Vol 55 (1) ◽  
pp. 32-42
Author(s):  
A. Kozyrev ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Double Auction

ZIP2 strategy of limited resources under environment of continuous double auction

2010 ◽  
Vol 29 (12) ◽  
pp. 3231-3234 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sheng-feng CHEN ◽  
Cheng-jian WEI
Keyword(s):  
Limited Resources ◽  
Double Auction ◽  
Continuous Double Auction
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