INTERNATIONAL TAX POLICY OF KAZAKHSTAN

The purpose of this article was to study the international aspects of taxation in Kazakhstan. What is relevant for Kazakhstan is that the country implements international standards in its national legislation, for example, the BEPS plan, information exchange, etc. In addition to the implementation of the 15 Actions of the BEPS plan, the country implements some special anti-avoidance rules (SAAR), for example, the transfer pricing rule, the thin capitalization rule, beneficial ownership concept, etc. In order to improve the international tax policy of Kazakhstan, the country needs to continue to implement all the Actions of the BEPS plan, conclude tax treaties, introduce general (GAAR) and targeted anti-avoidance rules (TAAR) into its legislation.

A Neural Network Auction For Group Decision Making Over a Continuous Space

We propose a system for conducting an auction over locations in a continuous space. It enables participants to express their preferences over possible choices of location in the space, selecting the location that maximizes the total utility of all agents. We prevent agents from tricking the system into selecting a location that improves their individual utility at the expense of others by using a pricing rule that gives agents no incentive to misreport their true preferences. The system queries participants for their utility in many random locations, then trains a neural network to approximate the preference function of each participant. The parameters of these neural network models are transmitted and processed by the auction mechanism, which composes these into differentiable models that are optimized through gradient ascent to compute the final chosen location and charged prices.

Modelling Bidding Behaviour on German Photovoltaic Auctions

In this article renewable energy support allocation through different types of auctions are assessed. The applied methodological framework is auction theory, based on the rules governing the German photovoltaic (PV) Feed-in Premium (FIP) auctions. The work focuses on bidding strategies based on an extended levelised cost of electricity (LCOE) methodology, comparing two different set of rules: uniform price and pay-as-bid. When calculating the optimal bids an iteration is developed to find the Nash-equilibrium optimal bidding strategy. When searching for the bid function, not only strictly monotone functions, but also monotone functions are considered, extending the framework typically applied in auction theory modelling. The results suggest that the PV support allocation in the German auction system would be more cost efficient using the uniform pricing rule, since many participants bid above their true valuation in the pay-as-bid auction Nash-equilibrium. Thus from a cost minimising perspective, the application of uniform pricing rule would be a better policy decision.

The Value of PV Power Forecast and the Paradox of the “Single Pricing” Scheme: The Italian Case Study

One of the major problem of photovoltaic grid integration is limiting the solar-induced imbalances since these can undermine the security and stability of the electrical system. Improving the forecast accuracy of photovoltaic generation is becoming essential to allow a massive solar penetration. In particular, improving the forecast accuracy of large solar farms’ generation is important both for the producers/traders to minimize the imbalance costs and for the transmission system operators to ensure stability. In this article, we provide a benchmark for the day-ahead forecast accuracy of utility scale photovoltaic (PV) plants in 1325 locations spanning the country of Italy. We then use these benchmarked forecasts and real energy prices to compute the economic value of the forecast accuracy and accuracy improvement in the context of the Italian energy market’s regulatory framework. Through this study, we further point out several important criticisms of the Italian “single pricing” system that brings paradoxical and counterproductive effects regarding the need to reduce the imbalance volumes. Finally, we propose a new market-pricing rule and innovative actions to overcome the undesired effects of the current dispatching regulations.

The Value of PV Power Forecast and the Paradox of the “Single Pricing” Scheme: The Italian Case Study

One of the major problem of photovoltaic grid integration is limiting the solar-induced imbalances since these can undermine the security and stability of the electrical system. Improving the forecast accuracy of photovoltaic generation is becoming essential to allow a massive solar penetration. In particular, improving the forecast accuracy of large solar farms generation is important both for the producers/traders to minimize the imbalance costs and for the Transmission System Operators to insure stability. In this article, we provide a benchmark for the day-ahead forecast accuracy of utility scale PV plants in 1325 locations spanning the country of Italy. We then use these benchmarked forecasts and real energy prices to compute the economic value of forecast accuracy and accuracy improvement in the context of the Italian energy market regulatory framework. Through this study, we further point out some several important criticisms of the Italian “single pricing” system that brings to paradoxical and counterproductive effects regarding the need to reduce the imbalance volumes. Finally, we propose a new market-pricing rule and innovative actions to overcome these undesired effects of the current dispatching regulations.

The Competitive Effects of Variance-based Pricing

In many markets, like electricity or cloud computing markets, providers incur large costs for keeping sufficient capacity in reserve to accommodate demand fluctuations of a mostly fixed user base. These costs are significantly affected by the unpredictability of the users' demand. Nevertheless, standard mechanisms charge fixed per-unit prices that do not depend on the variability of the users' demand. In this paper, we study a variance-based pricing rule in a two-provider market setting and perform a game-theoretic analysis of the resulting competitive effects. We show that an innovative provider who employs variance-based pricing can choose a pricing strategy that guarantees himself a higher profit than using fixed per-unit prices for any individually rational response of a provider playing a fixed pricing strategy. We then characterize all equilibria for the setting where both providers use variance-based pricing strategies. We show that, in equilibrium, the providers' profits may increase or decrease, depending on their cost functions. However, social welfare always weakly increases.