Are Shareholder Proposals All Bark and No Bite? Evidence from Shareholder Resolutions to Rescind Poison Pills

1998 ◽  
Vol 33 (4) ◽  
pp. 499 ◽  
Author(s):  
John M. Bizjak ◽  
Christopher J. Marquette
Keyword(s):  
Shareholder Proposals ◽  
Poison Pills

Governance mechanisms and effective activism: Evidence from shareholder proposals on poison pills

2017 ◽  
Vol 43 ◽  
pp. 185-202 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mireia Gine ◽  
Rabih Moussawi ◽  
John Sedunov
Keyword(s):  
Governance Mechanisms ◽  
Shareholder Proposals ◽  
Poison Pills

Shareholder Proposals to Rescind Poison Pills: All Bark and No Bite?

1996 ◽  
Author(s):  
John M. Bizjak ◽  
Christopher J. Marquette
Keyword(s):  
Shareholder Proposals ◽  
Poison Pills

A Comparative Analysis of Shareholder Activism in the US and UK: Evidence from Shareholder Proposals

2008 ◽  
Author(s):  
Bonnie Buchanan ◽  
Jeffry M. Netter ◽  
Tina Yang
Keyword(s):  
Comparative Analysis ◽  
Shareholder Activism ◽  
Shareholder Proposals ◽  
The Us

Are Shareholder Proposals an Important Corporate Governance Device? Evidence from US and UK Shareholder Proposals

2010 ◽  
Author(s):  
Bonnie Buchanan ◽  
Jeffry M. Netter ◽  
Tina Yang
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Shareholder Proposals

Peer Information and Empowered Voters: Evidence from Voting on Shareholder Proposals

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Xiao Li ◽  
Jeffrey Ng ◽  
Hong Wu
Keyword(s):  
Shareholder Proposals

Debt as Threat: Evidence from Union-Sponsored Shareholder Proposals

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Alberta Di Giuli ◽  
Arthur Petit-Romec
Keyword(s):  
Shareholder Proposals

scholarly journals The use of poison pills by US firms over the period 1997-2015: what has been their impact on shareholder value

2019 ◽  
Vol 18 (1) ◽  
pp. 98
Author(s):  
Duarte Pitta Ferraz ◽  
Ilídio Tomás Lopes ◽  
Simon Hitzelberger
Keyword(s):  
Shareholder Value ◽  
Poison Pills

The Costs and Benefits of Shareholder Democracy: Gadflies and Low-Cost Activism

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Nickolay Gantchev ◽  
Mariassunta Giannetti
Keyword(s):  
Low Cost ◽  
Shareholder Value ◽  
Career Concerns ◽  
Costs And Benefits ◽  
Cross Sectional ◽  
Shareholder Proposals ◽  
Active Individual ◽  
Shareholder Democracy ◽  
To Receive

Abstract We show that there is cross-sectional variation in the quality of shareholder proposals. On average, proposals submitted by the most active individual sponsors are less likely to receive majority support, but they occasionally pass if shareholders mistakenly support them and may even be implemented due to directors’ career concerns. While gadfly proposals destroy shareholder value if they pass, shareholder proposals on average are value enhancing in firms with more informed shareholders. We conclude that more informed voting could increase the benefits associated with shareholder proposals.

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