Dynamic Retail Price and Investment Competition

Green development is an important way to meet the challenges of ecological and environmental protection and economic growth, as well as an inevitable choice to realize China’s sustainable development in the new era. The Chinese economic system is such that local government competition has become a key factor affecting regional green development under the current leadership. Based on the inter-provincial panel data of 30 provinces in mainland China from 1997 to 2017, this paper uses the total-factor non-radial directional distance function and slack-based measure data envelopment analysis (SBM-DEA) to measure the green development efficiency of the provinces. Additionally, it also uses the Malmquist–Luenberger (ML) index to decompose green development efficiency and analyzes its internal driving factors. Finally, taking environmental regulation as a mediating variable, this paper empirically analyzes the influence mechanism of local government competition on green development efficiency from three perspectives including growth competition, fiscal competition and investment competition. The study found that: the green development efficiency of Chinese regions showed a downward trend, with significant regional differences; technological progress is the key factor to improve the efficiency of green development, and its role gradually decreases from eastern to western and central regions; pure technical efficiency has become a bottleneck restricting the improvement of green development efficiency, while scale efficiency shows significant regional differences; the growth competition, fiscal competition and investment competition of local government all have a significant inhibitory effect on the efficiency of green development. This paper puts forward policy suggestions supporting enterprise technology research and development, optimizing energy conservation and emission reduction as well as improving the local government performance evaluation system for green development.

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Investment competition on dedicated terminals under demand ambiguity

Transportation Research Part E Logistics and Transportation Review ◽

10.1016/j.tre.2021.102306 ◽

2021 ◽

Vol 150 ◽

pp. 102306

Author(s):

Shiyuan Zheng ◽

Changmin Jiang ◽

Xiaowen Fu

Keyword(s):

Investment Competition

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FEDERAL COMMODITY AND SERVICE TAXES EXPRESSED AS PERCENTAGES OF RETAIL PRICE

The Bulletin of the National Tax Association ◽

10.1086/bullnattax41786852 ◽

1937 ◽

Vol 22 (8) ◽

pp. 226-231

Author(s):

C. LOWELL HARRISS

Keyword(s):

Retail Price

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Strategic Analysis of the Pricing Mechanisms in an Online Book Supply Chain in the Presence of Reference Price Effects

Journal of theoretical and applied electronic commerce research ◽

10.3390/jtaer16050084 ◽

2021 ◽

Vol 16 (5) ◽

pp. 1492-1516

Author(s):

Wenhua Hou ◽

Yuwen Zeng

Keyword(s):

Supply Chain ◽

Discount Rate ◽

Reference Price ◽

Stackelberg Game ◽

Lower Boundary ◽

Retail Price ◽

Reference Points ◽

Price Effects ◽

Retail Prices ◽

Online Book

(1) Background: A binding recommended retail price has been used in several markets in a variety of forms, and the book market is a typical example. Publishers sell books to online retailers at a unit wholesale discount computed on the cover price. Retailers are then allowed to set the retail price. Therefore, if consumers regard the cover prices as reference points, then they may be more likely to purchase books if retail prices are lower than the cover prices. (2) Methods: We develop a Stackelberg game model for a book supply chain to investigates how reference price effects affect retailers and publisher’s pricing strategies. (3) Results: The results show that retailers will sell printed books at a discount only when the publisher’s wholesale discount rate is not high. Further, as the intensity of the reference price effects increases, (a) the lower boundary of the wholesale discount rate rises, (b) publishers’ profits increase and (c) retailers’ profits increase relative to the level of consumers’ e-books acceptance. (4) Conclusions: This result is related to the fact that the online retailer, such as Amazon and JD.com, like to invoke reference price effects in consumers’ minds by highlighting the printed book’s discount rate.

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Optimal Pricing Decisions for a Low-Carbon Supply Chain Considering Fairness Concern under Carbon Quota Policy

International Journal of Environmental Research and Public Health ◽

10.3390/ijerph18020556 ◽

2021 ◽

Vol 18 (2) ◽

pp. 556

Author(s):

Hao Zou ◽

Jin Qin ◽

Bo Dai

Keyword(s):

Emission Reduction ◽

Carbon Emission ◽

Reduction Rate ◽

Retail Price ◽

Low Carbon ◽

Close Attention ◽

Carbon Emission Reduction ◽

Carbon Supply ◽

Total Profit ◽

Fairness Concern

This research investigates the effect of fairness concerns on a sustainable low-carbon supply chain (LCSC) with a carbon quota policy, in which a manufacturer is in charge of manufacturing low-carbon products and sells them to a retailer. The demand is affected by price and the carbon emission reduction rate. The optimal decisions of pricing and carbon emission reduction rate are analyzed under four decision models: (i) centralized decision, (ii) decentralized decision without fairness concern, (iii) decentralized decision with manufacturer’s fairness concern, (iv) decentralized decision with retailer’s fairness concern. The results indicate that the profits in the centralized LCSC are higher than those in the decentralized LCSC with fairness concern. If a manufacturer pays close attention to fairness, the fairness concern coefficient will reduce the carbon emission reduction rate and the profit of the LCSC and increase the wholesale price and the retail price of the product. If a retailer pays close attention to fairness, and the preference of consumers for a low-carbon product is low, the fairness concern coefficient of the retailer increases the total profit of the LCSC and decreases the carbon emission reduction rate and retail price of the product. Otherwise, if the preference of consumers for a low-carbon product is great, the fairness concern coefficient of the retailer would lead to a lower retail price compared with the retail price in the centralized decision and decrease the total profit of the LCSC.

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