The Supply of Development Rights: Results from a Survey in Hadley, Massachusetts

1979 ◽  
Vol 55 (2) ◽  
pp. 269 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jon M. Conrad ◽  
David LeBlanc
Keyword(s):  



2002 ◽  
Vol 37 (0) ◽  
pp. 337-342
Author(s):  
Naoki Ushida ◽  
Yoshitaka Aoyama ◽  
Dai Nakagawa ◽  
Ryoji Matsunaka ◽  
Makoto Hattori




2015 ◽  
Vol 42 (4) ◽  
pp. 294-305 ◽  
Author(s):  
RUI SANTOS ◽  
CHRISTOPH SCHRÖTER-SCHLAACK ◽  
PAULA ANTUNES ◽  
IRENE RING ◽  
PEDRO CLEMENTE

SUMMARYHabitat banking and tradable development rights (TDR) have gained considerable currency as a way of achieving ‘no net loss’ of biodiversity and of reconciling nature conservation with economic development goals. This paper reviews the use of these instruments for biodiversity conservation and assesses their roles in the policy mix. The two instruments are compared in terms of effectiveness, cost effectiveness, social impact, institutional context and legal requirements. The role in the policy mix is discussed highlighting sequential relationships, as well as complementarities or synergies, redundancy and conflicts with other instruments, such as biodiversity offsets and land-use zoning.Habitat banking and TDR have the potential to contribute to biodiversity conservation objectives and attain cost-effective solutions with positive social impacts on local communities and landowners. They can also help to create a new mind-set more favourable to public-private cooperation in biodiversity conservation. At the same time, these policy instruments face a number of theoretical and implementation challenges, such as additionality and equivalence of offsets, endurance of land-use planning regulations, monitoring of offset performance, or time lags between restoration and resulting conservation benefits.A clear, enforceable regulatory approach is a prerequisite for the success of habitat banking and TDR. In return, these schemes provide powerful incentives for compliance with regulatory norms and ensure a more equitable allocation of the benefits and costs of land-use controls and conservation. Environmentally harmful subsidies in other policy sectors as well as alternative offset options, however, reduce the attractiveness and effectiveness of these instruments. Thus, the overall performance of habitat banking and TDR hinges on how they are integrated into the biodiversity conservation policy mix and fine-tuned with other sectoral policies.



2021 ◽  
Vol 5 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Jordan P. Howell ◽  
Mahbubur Meenar ◽  
Christina Friend ◽  
Jack Kelly ◽  
Owen Feeny

The “Pine Barrens” are a UNESCO-designated biosphere reserve encompassing about 1.1 million acres in southern New Jersey. A state agency, the New Jersey Pinelands Commission, in conjunction with county and local governments, works to implement land management and environmental protection goals via a comprehensive management plan. The pinelands development credit (PDC) program is one tool aimed specifically at land preservation outcomes. The PDC program is a regional “transfer of development rights” market allowing landowners to sell their rights to further develop their property and enter their land into permanent protected status. Since the program’s inception in 1982, over 55,000 acres of sensitive and rare ecosystem have been protected; the more than 1,200 transactions account for US$63 M of economic value. The PDC program is a clear illustration of the role that financial instruments and market mechanisms can play in achieving environmental protection outcomes. This case study offers an overview of the pinelands area, PDC program, and the transfer of development rights concept before examining the PDC program and its outcomes in greater detail. While the program has been hailed as a success, it will face challenges in the coming years, including a relatively inefficient process for converting PDCs into protected lands and the question of how the program can evolve once eligible lands become more scarce.



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