The Burger Court RevisitedThe Burger Court: Political and Judicial Profiles. By Charles M. Lamb and Stephen C. Halpern The Poor in Court: The Legal Services Program and Supreme Court Decision Making. By Susan E. Lawrence Representation Rights in the Burger Years. By Nancy Maveety In Pursuit of Equality: Women, Public Policy, and the Federal Courts. By Susan Gluck Mezey The Fate of Law. By Austin Sarat and Thomas R. Kearns The Ascent of Pragmatism: The Burger Court in Action. By Bernard Schwartz

Polity ◽  
1992 ◽  
Vol 25 (1) ◽  
pp. 159-171
Author(s):  
Richard A. Brisbin,
1994 ◽  
Vol 15 ◽  
pp. 21-42 ◽  
Author(s):  
Joseph A. Ignagni

In the first Establishment Clause case decided by the Burger Court, the U.S. Supreme Court laid down a new constitutional test. With this addition, the Court now had in place the third prong of a three-part Establishment Clause test. However, this three-part test has not settled what is allowable in church-state relations for many scholars. In fact, it is often complained that constitutional law in this area is confused and conflicting. This study attempts to show that the votes of the justices are not as uncertain or unpredictable as previously has been claimed. It also endeavors to contribute to explaining Supreme Court decision making in general. A fact-attitudinal model is derived from judicial behavior theory, cognitive-cybernetic decision-making theory, and the writings of the justices themselves. The results suggest that the model has explanatory as well as predictive value during both the Burger and early Rehnquist Court years.


1989 ◽  
Vol 3 ◽  
pp. 279-293
Author(s):  
Ronald Kahn

I seek to counter a view commonly held by scholars that the Burger Court is pragmatic in its constitutional choices in contrast to the Warren Court, which is viewed as ideological. I propose a methodology to study the effects of process values and rights values held by members of the Burger Court on their decision making. To view its decision making as pragmatic, without awareness of underlying values of process and rights, results in an oversimplified view and leads to the unwarranted conclusion that the Burger Court is case-specific in making constitutional choices. I limit my discussion to separation of church and state cases, primarily in the area of aid to parochial education, because traditionally scholars have emphasized the pragmatic nature of Burger Court choices in this area. A finding of consistency of values in justices' orientations in this area suggests that the methodology reported here might have general utility in the study of Supreme Court decision making.


Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document