Individual adaptive performance in computer-mediated work: a migration perspective

PurposeIn dynamic environments, employees should respond to changing demands carrying out actions to achieve proper knowledge of the information systems (IS) that they use (individual adaptation). However, few studies have investigated the determinants of this behaviour. This study proposes and empirically evaluates a cognitive-attitudinal model grounded in migration theory, which considers push, pull and mooring factors.Design/methodology/approachData collected from ERP users were analysed using partial least squares.FindingsCoherent with migration theory, the results show that the individual adapts influenced by push factors (dissatisfaction with their current command of the IS), pull factors (expected benefits from improving their command) and mooring factors (attitude to the adaptation process). Also, inertia and cost of adaption impact on attitude.Research limitations/implicationsThis study introduces migration theory to the IS literature as a basis for comprehensively explaining adaptation in organisational settings.Practical implicationsThe results suggest that management should: exhibit the instrumental benefits of a solid command of the IS; show the current gap in employee knowledge to revert it and, introduce changes to move employees out of their comfort zone to encourage ongoing learning and reduce resistance.Originality/valueWhile previous studies have focused on the implementation stage and the emotional factors to explain adaptation, this study intends to bridge this gap by investigating cognitive-attitudinal factors that trigger the intention to adapt in the post-adoption stage. The findings of this study are useful to researchers in adaptation behaviour, and to managers to promote IS learning for their staff.

Politics and Constitutional Law: A Distinction without a Difference?

This article examines the relationship between Politics and Law in U.S. Supreme Court decision-making. It argues that three major developments in recent decades have combined to undermine the Court’s status as a legal and judicial institution, and instead define it as political actor, motivated by ideology and the personal policy predilections of the Court’s Justices. The first of these elements is the increasingly political and partisan nature of the Supreme Court appointment process, as witnessed by the recent Gorsuch and Kavanaugh nominations. The behaviour of the President and Senators in these controversial appointments conclusively demonstrates that the country’s leading politicians view the Court as primarily a political body rather than a legal one. The second element of the assault on the Court’s status as a judicial institution is the rise in influence of the behaviouralist school of Supreme Court analysis. Beginning with the work of academics such as Glendon Schubert, the behaviouralists employed new methods and theories in an attempt to debunk the Legal Model of Supreme Court decision-making and to replace it with what is known today as the Attitudinal Model. It forcibly argues that Supreme Court Justices are political in intent and decision, with legal language and arguments being no more than judicial camouflage to disguise their true nature. This applies equally to both conservative and liberal justices. The article identifies the third element of the assault on the status of the Court as a legal institution as coming from Originalist scholars, activists and judges who accuse liberal Justices of having abandoned traditional interpretive methods in favour of redefining the language of the Constitution to suit their progressive political agenda. Originalists acknowledge that their own interpretive methods may lead to results deemed unacceptable to contemporary Americans, but argue that it the duty of the political branches of government, not the courts, to modernise policy and practice. This article concludes that while Originalism has genuine appeal as a theory of interpretation, it is nevertheless both impractical and undesirable. Moreover, rather than returning the Court to the Legal Model, the Originalist campaign has only served to persuade many that the Attitudinal Model is an accurate one. However, the article also argues that the break with Originalism by the Warren Court over segregation has developed into a wholesale change in the Court’s role in American government, one that ill-becomes the unelected judiciary in a representative democracy. It is argued here that the best way to restore the legal and judicial identity of the Court would be a return to the emphasis on ‘judicial role’, once championed by great jurists such as Learned Hand, Oliver Wendell Holmes, Louis Brandeis and John Harlan II. Judicial modesty and restraint would distinguish the Court from the political branches of American government. The Court should decide less and only where the case for a decision of unconstitutionality is very clear and very compelling.

A teoria da decisão judicial: como os juízes julgam?

Como os juízes decidem? A resposta a essa pergunta comporta dois vieses, um seguindo a linha formalista, segundo a qual a atividade de julgar consiste, basicamente, em uma subsunção – isto é, o julgador nada mais é do que um operador de uma grande máquina de silogismo, aplicando a lei abstrata a um caso concreto, de forma mecânica; e outro que observa a linha realista, por meio da qual referida atividade depende, principalmente, de outros elementos, denominados extralegais, por serem alheios ao Direito.O presente ensaio tem como objetivo demonstrar qual movimento se aplica, na prática, ao processo decisório judicial, principalmente no âmbito do Poder Judiciário Brasileiro.Para tanto, será feita, sucintamente, uma distinção entre as linhas formalista e realista. Após, serão expostos alguns métodos e modelos criados com o escopo de esclarecer como funciona o processo de tomada de decisão, bem como será analisado, brevemente, o princípio da imparcialidade, a fim de que se chegue às considerações finais de maneira genérica.Descritores: Teoria da decisão; Decisões Judiciais; Jurisprudência; Julgamento.ReferênciasTumonis V. Legal Realism & Judicial Decision-Making. Jurisprudence. 2012;19(4):1361-82.Posner RA. How judges think. London: Harvard University Press; 2008.Frank J. Courts on trial: mith and reality in american justice. Princeton: Princeton University Press; 1973.Hutcheson Jr JC. Judgment Intuitive: The Function of the “Hunch” in Judicial Decision. 1929, p. 274-88.Richards D. When judges have a hunch – intuition and experience in judicial decision-making. ARSP. 2016;102(2):245-60.Struchiner N, Brando MS. Como os juízes decidem os casos difíceis do direito? Novas Fronteiras da Teoria do Direito: da filosofia moral à psicologia experimental. Rio de Janeiro: PoD/PUC Rio; 2013.Cestari R, Nojiri S. Intepretações históricas e teóricas do Realismo Jurídico. XXIV Encontro Nacional do CONPEDI – UFS, Teorias da Decisão e Realismo Jurídico; 2015. p. 142-66.Holmes Jr OW. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 76. 1905.Leiter B. Rethinking legal realism: toward a naturalized jurisprudence. Tex L Rev. 1997; 76(2):267-315.Friedman B. The politics of judicial review. Tex L Rev. 2005;84(2):257-337.Horta RL, Costa AA. Das Teorias da Interpretação à Teoria da Decisão: por uma perspectiva realista acerca das influências e constrangimentos sobre a atividade judicial. R Opin Jur. 2017;15(20):271-97.Ferreira PFAN. Como decidem os ministros do STF: pontos ideais e dimensões de preferências [dissertação]. Brasília: Universidade de Brasília; 2013.Cross FB. Decisionmaking in the U.S. Circuit Courts of Appeals. Cal L Rev. 2003;91(6):1457-515.Hughes CE. Addresses and papers of Charles Evans Hughes,Governor of New York,1906-1908. New York: GP Putnam’s Sons; 1908.Ribeiro LM, Arguelhes DW. Preferências, Estratégias e Motivações: Pressupostos institucionais de teorias sobre comportamento judicial e sua transposição para o caso brasileiro, Rev Direito e Prax. 2013;4(7):85-121.Segal JA, Spaeth HJ. The Supreme Court and the Attitudinal Model. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; 1993.Kahneman D, Frederick S. A model of heuristic judgment. The Cambridge handbook of thinking and reasoning. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; 2005.Stanovich KE, West RF. Individual differences in reasoning: implications for the rationality debate? Heuristics and biases: the psychology of intuitive judgment. Gilovich T, Griffin D, Kahneman D (org). New York: Cambridge University Press; 2002.Costa EJF. Levando a imparcialidade a sério: proposta de um modelo interseccional entre direito processual, economia e psicologia [tese]. São Paulo:Pontifícia Universidade Católica; 2016.Guthrie C, Rachlinski JJ, Wistrich AJ. Blinking on the bench: how judges decide cases. Cornell L Rev. 2007; 93(1):1-43.

The Strategic Analysis of Judicial Behavior and the Separation of Powers

This chapter uses the separation of powers (SOP) literature to explore the application of strategic models to judicial behavior. Strategic conceptions of judicial decision-making are often presented as a theoretical alternative to the attitudinal model. A review of the basic SOP model highlights the key institutional assumptions that motivate the different major variants of the SOP model and the differences with the attitudinal model. While the empirical literature reveals a tremendous amount of progress in the past twenty-five years, empirical support for the classic statutory SOP model remains elusive. However, the same cannot be said for newer institutional legitimacy models. The chapter concludes with suggestions for directions of future research.

Judicial Behavior and Devolution at the Privy Council

In this article, we study judicial behavior at the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council (JCPC). British judges in general, and British high court judges in particular, are perceived to be independent and isolated from political pressure and interference. Furthermore, these judges tend to show a particularly high rate of consensus. This has led many scholars to consider that, contrarily to what holds for several other courts around the world (such as the US Supreme Court), the attitudinal model does not find support when British higher court judges are considered. In this paper we assess whether similar conclusions might be drawn from the JCPC, another British court of last resort. We create a unique dataset to study empirically decisions of the JCPC and investigate the extent to which judges exhibit different judicial behavior depending on the type of appeal being brought to the court,