How do international organizations in the United Nations system put together their budgets? What is the role of complex principals—most notably member states—and the complex agents in the bureaucracies of international organizations in budgeting processes? And what does a focus on budgeting tell us about the changing nature of the system of international organizations? This book provides answers to these questions through a detailed examination of budgeting in the UN system. The analysis draws on both quantitative and qualitative observations for a total of twenty-two UN system organizations and detailed case studies for the United Nations, ILO, UNESCO, and WHO. The findings demonstrate the importance of three key organizational outcomes—proceduralization, routinization, and budgetary segmentation—as international organizations grapple with managing discord over priorities as a result of complex principal–agent constellations. Contrary to a common view of international bureaucracies as pathological organizations, core budget routines are mostly successfully maintained. However, principal constellations are becoming more complex, notably through the rise of voluntary contributions and non-state donors; budgetary segmentation advances (in some cases even leading to the setting up of new international organizations); and budgeting and resource mobilization have become ever more intertwined. As a consequence, the capacity of international bureaucracies to fulfill their budgeting responsibilities is stretched to the limit and beyond.
