Patz, Ronny and Goetz, Klaus H. (2019). Managing Money and Discord in the UN. Budgeting and Bureaucracy. New York, NY, USA: Oxford University Press. Hardback, 272 Seiten, ISBN: 9780198838333.

How does budgeting work for international organizations within the United Nations system? What role do states as complex principals and international bureaucracies as complex agents play within budgeting processes? By providing four case studies on the UN, ILO, UNESCO, and WHO, the authors of “Managing Money and Discord in the UN – Budgeting and Bureaucracy” offer valuable insights on budgeting and its procedures in the UN System of organizations. Their findings demonstrate that despite global financial crisis and significant structural changes in global politics, the core budget routines of international organizations have remained relatively stable over the past decades. However, with vested interests of powerful member states, complementary financial arrangements outside the core organizations, diverging intraorganizational priorities, or the rise of philanthropy and voluntary contributions, complexities for both principals and agents have increased, which ultimately put the capacity of international bureaucracies to maintain budgetary routines at risk. By bridging the gap between related, but distinct disciplines within political science, the concept of budgeting put forward in this book is equally important for the study of International Relations, International Public Administrations, Political Economy, and Public Policy.

Why National Ministries Consider the Policy Advice of International Bureaucracies: Survey Evidence from 106 Countries

Scholars of international relations and public administration widely assume that international bureaucracies, in their role as policy advisors, directly influence countries’ domestic policies. Yet, this is not true across the board. Why do some countries closely consider the advice of international bureaucracies while others do not? This article argues that international bureaucracies’ standing as sources of expertise is crucial. We tested this argument using data from a unique survey that measured prevalent practices of advice utilization in thematically specialized policy units of national ministries in a representative sample of more than a hundred countries. Our findings show that ministries’ perceptions of international bureaucracies’ expertise, that is, specialized and reliable knowledge, are the key factor. International bureaucracies influence national ministries directly and without the support of other actors that may also have an interest in the international bureaucracies’ policy advice. Our analysis also demonstrates that the effects of alternative means of influence, such as third-party pressure and coercion, are themselves partly dependent on international bureaucracies’ reputation as experts. The findings presented in this article reinforce the emphasis on expertise as a source of international bureaucracies’ influence, and provide a crucial test of its importance.

Policy recommendations of international bureaucracies: the importance of country-specificity

Many international bureaucracies give policy advice to national administrative units. Why is the advice given by some international bureaucracies more influential than the recommendations of others? We argue that targeting advice to member states through national embeddedness and country-tailored research increases the influence of policy advice. Subsequently, we test how these characteristics shape the relative influence of 15 international bureaucracies’ advice in four financial policy areas through a global survey of national administrations from more than 80 countries. Our findings support arguments that global blueprints need to be adapted and translated to become meaningful for country-level work. Points for practitioners National administrations are advised by an increasing number of international bureaucracies, and they cannot listen to all of this advice. Whereas some international bureaucracies give ‘one-size-fits-all’ recommendations to rather diverse countries, others cater their recommendations to the national audience. Investigating financial policy recommendations, we find that national embeddedness and country-tailored advice render international bureaucracies more influential.

The heart of bureaucratic power: Explaining international bureaucracies’ expert authority

Expert authority is regarded as the heart of international bureaucracies’ power. To measure whether international bureaucracies’ expert authority is indeed recognised and deferred to, we draw on novel data from a survey of a key audience: officials in the policy units of national ministries in 121 countries. Respondents were asked to what extent they recognised the expert authority of nine international bureaucracies in various thematic areas of agricultural and financial policy. The results show wide variance. To explain this variation, we test well-established assumptions on the sources of de facto expert authority. Specifically, we look at ministry officials’ perceptions of these sources and, thus, focus on a less-studied aspect of the authority relationship. We examine the role of international bureaucracies’ perceived impartiality, objectivity, global impact, and the role of knowledge asymmetries. Contrary to common assumptions, we find that de facto expert authority does not rest on impartiality perceptions, and that perceived objectivity plays the smallest role of all factors considered. We find some indications that knowledge asymmetries are associated with more expert authority. Still, and robust to various alternative specifications, the perception that international bureaucracies are effectively addressing global challenges is the most important factor.

Connecting International Relations and Public Administration: Toward A Joint Research Agenda for the Study of International Bureaucracy

The recent debate on administrative bodies in international organizations has brought forward multiple theoretical perspectives, analytical frameworks, and methodological approaches. Despite these efforts to advance knowledge on these actors, the research program on international public administrations (IPAs) has missed out on two important opportunities: reflection on scholarship in international relations (IR) and public administration and synergies between these disciplinary perspectives. Against this backdrop, the essay is a discussion of the literature on IPAs in IR and public administration. We found influence, authority, and autonomy of international bureaucracies have been widely addressed and helped to better understand the agency of such non-state actors in global policy-making. Less attention has been given to the crucial macro-level context of politics for administrative bodies, despite the importance in IR and public administration scholarship. We propose a focus on agency and politics as future avenues for a comprehensive, joint research agenda for international bureaucracies.

UNESCO: Between Sectoral Fragmentation and Budget Crisis

Chapter 7 examines the case of UNESCO and the effects of the sectoral and vertical fragmentation of the organization. The case is particularly pertinent since the US stopped its contributions after Palestine was admitted as a member in 2011, resulting in a major financial crisis for the organization. Despite the need for rigorous cutback management, budgeting procedures and budgeting administration have remained highly routinized. While this highlights the important procedural role of international bureaucrats and their ability to ensure the continued functioning of IOs, these solutions also show the limits to the substantive influence of international bureaucracies in budgeting. In essence, UNESCO remains an organization that is highly fragmented along policy lines, horizontally and vertically, and both among member states as well as inside its own bureaucracy. This results in budgetary segmentation and increased proceduralization well beyond the core budgeting stages regulated by formal rules.

Theory: Understanding Budgeting in International Organizations

Chapter 2 presents the theoretical contribution of the book as it seeks to go beyond recent discussions that consider either principal complexity or agency complexity as key drivers of organizational dynamics in international organizations. It also introduces the main outcomes of interest with regard to UN budgeting: proceduralization, routinization, and budgetary segmentation. By combining both types of complexity and by studying these outcomes, one can make predictions about the types of budgets to expect in international organizations; one can make assumptions about various dynamics of IO budgeting procedures; and one can understand how conflicts in international bureaucracies relate to disagreements amongst member states. This advances important conceptual and theoretical debates that started, in particular, with Hawkins et al.’s Delegation and Agency in International Organizations. It also enlarges a theoretical understanding of budgeting under complex principal–agent constellations more broadly.