The Military Tactics of Caesar and of To-day

1914 ◽  
Vol 8 (9) ◽  
pp. 69
Author(s):  
Roland G. Kent
Author(s):  
Pratyay Nath

What can war tell us about empire? Climate of Conquest is built around this question. Pratyay Nath eschews the conventional way of writing about warfare primarily in terms of battles and technologies. Instead, he unravels the deep connections that Mughal war-making shared with the broader dynamics of society, culture, and politics. In the process, he offers a new analysis of the Mughal empire from the vantage point of war. Climate of Conquest closely studies the dynamics of the military campaigns that helped the Mughals conquer North India and project their power beyond it. In the first part, Nath argues that these campaigns unfolded in constant negotiation with the diverse natural environment of South Asia. The empire sought to discipline the environment and harness its resources to satisfy its own military needs. At the same time, environmental factors like climate, terrain, and ecology profoundly influenced Mughal military tactics, strategy, and deployment of technology. In the second part, Nath makes three main points. Firstly, he argues that Mughal military success owed a lot to the efficient management of military logistics and the labour of an enormous non-elite, non-combatant workforce. Secondly, he explores the making of imperial frontiers and highlights the roles of forts, routes, and local alliances in the process. Finally, he maps the cultural climate of war at the Mughal court and discusses how the empire legitimized war and conquest. In the process, what emerges is a fresh interpretation of Mughal empire-building as a highly adaptive, flexible, and accommodative process.


2020 ◽  
pp. 1-37
Author(s):  
Omar Ashour

This chapter introduces the puzzle of the military endurance and combat effectiveness of ISIS/IS, though outnumbered and outgunned by substantially stronger state and nonstate militaries. Beginning with the academic study of insurgency dating back to Lawrence, Mao, Templar, Lansdale, Guevara, Galula, Hoffman and more recent scholars; this book explores traditional factors associated with insurgency success, such as the support of an external power, popular support from the disaffected population, sanctuary, geography or topography, regime type, or other factors, which might, individually or in combination, be explanatory of ISIS/IS endurance and expansion. Most of those factors are found not to be especially significant, so the chapter focuses on the military strategies and tactics employed by ISIS/IS and central to its successes. The chapter then argues that the military tactics employed by ISIS/IS in the four countries and elsewhere better explain their expansion and endurance. The chapter concludes by outlining a framework of analysis explaining ISIS/IS combat effectiveness in the four countries and beyond.


Author(s):  
Christine Cheng

Building on Liberia’s social and political inheritance, this chapter places the Liberian civil war in historical context and shows how conflict dynamics affected the development of extralegal groups. It examines the period of political instability leading up to the war (1979–89) and the post-conflict transition period that followed it (post-2003), as well as the war itself (1989–2003). The emphasis is not on the battles fought, nor the military tactics employed. Instead, the intention is to understand how the practices and interactions that were specific to Liberia’s war impacted upon the emergence of extralegal groups. Understanding the war economy, its incentives, and the patterns of interaction embedded within it is critical to the commodity chapters that follow. War leaves behind a legacy of conflict capital, and this legacy of relationships, interactions, and social expectations persists long after war ends.


1999 ◽  
Vol 27 (1) ◽  
pp. 29-33
Author(s):  
Darren Kew

In many respects, the least important part of the 1999 elections were the elections themselves. From the beginning of General Abdusalam Abubakar’s transition program in mid-1998, most Nigerians who were not part of the wealthy “political class” of elites—which is to say, most Nigerians— adopted their usual politically savvy perspective of siddon look (sit and look). They waited with cautious optimism to see what sort of new arrangement the military would allow the civilian politicians to struggle over, and what in turn the civilians would offer the public. No one had any illusions that anything but high-stakes bargaining within the military and the political class would determine the structures of power in the civilian government. Elections would influence this process to the extent that the crowd influences a soccer match.


1978 ◽  
Vol 114 (2) ◽  
pp. 289c-289
Author(s):  
R. L. Garcia
Keyword(s):  

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