Reelection and Representation in Conflict: The Case of Agenda Manipulation

1990 ◽  
Vol 15 (2) ◽  
pp. 263 ◽  
Author(s):  
John D. Wilkerson
Keyword(s):  



1987 ◽  
Vol 81 (3) ◽  
pp. 873-896 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jonathan Bendor ◽  
Serge Taylor ◽  
Roland Van Gaalen

Empirical studies suggest that mission-oriented bureaucrats bias their design of program alternatives to increase the odds that a superior will choose the kind of program the officials want. However, political executives may anticipate this manipulation and try to reassert control. These struggles are examined in three models. In Model 1 a senior bureaucrat is interested only in missions; the bureaucrat's political superior controls him or her by rejecting inferior proposals and entertaining new options from other policy specialists. Model 2 is a principal-agent analysis. Here the official is interested only in budgets; the official's superior reduces search bias by creating an ex ante incentive scheme. In Model 3 the bureaucrat cares about both budgets and programs; the superior uses both his or her final review authority and ex ante incentives to reduce agenda manipulation. The models' contrasting implications for the political control of bureaucracy are examined.



2016 ◽  
Vol 95 ◽  
pp. 113-136 ◽  
Author(s):  
Franz Dietrich


2017 ◽  
Vol 12 (1) ◽  
pp. 211-247 ◽  
Author(s):  
Salvador Barberà ◽  
Anke Gerber




1998 ◽  
Vol 15 (2) ◽  
pp. 289-296 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michael Dummett


1982 ◽  
Vol 2 (1) ◽  
pp. 123 ◽  
Author(s):  
Christopher Long ◽  
Susan Rose-Ackerman
Keyword(s):  


2014 ◽  
Author(s):  
Salvador Barberr ◽  
Anke Gerber


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