Agenda Manipulation under Doctrinal Paradox

2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Masaki Miyashita
Keyword(s):  
Doctrinal Paradox ◽  
Agenda Manipulation

Reelection and Representation in Conflict: The Case of Agenda Manipulation

1990 ◽  
Vol 15 (2) ◽  
pp. 263 ◽  
Author(s):  
John D. Wilkerson
Keyword(s):  
Agenda Manipulation

Sophisticated Voting and Agenda Manipulation

2017 ◽  
pp. 192-213
Keyword(s):  
Agenda Manipulation

Stacking the Deck: Bureaucratic Missions and Policy Design

1987 ◽  
Vol 81 (3) ◽  
pp. 873-896 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jonathan Bendor ◽  
Serge Taylor ◽  
Roland Van Gaalen
Keyword(s):  
Policy Design ◽  
Empirical Studies ◽  
Political Control ◽  
The Political ◽  
Principal Agent ◽  
Incentive Scheme ◽  
Ex Ante ◽  
Search Bias ◽  
Agenda Manipulation

Empirical studies suggest that mission-oriented bureaucrats bias their design of program alternatives to increase the odds that a superior will choose the kind of program the officials want. However, political executives may anticipate this manipulation and try to reassert control. These struggles are examined in three models. In Model 1 a senior bureaucrat is interested only in missions; the bureaucrat's political superior controls him or her by rejecting inferior proposals and entertaining new options from other policy specialists. Model 2 is a principal-agent analysis. Here the official is interested only in budgets; the official's superior reduces search bias by creating an ex ante incentive scheme. In Model 3 the bureaucrat cares about both budgets and programs; the superior uses both his or her final review authority and ex ante incentives to reduce agenda manipulation. The models' contrasting implications for the political control of bureaucracy are examined.

How Do Individuals Solve the Doctrinal Paradox in Collective Decisions?

2007 ◽  
Vol 18 (9) ◽  
pp. 753-755 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jean-François Bonnefon
Keyword(s):  
Collective Decisions ◽  
Doctrinal Paradox

scholarly journals Belief Merging and Judgment Aggregation in Fuzzy Setting

2012 ◽  
Vol 2012 ◽  
pp. 1-5 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ismat Beg ◽  
Nabeel Butt
Keyword(s):  
Fuzzy Logic ◽  
Social Choice ◽  
Choice Theory ◽  
Social Choice Theory ◽  
Judgment Aggregation ◽  
Belief Merging ◽  
Aggregation Functions ◽  
Fuzzy Aggregation ◽  
Doctrinal Paradox ◽  
Fuzzy Setting

We explore how judgment aggregation and belief merging in the framework of fuzzy logic can help resolve the “Doctrinal Paradox.” We also illustrate the use of fuzzy aggregation functions in social choice theory.

scholarly journals Judgment aggregation and agenda manipulation

2016 ◽  
Vol 95 ◽  
pp. 113-136 ◽  
Author(s):  
Franz Dietrich
Keyword(s):  
Judgment Aggregation ◽  
Agenda Manipulation

The doctrinal paradox and the mixed-motivation problem

Analysis ◽  
2006 ◽  
Vol 66 (1) ◽  
pp. 35-39 ◽  
Author(s):  
L. Bovens
Keyword(s):  
Doctrinal Paradox

scholarly journals Sequential voting and agenda manipulation

2017 ◽  
Vol 12 (1) ◽  
pp. 211-247 ◽  
Author(s):  
Salvador Barberà ◽  
Anke Gerber
Keyword(s):  
Sequential Voting ◽  
Agenda Manipulation

Epistemic Failures of Majority Rule: Real and Imagined

2012 ◽  
Author(s):  
Hélène Landemore
Keyword(s):  
Majority Rule ◽  
Free Riding ◽  
Impossibility Theorem ◽  
Discursive Dilemma ◽  
Voting Paradox ◽  
Doctrinal Paradox ◽  
Arrow's Impossibility Theorem ◽  
Systematic Biases ◽  
Epistemic Approach ◽  
General Objection

This chapter addresses a series of objections to the claimed epistemic properties of majority rule and, more generally, aggregation of judgments. It first considers a general objection to the epistemic approach to voting, which supposedly does not take seriously enough the possibility that politics is about aggregation of interests, rather than aggregation of judgments. The chapter also considers the objection from Arrow's Impossibility Theorem and the doctrinal paradox (or discursive dilemma). Next, the chapter addresses the problem of informational free riding supposedly afflicting citizens in mass democracies, as well as the problem of the voting paradox (as a by-product). Finally, the chapter turns to a refutation of the objection that citizens suffer from systematic biases that are amplified at the collective level.

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