Agenda Manipulation under Doctrinal Paradox

2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Masaki Miyashita

1990 ◽  
Vol 15 (2) ◽  
pp. 263 ◽  
Author(s):  
John D. Wilkerson
Keyword(s):  




1987 ◽  
Vol 81 (3) ◽  
pp. 873-896 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jonathan Bendor ◽  
Serge Taylor ◽  
Roland Van Gaalen

Empirical studies suggest that mission-oriented bureaucrats bias their design of program alternatives to increase the odds that a superior will choose the kind of program the officials want. However, political executives may anticipate this manipulation and try to reassert control. These struggles are examined in three models. In Model 1 a senior bureaucrat is interested only in missions; the bureaucrat's political superior controls him or her by rejecting inferior proposals and entertaining new options from other policy specialists. Model 2 is a principal-agent analysis. Here the official is interested only in budgets; the official's superior reduces search bias by creating an ex ante incentive scheme. In Model 3 the bureaucrat cares about both budgets and programs; the superior uses both his or her final review authority and ex ante incentives to reduce agenda manipulation. The models' contrasting implications for the political control of bureaucracy are examined.



2007 ◽  
Vol 18 (9) ◽  
pp. 753-755 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jean-François Bonnefon


2012 ◽  
Vol 2012 ◽  
pp. 1-5 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ismat Beg ◽  
Nabeel Butt

We explore how judgment aggregation and belief merging in the framework of fuzzy logic can help resolve the “Doctrinal Paradox.” We also illustrate the use of fuzzy aggregation functions in social choice theory.



2016 ◽  
Vol 95 ◽  
pp. 113-136 ◽  
Author(s):  
Franz Dietrich


Analysis ◽  
2006 ◽  
Vol 66 (1) ◽  
pp. 35-39 ◽  
Author(s):  
L. Bovens
Keyword(s):  


2017 ◽  
Vol 12 (1) ◽  
pp. 211-247 ◽  
Author(s):  
Salvador Barberà ◽  
Anke Gerber


Author(s):  
Hélène Landemore

This chapter addresses a series of objections to the claimed epistemic properties of majority rule and, more generally, aggregation of judgments. It first considers a general objection to the epistemic approach to voting, which supposedly does not take seriously enough the possibility that politics is about aggregation of interests, rather than aggregation of judgments. The chapter also considers the objection from Arrow's Impossibility Theorem and the doctrinal paradox (or discursive dilemma). Next, the chapter addresses the problem of informational free riding supposedly afflicting citizens in mass democracies, as well as the problem of the voting paradox (as a by-product). Finally, the chapter turns to a refutation of the objection that citizens suffer from systematic biases that are amplified at the collective level.



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