scholarly journals Sequential voting and agenda manipulation

2017 ◽  
Vol 12 (1) ◽  
pp. 211-247 ◽  
Author(s):  
Salvador Barberà ◽  
Anke Gerber

2014 ◽  
Author(s):  
Salvador Barberr ◽  
Anke Gerber


2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Harisu Abdullahi Shehu ◽  
William Browne ◽  
Hedwig Eisenbarth

Emotion categorization can be the process of identifying different emotions in humans based on their facial expressions. It requires time and sometimes it is hard for human classifiers to agree with each other about an emotion category of a facial expression. However, machine learning classifiers have done well in classifying different emotions and have widely been used in recent years to facilitate the task of emotion categorization. Much research on emotion video databases uses a few frames from when emotion is expressed at peak to classify emotion, which might not give a good classification accuracy when predicting frames where the emotion is less intense. In this paper, using the CK+ emotion dataset as an example, we use more frames to analyze emotion from mid and peak frame images and compared our results to a method using fewer peak frames. Furthermore, we propose an approach based on sequential voting and apply it to more frames of the CK+ database. Our approach resulted in up to 85.9% accuracy for the mid frames and overall accuracy of 96.5% for the CK+ database compared with the accuracy of 73.4% and 93.8% from existing techniques.



1990 ◽  
Vol 15 (2) ◽  
pp. 263 ◽  
Author(s):  
John D. Wilkerson
Keyword(s):  




2019 ◽  
Vol 33 (1-2) ◽  
pp. 159-191 ◽  
Author(s):  
Cristina Cornelio ◽  
Maria Silvia Pini ◽  
Francesca Rossi ◽  
Kristen Brent Venable


1987 ◽  
Vol 81 (3) ◽  
pp. 873-896 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jonathan Bendor ◽  
Serge Taylor ◽  
Roland Van Gaalen

Empirical studies suggest that mission-oriented bureaucrats bias their design of program alternatives to increase the odds that a superior will choose the kind of program the officials want. However, political executives may anticipate this manipulation and try to reassert control. These struggles are examined in three models. In Model 1 a senior bureaucrat is interested only in missions; the bureaucrat's political superior controls him or her by rejecting inferior proposals and entertaining new options from other policy specialists. Model 2 is a principal-agent analysis. Here the official is interested only in budgets; the official's superior reduces search bias by creating an ex ante incentive scheme. In Model 3 the bureaucrat cares about both budgets and programs; the superior uses both his or her final review authority and ex ante incentives to reduce agenda manipulation. The models' contrasting implications for the political control of bureaucracy are examined.



Author(s):  
Lirong Xia ◽  
Jérôme Lang ◽  
Mingsheng Ying


2017 ◽  
Vol 90 ◽  
pp. 141-144 ◽  
Author(s):  
Natalia M. Novikova ◽  
Irina I. Pospelova


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