On Intrinsic Value and Environmental Ethics

Author(s):  
Bob Pepperman Taylor
2020 ◽  
Vol 29 (3) ◽  
pp. 317-337 ◽  
Author(s):  
Chelsea Batavia ◽  
Jeremy T. Bruskotter ◽  
Michael Paul Nelson

Though largely a theoretical endeavour, environmental ethics also has a practical agenda to help humans achieve environmental sustainability. Environmental ethicists have extensively debated the grounds, contents and implications of our moral obligations to nonhuman nature, offering up different notions of an 'environmental ethic' with the presumption that, if humans adopt such an environmental ethic, they will then engage in less environmentally damaging behaviours. We assess this presumption, drawing on psychological research to discuss whether or under what conditions an environmental ethic might engender pro-environmental behaviour. We focus discussion on three lines of scholarship in the environmental ethics literature, on 1) intrinsic value, 2) care ethics, and 3) the land ethic. We conclude by commenting generally on both the limits and transformative potential of an environmental ethic in its larger sociocultural context.


Author(s):  
Bartosz Bartkowski

Massive population declines and species extinction have characterized the 20th and early 21st centuries. These local and global phenomena do not only involve the loss of particular species, habitats, and ecosystem services; they also result in a general reduction in biotic diversity. Ecological research has long indicated the importance of biodiversity within and across ecosystems. However, capturing the economic value of biodiversity remains a challenge. Biodiversity is a multidimensional public good; it encompasses the diversity of genes, species, functional groups, habitats, and ecosystems. A large empirical literature in biology and ecology indicates that biodiversity has a stabilizing effect on ecosystems—the higher the biodiversity within a given ecosystem type, the more well-functioning (productive, stable, and resilient) is the ecosystem. However, the economic importance of biodiversity goes beyond this stabilizing effect. The multidimensionality and complexity of the biodiversity concept has resulted in a multitude of approaches to its economic valuation. While the theoretical and conceptual literature has focused on biodiversity as insurance and as a pool of options, empirical studies have been much more diverse. Given the public-good nature and complexity of biodiversity, stated preference methods are particularly common. The focus on biodiversity valuation has fostered many important theoretical and methodological developments. Many estimates exist of the willingness to pay for biodiversity conservation in different countries across the world; however, relatively few studies have been conducted in developing countries despite the considerably higher biodiversity levels there as compared with the better-covered developed countries. Valuation of biodiversity is a controversial subject, and the economic, predominantly anthropocentric approach has been criticized frequently. However, non-anthropocentric accounts of biodiversity value are problematic for their own reasons; an important question is whether biodiversity has intrinsic value and, if yes, whether this can be captured within the economic perspective. Valuation of biodiversity remains a vibrant topic at the intersections of disciplines such as ecology, environmental ethics, and economics.


The Monist ◽  
1992 ◽  
Vol 75 (2) ◽  
pp. 227-235 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jim Cheney ◽  

1994 ◽  
Vol 36 ◽  
pp. 89-101 ◽  
Author(s):  
Keekok Lee

This paper will argue for a conception of intrinsic value which, it is hoped, will do justice to the following issues:(1) that Nature need not and should not be understood to refer only to what exists on this planet, Earth;(2) that an environmental ethics informed by features unique to Earth may be misleading and prove inadequate as technology increasingly threatens to invade and colonize other planets in the solar system;(3) that a comprehensive environmental ethics must encompass not only our attitude to Earth, but to other planets as well—in other words, it must not simply be an Earthbound but virtually an astronomically bounded ethics.


2009 ◽  
Vol 43 ◽  
pp. 167-185
Author(s):  
Trish Glazebrook ◽  

This paper is an application of Heidegger’s work to issues in sustainability and environmental justice that demonstrates the value and significance of his work beyond traditional contexts for analysis of his thinking. It argues that Heidegger prompts a constructive environmental phenomenology, which is developed around three themes: physics and teleology; dwelling in nature; and the social obligations of the sciences. Aristotle’s Physics is shown to provide Heidegger with a teleological conception of nature that promotes its intrinsic value. This analysis is used toward an environmental ethics of “dwelling,” in contrast to consumer culture’s reduction of nature to resource. Finally, Heidegger’s potential contribution to debates concerning the social obligations of the sciences is developed. Throughout these analyses, his work is connected with principles of deep ecology, social ecology and ecofeminism, and his applicability to environmental issues in international development is demonstrated. In conclusion, Heideggerian ecophenomenology is argued to promote sustainability and environmental justice insofar as it supports an alternative to the logic of domination currently overrunning the globe.


Topoi ◽  
2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Konrad Werner ◽  
Magdalena Kiełkowicz-Werner

AbstractTwo major philosophical movements have sought to fundamentally rethink the relationship between humans and their environment(s): environmental ethics and enactivism. Surprisingly, they virtually never refer to or seek inspiration from each other. The goal of this analysis is to bridge the gap. Our main purpose, then, is to address, from the enactivist angle, the conceptual backbone of environmental ethics, namely the concept of intrinsic value. We argue that intrinsic value does indeed exist, yet its "intrinsicality" does not boil down to being independent of the interests and needs of humans. Rather, it is brought forth by what we call shared enaction of an axiological domain. The latter is built upon such core posits of enactivism as autonomy, enaction, participatory sense-making as well as the most recent concept of loving as knowing proposed by Hanne De Jaegher.


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