scholarly journals Multinational Federalism and Fiscal Autonomy

Author(s):  
François Boucher
Keyword(s):  
2004 ◽  
pp. 126-141
Author(s):  
A. Chernyavsky ◽  
K. Vartapetov

By employing the methodology developed by the OECD the paper assesses the degree of revenue decentralization in Russia in comparison with other post-communist European countries. The paper provides theoretical arguments underpinning fiscal decentralization, analyzes the composition of subnational government revenues, the level of regional and local tax autonomy and types of intergovernmental fiscal transfers. The analysis presents the composition of revenues depending on the degree of subnational and local government control. In comparison with other transition countries fiscal decentralization in Russia is relatively low. It is concluded that Russia's public finance reform has not progressed towards providing greater fiscal autonomy for regional and local governments.


2020 ◽  
pp. 5-27
Author(s):  
S. M. Drobyshevsky ◽  
N. S. Kostrykina ◽  
A. V. Korytin

The problem of efficiency of regional tax expenditures is an actual issue of the fiscal policy and fiscal federalism in Russia. A large fiscal autonomy allows federal subjects to realize a more active tax policy to attract new investments. One cannot claim current fiscal powers of the Russian regions to be wide. However, not all the regions use even existing tax policy instruments. Moreover, out of the regions that use them only few provide incentives to stimulate investment decisions. Others use regional tax measures to support businesses that already have strong positions in the region. And it is an open question whether such tax incentives are efficient. On the other hand, an aggressive tax competition for investors can also be wasteful for regional budgets. In this paper, we calculate indicators that characterize the depth and scope of tax exemptions provided at the regional level. The calculations are based on the open tax statistics. Through the analysis of the tax legislation as well as the economic structure of selected regions, we reveal the inducements of their higher activity: federal regional tax policy, tax competition or benefits for budget-forming companies of the region.


2016 ◽  
Vol 6 (3) ◽  
pp. 1 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lukio Mrutu ◽  
Pendo Mganga

Outsourcing revenue collection in Local Government Authorities  has been adopted as a mechanism to solve the previous problems of revenue collection which resulted into loss and missmanagement of the whole process. One of the expectations was to increase revenue collection which will  provide a room for fiscal autonomy. However, experience from few local government authorities which have outsourced their revenue collection shows that, the whole process of outsourcing has not yielded the expected outcome especially on enabling local authorities to have fiscal autonomy instead it has turned to benefit the private agent who collect Tax. By using secondary data this paper attempts to show how the process of outsourcing is benefiting the private agent and therefore it is like giving everything out. It concludes that, though outsourcing seems to benefit local authorities by reducing some tasks especially on tax collection, outsorcing benefits much a private agent and therefore quick meausures should be adopted including building the capacity of Local Authorities in identifying the sources of revenue and  in estimating the actual collections so as to have clear picture of how much will be generated by the agent and what should be the appropriate amount to be submitted to the Local authority.


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