Assuming Direct Control:

Oil-rich countries have oftentimes been confronted with the challenge of diversifying their economies away from oil dependence given the exhaustible nature of these fossil fuels. Investing in sovereign wealth funds has been one of the most ubiquitous ways of preparing for the post-oil period. Investing in sovereign wealth funds rather than directly injecting the oil revenues in the economy not only precludes the outbreak of the Dutch Disease (which is known for giving rise to an exchange rate appreciation, crowding out non-oil industries and keeping the economy reliant on oil), but it also saves for future generations. Yet, in the case of Azerbaijan, the Sovereign Wealth Fund of Azerbaijan (SOFAZ), founded in 1999, has only increased this reliance on oil. Using the rentier states theoretical framework, this paper will argue that the direct control over SOFAZ exercised by the president and the lack of consultation with the NGOs have made corruption easier, making the task of economic diversification more difficult. This has been possible because through corruption the president has often resorted to oil money to buy peace rather than invest it in economic diversification. As a result, since the foundation of SOFAZ, the country is more reliant, not less, on oil. Full text available at: https://doi.org/10.22215/rera.v8i1.223

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The Qizilbāsh and their Shah: The Preservation of Royal Prerogative during the Early Reign of Shah Ṭahmāsp

Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society ◽

10.1017/s1356186321000250 ◽

2021 ◽

pp. 1-16

Author(s):

GREGORY ALDOUS

Keyword(s):

The Other ◽

Close Reading ◽

Direct Control ◽

Historical Literature

Abstract Modern historians of Persia's Safavid period (1501–1722) have long assumed that there was an interregnum between the death of Shah Ismāʿīl I in 1524 and the date when his son Ṭahmāsp came of age and established direct control in the 1530s. This idea of an interregnum takes two forms in the historiography. According to one narrative, during this time the Qizilbāsh amirs were disloyal to the young Ṭahmāsp and tried to seize control of Persia for themselves. According to the other, there was a war of succession in which Qizilbāsh factions supported different sons of Ismāʿīl I. Both of these narratives co-exist in the contemporary historical literature even though they disagree. Based on a close reading of the early Safavid chronicles, this article demonstrates that both narratives are incorrect and there was no interregnum. The Qizilbāsh continued throughout Ṭahmāsp's minority to respect him and treat him as their leader. Unsurprisingly, given his youth and inexperience, he deferred matters of state to his amirs. Nevertheless, his amirs derived their legitimacy to rule from him, and when leadership passed from one amir to another, it did so only with Ṭahmāsp's approval. Moreover, there was no dispute over the succession during Ṭahmāsp's minority.

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RECENT INVESTIGATIONS AT TULA CHICO, TULA, HIDALGO

Ancient Mesoamerica ◽

10.1017/s0956536120000139 ◽

2021 ◽

Vol 32 (1) ◽

pp. 41-55

Author(s):

Robert H. Cobean ◽

Dan M. Healan ◽

María Elena Suárez

Keyword(s):

Classic Period ◽

Cultural Continuity ◽

Direct Control ◽

Early Postclassic ◽

Initial Settlement ◽

Show Evidence ◽

History Of

AbstractRecent excavations at Tula Chico, the monumental center for Tula's earliest settlement, revealed a long and complex history of occupation, beginning with its initial settlement in the Middle Classic period by Coyotlatelco peoples, when much of the region was under Teotihuacan's direct control. During the Epiclassic period, a program of monumental construction began that developed the monumental complex seen today over a period of about 200 years. Although Tula Chico was superseded by Tula Grande, the monumental center for the Early Postclassic city, it continued to be occupied and maintained until its destruction by fire. Tula Chico and Tula Grande show evidence of clear cultural continuity in ceramics, architecture, and sculpture, including “Toltec style” sculpture characteristic of Tula Grande that is present in temporally early contexts at Tula Chico.

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Institutional Transformation and Enterprise Change in an Emergent Capitalist Economy: The Case of Hungary

Organization Studies ◽

10.1177/017084069801900205 ◽

1998 ◽

Vol 19 (2) ◽

pp. 259-280 ◽

Cited By ~ 68

Author(s):

Richard Whitley ◽

Laszlo Czaban

Keyword(s):

Eastern Europe ◽

Institutional Environment ◽

Institutional Transformation ◽

Foreign Firms ◽

State Socialism ◽

Organizational Changes ◽

Direct Control ◽

Liberal Democracies ◽

Financial Difficulties ◽

State Enterprises

The collapse of state socialism in Eastern Europe has transformed many of the institutions governing state enterprises and was expected to lead to radical changes in enterprise structures and practices. This was especially so where ownership had changed. However, just as new constitutions do not create liberal democracies overnight, so too the withdrawal of the state from direct control over the economy and privatization does not automatically generate dramatic enterprise transformations. This study of 27 Hungarian enterprises in the early 1990s shows that products and the markets served changed remarkably little, and the employment and organizational changes that have taken place in most enterprises have been less radical than might be expected. Ownership changes have not always led to major shifts in control, nor have private owners implemented sharply different policies from state controllers. The highly fluid institutional environment limited the commitment to, and capacity for, major strategic changes in most substantial Hungarian enterprises. Where changes have occurred, they have been most significant in: (a) state enterprises that are in severe financial difficulties, and (b) companies controlled by foreign firms.

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