THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF AN ANTI-RENT-SEEKING EQUALITY AGENDA

2018 ◽  
pp. 23-44
Author(s):  
Dean Baker
Keyword(s):  
Political Economy ◽  
Rent Seeking ◽  
The Political

The Political Economy of Rent-Seeking

1989 ◽  
Vol 55 (4) ◽  
pp. 1063 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jerry Evensky ◽  
Charles Rowley ◽  
Robert Tollison ◽  
Gordon Tullock
Keyword(s):  
Political Economy ◽  
Rent Seeking ◽  
The Political

scholarly journals The Case Against Patents

2013 ◽  
Vol 27 (1) ◽  
pp. 3-22 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michele Boldrin ◽  
David K Levine
Keyword(s):  
Political Economy ◽  
General Equilibrium ◽  
Empirical Evidence ◽  
Policy Change ◽  
Rent Seeking ◽  
Partial Equilibrium ◽  
The Political ◽  
General Equilibrium Effect ◽  
Equilibrium Effect ◽  
Over Time

The case against patents can be summarized briefly: there is no empirical evidence that they serve to increase innovation and productivity, unless productivity is identified with the number of patents awarded—which, as evidence shows, has no correlation with measured productivity. Both theory and evidence suggest that while patents can have a partial equilibrium effect of improving incentives to invent, the general equilibrium effect on innovation can be negative. A properly designed patent system might serve to increase innovation at a certain time and place. Unfortunately, the political economy of government-operated patent systems indicates that such systems are susceptible to pressures that cause the ill effects of patents to grow over time. Our preferred policy solution is to abolish patents entirely and to find other legislative instruments, less open to lobbying and rent seeking, to foster innovation when there is clear evidence that laissez-faire undersupplies it. However, if that policy change seems too large to swallow, we discuss in the conclusion a set of partial reforms that could be implemented

The political economy of pervasive rent-seeking

Thesis Eleven ◽  
2013 ◽  
Vol 115 (1) ◽  
pp. 112-126
Author(s):  
Raphael de Kadt ◽  
Charles Simkins
Keyword(s):  
Political Economy ◽  
Rent Seeking ◽  
The Political

The Political Economy of Dynamic Elections: Accountability, Commitment, and Responsiveness

2017 ◽  
Vol 55 (3) ◽  
pp. 916-984 ◽  
Author(s):  
John Duggan ◽  
César Martinelli
Keyword(s):  
Political Economy ◽  
Dynamic Models ◽  
Rent Seeking ◽  
Term Limits ◽  
Future Research ◽  
The Political ◽  
Imperfect Monitoring ◽  
Electoral Equilibrium ◽  
Commitment Problems ◽  
General Conditions

We survey the literature on dynamic elections in the traditional settings of spatial preferences and rent seeking under perfect and imperfect monitoring of politicians. We define stationary electoral equilibrium, which encompasses notions used by Barro (1973), Ferejohn (1986), Banks and Sundaram (1998), and others. We show that repeated elections mitigate the commitment problems of politicians and voters, and that a responsive democracy result holds under general conditions. Term limits, however, attenuate the responsiveness finding. We also touch on related applied work, and we point to areas for fruitful future research, including the connection between dynamic models of politics and economics. ( JEL D72, D82, D83)

Seeking Rents by Setting Rents: The Political Economy of Rent Seeking

1987 ◽  
Vol 97 (387) ◽  
pp. 685 ◽  
Author(s):  
Elie Appelbaum ◽  
Eliakim Katz
Keyword(s):  
Political Economy ◽  
Rent Seeking ◽  
The Political
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