scholarly journals The Case Against Patents

2013 ◽  
Vol 27 (1) ◽  
pp. 3-22 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michele Boldrin ◽  
David K Levine
Keyword(s):  
Political Economy ◽  
General Equilibrium ◽  
Empirical Evidence ◽  
Policy Change ◽  
Rent Seeking ◽  
Partial Equilibrium ◽  
The Political ◽  
General Equilibrium Effect ◽  
Equilibrium Effect ◽  
Over Time

The case against patents can be summarized briefly: there is no empirical evidence that they serve to increase innovation and productivity, unless productivity is identified with the number of patents awarded—which, as evidence shows, has no correlation with measured productivity. Both theory and evidence suggest that while patents can have a partial equilibrium effect of improving incentives to invent, the general equilibrium effect on innovation can be negative. A properly designed patent system might serve to increase innovation at a certain time and place. Unfortunately, the political economy of government-operated patent systems indicates that such systems are susceptible to pressures that cause the ill effects of patents to grow over time. Our preferred policy solution is to abolish patents entirely and to find other legislative instruments, less open to lobbying and rent seeking, to foster innovation when there is clear evidence that laissez-faire undersupplies it. However, if that policy change seems too large to swallow, we discuss in the conclusion a set of partial reforms that could be implemented

Macro/Micro Modelling and Gini Multi-Decomposition: An Application to the Philippines

2010 ◽  
Author(s):  
Stéphane Mussard ◽  
Luc Savard
Keyword(s):  
General Equilibrium ◽  
The Philippines ◽  
Equilibrium Analysis ◽  
Partial Equilibrium ◽  
Economic Modelling ◽  
Policy Reforms ◽  
Policy Makers ◽  
Partial Equilibrium Analysis ◽  
General Equilibrium Effect ◽  
Equilibrium Effect

Macro/micro-economic modelling has emerged as a rigorous instrument to link policy reforms with changes in income distribution. Indeed, this approach enables one to capture directly the general equilibrium effect of policy reforms upon changes in household welfare. These endogenous distributions combined with the Gini multi-decomposition provide powerful and detailed information for policy-makers interested in the trade-off between inequality and the efficient impact of reforms. Our results show that including the general equilibrium effect can yield results that differ from those of partial equilibrium analysis.

The Political Economy of Rent-Seeking

1989 ◽  
Vol 55 (4) ◽  
pp. 1063 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jerry Evensky ◽  
Charles Rowley ◽  
Robert Tollison ◽  
Gordon Tullock
Keyword(s):  
Political Economy ◽  
Rent Seeking ◽  
The Political

Climate Change, Conflicts and Migration

2020 ◽  
pp. 59-82
Author(s):  
Lisa Thalheimer ◽  
Christian Webersik
Keyword(s):  
Climate Change ◽  
Political Economy ◽  
Empirical Evidence ◽  
Environmental Problems ◽  
Per Se ◽  
And Migration ◽  
Governance Arrangements ◽  
Over Time

This chapter focuses on climate conflicts from a political economy perspective. Using the example of droughts in Somalia, the chapter investigates the different drivers of conflict and fragility over time, as well as the relation of changing actors in conflict, environmental disruptions and mixed migration. The chapter shows that there is no empirical evidence to state that climate change per se will increase the number of conflicts and migration. Instead, pre-existing conflicts exacerbate environmental problems that weaken local and national governance arrangements, as well as society’s capacities to deal with climatic shocks, which then can increase migration. However, the authors argue that these relations have to be seen with caution, as conflict-induced and climate-related migration cannot be yet clearly disentangled empirically. Thus, the authors conclude the need for streamlined, flexible governance measures to address climate conflicts.

The Political Economy of Trust

2019 ◽  
pp. 627-648
Author(s):  
Christian Bjørnskov
Keyword(s):  
Political Economy ◽  
Public Choice ◽  
Empirical Evidence ◽  
Government Policy ◽  
Social Trust ◽  
The Political ◽  
Institutional Changes ◽  
Reverse Causality ◽  
Quality Of Institutions

This chapter provides a selective survey of the literature on social trust in public choice and political economy. It outlines the empirical evidence and discusses theoretical channels through which social trust can affect the quality of institutions and policies, and the conditions under which such mechanisms are likely to work. It also addresses the discussion of reverse causality, that is, whether good institutions or policies actively create trust. It then discusses whether trust can be created or destroyed by activist government policy or accidental institutional changes. Its main focus is on the set of theories and evidence of the association between social trust and institutions of governance.

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