Market Reaction to Abnormal Inventory Growth: Evidence for Managerial Decision-Making

Author(s):  
Kirsten A. Cook ◽  
G. Ryan Huston ◽  
Michael R. Kinney ◽  
Jeffery S. Smith

Prior research demonstrates that manufacturing firms increase production (relative to sales) to transfer fixed costs from cost of goods sold (COGS) to inventory accounts, thereby increasing income to reach or surpass earnings thresholds. We examine how the market reacts to this earnings management strategy. We find that investors respond positively to inventory growth based on an expectation of increased future sales; however, this signal is weaker for inventory manipulators. Further, the market premium from meeting or beating analyst earnings forecasts by manipulating inventory is smaller than the premium for achieving this threshold absent inventory manipulation or through accrual manipulation. Finally, we examine firms considered to be “serial” inventory manipulators, finding that the market consistently discounts earnings beats for these firms, suggesting that inventory manipulation erodes investor confidence in firms’ earnings. Collectively, our results provide new insights into a challenge facing operations managers and finance managers in manufacturing firms.

Author(s):  
O. N. Romashkova ◽  
◽  
R. S. Lomovtsev ◽  
L. A. Ponomareva ◽  
◽  
...  

2003 ◽  
Vol 22 (1) ◽  
pp. 93-108 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ho Young Lee ◽  
Vivek Mande

This study examines how the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (PSLRA) affects auditors' incentives to curtail earnings management by client managers. The most significant reform of PSLRA was the elimination of joint and several liability under which auditors and other parties could be named to lawsuits because of ‘deep pockets’ rather than culpability. While the elimination of joint and several liability provides significant relief to auditors from litigation, opponents of PSLRA argue that it discourages meritorious lawsuits and lowers audit quality, reducing investor confidence in markets. The potential benefit would be greatest for Big 6 firms, who have the highest exposure (largest clients) and significant resources to pay damages. In this paper we argue that if PSLRA induces decreases in audit quality, then we should expect increases in the prevalence of accruals after this Act. To investigate this issue we examine the discretionary accruals of a sample of 2,600 companies three years before and after the act. Our results support this hypothesis. Specifically, we find that after PSLRA income-increasing discretionary accruals rise for auditees of Big 6 firms but not for auditees of non-Big 6 firms.


2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kai Wai Hui ◽  
Alfred Z. Liu ◽  
Yao Zhang

This study documents a stock return premium for meeting or beating management's own earnings guidance (MBMG) that is separate and distinct from the premium for meeting or beating analysts' earnings forecasts (MBAF) documented in prior literature. Cross-sectional analyses reveal that the MBMG premium relative to the MBAF premium increases when management guidance is more informative. We also find that MBMG is incrementally informative about a firm's future performance after considering MBAF. Our findings suggest that investors consider management earnings guidance to be a performance threshold in addition to analyst earnings forecasts when forming earnings expectations.


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