Executive equity incentives and opportunistic manager behavior: new evidence from a quasi-natural experiment

This study provides plausible causal evidence on the effect of executive equity incentives on opportunistic manager behavior. I exploit a unique setting created by the introduction of Financial Accounting Standard (FAS) 123R in 2005, which led to an exogenous increase in the cost of option pay, causing a substantial decline in option pay for some firms while leaving others largely unaffected. Using difference-in-differences analyses with a treatment group of firms that show a decline in option pay and two control groups, I find that the likelihood of a treatment firm meeting or beating analyst forecasts decreases by 14–20%. The results show that the relatively high levels of meet-or-beat before FAS 123R were largely driven by real activities manipulation such as abnormal asset sales and sales manipulation to beat analysts’ benchmarks, while accrual manipulation and analyst management were less relevant. Together, the results suggest that equity incentives encourage opportunistic actions to meet or beat earnings expectations, and a decline in option pay results in a decline in earnings management to meet earnings expectations.

Identifying the News in Analysts’ Earnings Forecasts Revisions: An Alternative to the Random Walk Expectation

Previous research indicates that analysts’ forecasts are superior to time series models as measures of investors’ earnings expectations. Nevertheless, research also documents predictable patterns in analysts’ forecasts and forecast errors. If investors are aware of these patterns, analysts’ forecast revisions measured using the random walk expectation are an incomplete representation of changes in investors’ earnings expectations. Investors can use knowledge of errors and biases in forecasts to improve upon the simple random walk expectation by incorporating conditioning information. Using data from 2005 to 2015, we compare associations between market-adjusted stock returns and alternative specifications of forecast revisions to determine which best represents changes in investors’ earnings expectations. We find forecast revisions measured using a ‘bandwagon expectations’ specification, which includes two prior analysts’ forecast signals and provides the most improvement over random-walk-based revision measures. Our findings demonstrate benefits to considering information beyond the previously issued analyst forecast when representing investors’ expectations of analysts’ forecasts.

The Distress Anomaly is Deeper than you Think: Evidence from Stocks and Bonds

The distress anomaly reflects the abnormally low returns of high credit risk stocks during financial distress. Evidence from stocks and corporate bonds reinforces the anomaly and challenges rationales based on shareholders’ ability to extract value from bondholders, time-varying betas, lottery-type preferences, biased earnings expectations, and limits-to-arbitrage. Moreover, mispricing of distressed stocks and bonds is associated with excess investment and excess external financing. Potential real distortions are materially understated when assessed based only on equity mispricing. We emphasize the important role of corporate bonds in dissecting the distress anomaly, and show that the anomaly is an unresolved puzzle.

The Earnings Expectations Game and the Dispersion Anomaly

This study examines the role of differences in firms’ propensity to meet earnings expectations in explaining why firms with high analyst forecast dispersion experience relatively low future stock returns. We first demonstrate that the negative relation between dispersion and returns is concentrated around earnings announcements. Next, we show that this relation disappears when we control for ex ante measures of firms’ propensity to meet earnings expectations and that the component of dispersion explained by these measures drives the return predictability of dispersion. We further demonstrate that firms with low analyst dispersion are substantially more likely to achieve positive earnings surprises and provide new evidence consistent with both expectations management and strategic forecast pessimism explaining this result. Overall, we conclude that investor mispricing of firms’ participation in the earnings-expectations game provides a viable explanation for the dispersion anomaly. Accepted by Brian Bushee, accounting.

Casting Conference Calls

We explore a subtle but important mechanism through which firms can control information flow to the markets. We find that firms that “cast” their conference calls by disproportionately calling on bullish analysts tend to underperform in the future. Firms that call on more favorable analysts experience more negative future earnings surprises and more future earnings restatements. A long–short portfolio that exploits this differential firm behavior earns abnormal returns of up to 149 basis points per month or almost 18% per year. We find similar evidence in an international sample of earnings call transcripts from the United Kingdom, Canada, France, and Japan. Firms with higher discretionary accruals, firms that barely meet/exceed earnings expectations, and firms (and their executives) that are about to issue equity, sell shares, and exercise options are all significantly more likely to cast their earnings calls. This paper was accepted by Tyler Shumway, finance.