scholarly journals Price, delivery time and retail service sensitive dual channel supply chain

2019 ◽  
Vol 0 (0) ◽  
pp. 0-0
Author(s):  
Brojeswar Pal ◽  
Leopoldo Eduardo Cardenas-Barron ◽  
Kripasindhu Chaudhuri
2020 ◽  
Vol 37 (02) ◽  
pp. 2050005
Author(s):  
Ciwei Dong ◽  
Liu Yang ◽  
Chi To Ng

In a dual-channel supply, the manufacturer sells the products by both a traditional channel via the retailer and an online channel directly. Comparing with the direct channel, the retailer may provide additional services to the traditional channel. This paper studies the quantity leadership for a dual-channel supply chain with retail service. The manufacturer decides the wholesale price of the products and its selling quantity via the online channel, and the retailer decides the service level and its selling quantity via the traditional channel. We consider three Cournot competition games: Manufacturer-as-leader game, retailer-as-leader game, and simultaneous game. Optimal solutions are derived for these games. Based on the optimal solutions, we investigate the quantity leadership/followership decisions for the manufacturer and retailer, associated with the changes of some parameters. We observe that when the service sensitivity parameters are low, being a follower is a dominant strategy for the retailer; otherwise, both strategies of manufacturer-as-leader (retailer as the follower) and retailer-as-leader (manufacturer as the follower) are Nash equilibriums. We further conduct the numerical studies to investigate the impacts of parameters related to the retail service, and discuss the insights of the findings.


2020 ◽  
Vol 54 (4) ◽  
pp. 1041-1056 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jiumei Chen ◽  
Wen Zhang ◽  
Zhiying Liu

With the rapid development of the Internet, many manufacturers nowadays are increasingly adopting a dual-channel to sell their products, i.e., the traditional retail channel and online direct channel. In this paper, we focus on retail service, manufacturer’s direct service and quality effort, and present an analytical framework to examine the optimal decisions in dual-channel supply chain between the manufacturer and the retailer. Considering the efficacy of different supply chain structures, centralized and decentralized models are established. By using the backwards induction and the two-stage optimization technique in Stackelberg game, the corresponding analytical equilibrium solutions are obtained. Our analysis shows that the degree of customer loyalty to the direct channel strongly influences the manufacturer’s and the retailer’s services and quality strategies in the decentralized dual-channel supply chain, but not in the centralized model. Our results also point out that compared to centralized model, for any given selling price, the ratio of profit margins of selling one unit in the direct and retail channels determines the retailer’s service strategy; and the manufacturer will raise the level of direct channel service, but put less effort on quality improvement in the decentralized model. Finally, numerical examples present the contrasting view that disparate interests within a dual-channel supply chain can actually realize improving outcomes.


2018 ◽  
Vol 13 (2) ◽  
pp. 351-374 ◽  
Author(s):  
Subrata Saha ◽  
Nikunja Mohan Modak ◽  
Shibaji Panda ◽  
Shib Sankar Sana

Purpose This paper aims to explore optimal pricing policies and characteristics of a two-level dual-channel supply chain under price- and delivery time-sensitive demand. Besides price of the product, the delivery lead time is also a crucial factor in customers’ purchase decisions. A longer delivery lead time would diminish customers’ acceptance and faithfulness on the online channel, while a shorter delivery lead time would lead to incorporation of a substantial amount of logistics costs. In formulation of mathematical model, the effects of delivery lead time on the manufacturer and the retailer’s pricing strategies and profits in cooperative and non-cooperative dual-channel supply chain are explained analytically. Design/methodology/approach The analytical models are formed for both non-cooperative and cooperative scenarios under inconsistent and consistent pricing. The authors examine whether revenue sharing (RS) contract or delivery cost sharing contract can solely coordinate the dual-channel supply chain. If a single contract fails, then the combination of RS contract with delivery cost sharing to achieve channel coordination is discussed. Findings It is found that the RS or delivery cost sharing contract cannot coordinate the channel individually but revenue and delivery cost sharing contract jointly coordinate the channel. All analytical results are illustrated numerically, along with sensitivity analysis. Research limitations/implications There are many correlated issues that need to be further investigated. First, one good extension to this research may include the consideration of the channel structure with competitive retailers. It will be interesting to analyze the performance of coordination mechanisms by considering the retailer as a Stackelberg leader in retailing. Originality/value The findings and subsequent methodological discussions aim to provide practical guidance to retailers who are allowing customers to choose how, when and where they interact and purchase by offering a combination of websites (fully functional and mobile-enabled), catalogs and stores with increasing convergence of channels.


CONVERTER ◽  
2021 ◽  
pp. 498-517
Author(s):  
Sihua Xu, Xiaoying Ju

Under the background of "Internet +", increasing manufacturers sell standard products through retail channels and sell customized products in electronic channel. The competition about dual-channel supply, relationship between production cost and delivery time and the influences of online market acceptance, product customization attribute value, price and delivery time on online customization and traditional retail markets are considered, based on the decision variables of the price of custom and standard products and the guaranteed delivery time, the Stackelberg models are constructed respectively for the manufacturer-led and retail-led supply chain under decentralized system and the overall profits maximization of the supply chain is modeled under centralized system, the existence and uniqueness of the optimal solutions is proved by the optimization theory. The optimal decisions, market demands and enterprises profits under different systems are compared through numerical examples, the relation between the sensitivity coefficients and the optimal enterprises profits are obtained through the parameters sensitivity analysis. The idea of model construction and relevant conclusions are of reference and significance for manufacturing enterprise management practices.


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