A Cosmological Argument against Physicalism

2017 ◽  
Vol 9 (2) ◽  
pp. 165-188 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mats Wahlberg
Keyword(s):  
Physical Phenomenon ◽  
Sufficient Reason ◽  
Physical Effect ◽  
Cosmological Argument ◽  
Causal Principle ◽  
Restricted Version ◽  
Necessary Being ◽  
Principle Of Sufficient Reason ◽  
Sufficient Cause ◽  
Causal Closure

In this article, I present a Leibnizian cosmological argument to the conclusion that either the totality of physical beings has a non-physical cause, or a necessary being exists. The crucial premise of the argument is a restricted version of the Principle of Sufficient Reason, namely the claim that every contingent physical phenomenon has a sufficient cause (PSR-P). I defend this principle by comparing it with a causal principle that is fundamental for physicalism, namely the Causal Closure of Physics, which says that every physical effect has a sufficient physical cause (CC). I find that the evidence for Causal Closure is weaker than the evidence for PSR-P, which means that physicalists who take CC to be justified must concede that PSR-P is also justified, and to a higher degree. Since my Leibnizian cosmological argument succeeds if PSR-P is granted, I conclude that physicalists must either give up CC and thereby physicalism, or accept that a necessary being exists.

A restricted Principle of Sufficient Reason and the cosmological argument

2004 ◽  
Vol 40 (2) ◽  
pp. 165-179 ◽  
Author(s):  
ALEXANDER R. PRUSS
Keyword(s):  
Ad Hoc ◽  
Sufficient Reason ◽  
Quantum Mechanical ◽  
Cosmological Argument ◽  
Existence Of God ◽  
Restricted Version ◽  
Van Inwagen ◽  
Principle Of Sufficient Reason ◽  
Peter Van Inwagen ◽  
Mechanical Phenomena

The Principle of Sufficient Reason (PSR) says that, necessarily, every contingently true proposition has an explanation. The PSR is the most controversial premise in the cosmological argument for the existence of God. It is likely that one reason why a number of philosophers reject the PSR is that they think there are conceptual counter-examples to it. For instance, they may think, with Peter van Inwagen, that the conjunction of all contingent propositions cannot have an explanation, or they may believe that quantum mechanical phenomena cannot be explained. It may, however, be that these philosophers would be open to accepting a restricted version of the PSR as long as it was not ad hoc. I present a natural restricted version of the PSR that avoids all conceptual counter-examples, and yet that is strong enough to ground a cosmological argument. The restricted PSR says that all explainable true propositions have explanations.

Schopenhauer on the Principle of Sufficient Reason

1971 ◽  
Vol 5 ◽  
pp. 145-162
Author(s):  
D. W. Hamlyn
Keyword(s):  
Sufficient Reason ◽  
Intrinsic Interest ◽  
Absolute Necessity ◽  
Necessary Being ◽  
Principle Of Sufficient Reason

‘The Principle of Sufficient Reason in all its forms is the sole principle and the sole support of all necessity. For necessity has no other true and distinct meaning than that of the infallibility of the consequence when the reason is posited. Accordingly every necessity is conditioned; absolute, i.e. unconditioned, necessity therefore is a contradicto in adjecto. For to be necessary can never mean anything but to result from a given reason.’ These words are taken from the beginning of section 49 of Schopenhauer's The Fourfold Root of the Principle of Sufficient Reason. They express sentiments with which I am to some extent in agreement, and it therefore seemed to me worth while to explore in some kind of detail Schopenhauer's treatment of the issues. It might, however, be asked why the view expressed by Schopenhauer should be of philosophical interest, what, if anything, turns on the rejection of the notion of absolute necessity. To this I can reply by saying only that apart from the intrinsic interest of the notion of necessity itself, an issue on which a philosopher ought to make himself clear, Schopenhauer himself points to some of the consequences of his doctrine - the impossiblity, for example, of an absolutely necessary being, and the similar impossibility of ontological or cosmological arguments

Schopenhauer on the Principle of Sufficient Reason

1971 ◽  
Vol 5 ◽  
pp. 145-162
Author(s):  
D. W. Hamlyn
Keyword(s):  
Sufficient Reason ◽  
Intrinsic Interest ◽  
Absolute Necessity ◽  
Necessary Being ◽  
Principle Of Sufficient Reason

‘The Principle of Sufficient Reason in all its forms is the sole principle and the sole support of all necessity. For necessity has no other true and distinct meaning than that of the infallibility of the consequence when the reason is posited. Accordingly every necessity is conditioned; absolute, i.e. unconditioned, necessity therefore is a contradicto in adjecto. For to be necessary can never mean anything but to result from a given reason.’ These words are taken from the beginning of section 49 of Schopenhauer's The Fourfold Root of the Principle of Sufficient Reason. They express sentiments with which I am to some extent in agreement, and it therefore seemed to me worth while to explore in some kind of detail Schopenhauer's treatment of the issues. It might, however, be asked why the view expressed by Schopenhauer should be of philosophical interest, what, if anything, turns on the rejection of the notion of absolute necessity. To this I can reply by saying only that apart from the intrinsic interest of the notion of necessity itself, an issue on which a philosopher ought to make himself clear, Schopenhauer himself points to some of the consequences of his doctrine - the impossiblity, for example, of an absolutely necessary being, and the similar impossibility of ontological or cosmological arguments

A response to Oppy, and to Davey and Clifton

2002 ◽  
Vol 38 (1) ◽  
pp. 89-99 ◽  
Author(s):  
RICHARD M. GALE ◽  
ALEXANDER R. PRUSS
Keyword(s):  
Sufficient Reason ◽  
True Proposition ◽  
Cosmological Argument ◽  
Existence Of God ◽  
Principle Of Sufficient Reason ◽  
Entailment Relation ◽  
Strong Principle

Our paper ‘A new cosmological argument’ gave an argument for the existence of God making use of the weak Principle of Sufficient Reason (W-PSR) which states that for every proposition p, if p is true, then it is possible that there is an explanation for p. Recently, Graham Oppy, as well as Kevin Davey and Rob Clifton, have criticized the argument. We reply to these criticisms. The most interesting kind of criticism in both papers alleges that the W-PSR can be justifiably denied by the atheist, and constitutes no improvement on the strong Principle of Sufficient Reason (S-PSR) which claims that every true proposition in fact has an explanation. The criticism is predicated on the fact that it can be shown that the W-PSR entails the S-PSR. We argue that the W-PSR's plausibility remains despite the criticisms. From this it can be seen to follow that the entailment relation between the W-PSR and the S-PSR gives one reason to believe the S-PSR.

A new cosmological argument

1999 ◽  
Vol 35 (4) ◽  
pp. 461-476 ◽  
Author(s):  
RICHARD M. GALE ◽  
ALEXANDER R. PRUSS
Keyword(s):  
Sufficient Reason ◽  
Cosmological Argument ◽  
Weak Version ◽  
Strong Version ◽  
Begging The Question ◽  
Principle Of Sufficient Reason ◽  
Duns Scotus ◽  
Necessary Existence

We present a valid deductive cosmological argument for the necessary existence of a powerful and intelligent creator of the actual universe. Whereas traditional cosmological arguments had to employ a strong version of the principle of sufficient reason that held that every fact actually has an explanation, our argument can make do with the weak version of Duns Scotus according to which every fact possibly has an explanation. As a result, our argument is less vulnerable to the charge of begging the question than are these traditional cosmological arguments.

scholarly journals Merely possible explanation

2010 ◽  
Vol 47 (3) ◽  
pp. 359-370
Author(s):  
GHISLAIN GUIGON
Keyword(s):  
Sufficient Reason ◽  
Cosmological Argument ◽  
Principle Of Sufficient Reason ◽  
Strong Principle

AbstractGraham Oppy has argued that possible explanation entails explanation in order to object to Richard Gale and Alexander Pruss's new cosmological argument that it does not improve upon familiar cosmological arguments. Gale and Pruss, as well as Pruss individually, have granted Oppy's inference from possible explanation to explanation and argue that this inference provides a reason to believe that the strong principle of sufficient reason is true. In this article, I shall undermine Oppy's objection to the new cosmological argument by arguing that it is logically possible that some truths are merely possibly explained.

scholarly journals On ‘A new cosmological argument’

2000 ◽  
Vol 36 (3) ◽  
pp. 345-353 ◽  
Author(s):  
GRAHAM OPPY
Keyword(s):  
Sufficient Reason ◽  
Cosmological Argument ◽  
Principle Of Sufficient Reason

Richard Gale and Alexander Pruss contend that their ‘new cosmological argument’ is an improvement over familiar cosmological arguments because it relies upon a weaker version of the Principle of Sufficient Reason than that used in those more familiar arguments. However, I note that their ‘weaker’ version of the Principle of Sufficient Reason entails the ‘stronger’ version of that principle which is used in more familiar arguments, so that the alleged advantage of their proof turns out to be illusory. Moreover, I contend that, even if their argument did rely on a weaker version of the Principle of Sufficient reason, nontheists would still be perfectly within their rights to refuse to accept the conclusion of the argument.

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