Irrational Attributions of Responsibility: Who, What, When, and Why

D. Sadow

doi:10.2466/pr0.1983.52.2.403

Irrational Attributions of Responsibility: Who, What, When, and Why

Psychological Reports ◽

10.2466/pr0.1983.52.2.403 ◽

1983 ◽

Vol 52 (2) ◽

pp. 403-406 ◽

Cited By ~ 3

Author(s):

D. Sadow

Keyword(s):

Moral Judgments ◽

Attributions Of Responsibility

“Irrational” attributions of responsibility (attributing more responsibility to a victim when his misfortune is greater and attributing more responsibility to a weaker rather than a stronger victim) were more common when decisions were hurried and among people who characteristically assign causes of actions to persons. People whose moral judgments are more sophisticated in Kohlberg's schema made fewer irrational attributions generally.

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Introduction

Asking and Telling in Conversation ◽

10.1093/oso/9780190927431.003.0001 ◽

2021 ◽

pp. 1-10

Author(s):

Anita Pomerantz

Keyword(s):

Conversation Analysis ◽

Early Years ◽

Moral Judgments ◽

Attributions Of Responsibility ◽

Knowledge Claims

The Introduction identifies eight complexities associated with asking and telling. Four domains that intersect with asking and telling activities are further elaborated: knowledge claims and assumptions (epistemics); asking and telling’s place in sequences of action and within interactional projects; attributions of responsibility for praiseworthy or blameworthy attributes, actions, or outcomes; and moral judgments regarding actions. In addition, the Introduction characterizes the early years of Conversation Analysis, highlights aspects of Pomerantz’s approach to conversation analysis, explains the order of the papers within the book, and provides brief descriptions of the papers.

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Cautiously optimistic rationalism may not be cautious enough

Behavioral and Brain Sciences ◽

10.1017/s0140525x18002613 ◽

2019 ◽

Vol 42 ◽

Author(s):

Justin F. Landy

Keyword(s):

Moral Knowledge ◽

Moral Judgments

Abstract May expresses optimism about the source, content, and consequences of moral judgments. However, even if we are optimistic about their source (i.e., reasoning), some pessimism is warranted about their content, and therefore their consequences. Good reasoners can attain moral knowledge, but evidence suggests that most people are not good reasoners, which implies that most people do not attain moral knowledge.

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Interactive Experience and Identification as Predictors of Attributing Responsibility in Video Games

Journal of Media Psychology Theories Methods and Applications ◽

10.1027/1864-1105/a000168 ◽

2018 ◽

Vol 30 (1) ◽

pp. 3-15

Author(s):

Nathan Walter ◽

Yariv Tsfati

Keyword(s):

Video Game ◽

Psychological Research ◽

External Factors ◽

Theoretical Expectation ◽

Main Character ◽

Attribution Of Responsibility ◽

Attributions Of Responsibility ◽

Violent Video Game ◽

Grand Theft Auto Iv ◽

Interactive Experience

Abstract. This study examines the effect of interactivity on the attribution of responsibility for the character’s actions in a violent video game. Through an experiment, we tested the hypothesis that identification with the main character in Grand Theft Auto IV mediates the effect of interactivity on attributions of responsibility for the main character’s antisocial behavior. Using the framework of the fundamental attribution error, we demonstrated that those who actually played the game, as opposed to those who simply watched someone else playing it, identified with the main character. In accordance with the theoretical expectation, those who played the game and came to identify with the main character attributed the responsibility for his actions to external factors such as “living in a violent society.” By contrast, those who did not interact with the game attributed responsibility for the character’s actions to his personality traits. These findings could be viewed as contrasting with psychological research suggesting that respondents should have distanced themselves from the violent protagonist rather than identifying with him, and with Iyengar’s (1991) expectation that more personalized episodic framing would be associated with attributing responsibility to the protagonist.

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Neuroscience and Ethics

Experimental Psychology (formerly Zeitschrift für Experimentelle Psychologie) ◽

10.1027/1618-3169/a000352 ◽

2017 ◽

Vol 64 (2) ◽

pp. 82-92 ◽

Cited By ~ 5

Author(s):

S. Matthew Liao

Keyword(s):

Empirical Evidence ◽

Moral Judgments ◽

Empirical Results ◽

Joshua Greene

Abstract. A number of people believe that results from neuroscience have the potential to settle seemingly intractable debates concerning the nature, practice, and reliability of moral judgments. In particular, Joshua Greene has argued that evidence from neuroscience can be used to advance the long-standing debate between consequentialism and deontology. This paper first argues that charitably interpreted, Greene’s neuroscientific evidence can contribute to substantive ethical discussions by being part of an epistemic debunking argument. It then argues that taken as an epistemic debunking argument, Greene’s argument falls short in undermining deontological judgments. Lastly, it proposes that accepting Greene’s methodology at face value, neuroimaging results may in fact call into question the reliability of consequentialist judgments. The upshot is that Greene’s empirical results do not undermine deontology and that Greene’s project points toward a way by which empirical evidence such as neuroscientific evidence can play a role in normative debates.

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Why People With High Alexithymia Make More Utilitarian Judgments

Experimental Psychology (formerly Zeitschrift für Experimentelle Psychologie) ◽

10.1027/1618-3169/a000474 ◽

2020 ◽

Vol 67 (1) ◽

pp. 23-30

Author(s):

Xiangyi Zhang ◽

Zhihui Wu ◽

Shenglan Li ◽

Ji Lai ◽

Meng Han ◽

...

Keyword(s):

Empathic Concern ◽

Moral Judgments ◽

Affective Processing ◽

Process Dissociation ◽

The Difference

Abstract. Although recent studies have investigated the effect of alexithymia on moral judgments, such an effect remains elusive. Furthermore, moral judgments have been conflated with the moral inclinations underlying those judgments in previous studies. Using a process dissociation approach to independently quantify the strength of utilitarian and deontological inclinations, the present study investigated the effect of alexithymia on moral judgments. We found that deontological inclinations were significantly lower in the high alexithymia group than in the low alexithymia group, whereas the difference in the utilitarian inclinations between the two groups was nonsignificant. Furthermore, empathic concern and deontological inclinations mediated the association between alexithymia and conventional relative judgments (i.e., more utilitarian judgments over deontological judgments), showing that people with high alexithymia have low empathic concern, which, in turn, decreases deontological inclinations and contributes to conventional relative judgments. These findings underscore the importance of empathy and deontological inclinations in moral judgments and indicate that individuals with high alexithymia make more utilitarian judgments over deontological judgments possibly due to a deficit in affective processing.

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