Why People With High Alexithymia Make More Utilitarian Judgments

Author(s):  
Xiangyi Zhang ◽  
Zhihui Wu ◽  
Shenglan Li ◽  
Ji Lai ◽  
Meng Han ◽  
...  

Abstract. Although recent studies have investigated the effect of alexithymia on moral judgments, such an effect remains elusive. Furthermore, moral judgments have been conflated with the moral inclinations underlying those judgments in previous studies. Using a process dissociation approach to independently quantify the strength of utilitarian and deontological inclinations, the present study investigated the effect of alexithymia on moral judgments. We found that deontological inclinations were significantly lower in the high alexithymia group than in the low alexithymia group, whereas the difference in the utilitarian inclinations between the two groups was nonsignificant. Furthermore, empathic concern and deontological inclinations mediated the association between alexithymia and conventional relative judgments (i.e., more utilitarian judgments over deontological judgments), showing that people with high alexithymia have low empathic concern, which, in turn, decreases deontological inclinations and contributes to conventional relative judgments. These findings underscore the importance of empathy and deontological inclinations in moral judgments and indicate that individuals with high alexithymia make more utilitarian judgments over deontological judgments possibly due to a deficit in affective processing.


2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Andreas Kappes ◽  
Jay Joseph Van Bavel

From moral philosophy to programming driverless cars, scholars have long been interested in how to shape moral decision-making. We examine how framing can impact moral judgments either by shaping which emotional reactions are evoked in a situation (antecedent-focused) or by changing how people respond to their emotional reactions (response-focused). In three experiments, we manipulated the framing of a moral decision-making task before participants judged a series of moral dilemmas. Participants encouraged to go “with their first” response beforehand favored emotion-driven judgments on high-conflict moral dilemmas. In contrast, participants who were instructed to give a “thoughtful” response beforehand or who did not receive instructions on how to approach the dilemmas favored reason-driven judgments. There was no difference in response-focused control during moral judgements. Process-dissociation confirmed that people instructed to go with their first response had stronger emotion-driven intuitions than other conditions. Our results suggest that task framing can alter moral intuitions.



Dialogue ◽  
2011 ◽  
Vol 50 (2) ◽  
pp. 281-306 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jessy Giroux

ABSTRACT: In this paper, I distinguish between two families of theories which view moral norms as either “inputs” or “outputs.” I argue that the most plausible version of each model can ultimately be seen as the two sides of the same model, which I call Moderate Nativism. The difference between these two apparently antagonistic models is one of perspective rather than content: while the Input model explains how emotional dispositions constrain the historical evolution of moral norms, the Output model explains how these same dispositions naturally give rise to corresponding moral judgments in individuals.







2021 ◽  
Vol 4 (2) ◽  
pp. 63
Author(s):  
Farid Muthaqin ◽  
Hamdani M Syam ◽  
Putri Wahyuni

This study aims to find out how the framing in the news related to the destruction of the Musala in North Minahasa on the news of online  media Kompas.com in the period 30 January to 13 February 2020 and Republika.co.id for the period 30 January 2020 to 12 February 2020. This study uses a qualitative method. descriptive analysis with framing analysis by Robert N. Entman with four elements, namely defining the problem, diagnosing the cause, making moral judgments, and recommending treatment. This study focuses on news about the destruction of the Musala that occurred in North Minahasa. The results show that the framing of the news presented by Kompas.com media is objectivity in reporting the case of the destruction of the Musala in North Minahasa, by not taking sides with certain groups, as well as in explaining that Kompas.com refrains from writing in a safe style, as well as a narrow news perspective. while Republika.co.id is more daring in conveying facts and news that are presented in depth and viewed from various perspectives so that it is possible to find the aspirations of Muslims to get the right to get a Musala as a place of worship. The difference in the frame of the two media is influenced by the ideological factors of each media. Even though they have different framing, these two media want the incident of vandalism of places of worship in North Minahasa to be resolved peacefully.



2014 ◽  
Vol 2 (1) ◽  
pp. 74-98 ◽  
Author(s):  
Iphigenia Moulinou

The present paper discusses issues of language aggression, conflict and identity, and of emotional communication and conflict. In particular, it explores different positionings of deviant identity as projected by a number of juvenile delinquents through the display of moral indignation (Ochs et al. 1989; Günthner 1995), at moments of crisis and conflictual relationships between them. Moral indignation is expressed through the co-occurrence of a number of linguistic and discursive devices, such as hypothetical examples and personal analogies (Günthner 1995; Kakavá 2002), prosodic features, implicit or explicit moral judgments (Günthner 1995), or non-literal threats. These devices are employed in interaction in order to construct opposing moral versions of identities. The paper argues for a tight interweaving between moral indignation, affect, identity indexing, and moral positioning. It further argues that displays of indignation are powerful interactional devices of conflict management and control of the moral and social order and of social relationships.



2011 ◽  
Vol 23 (10) ◽  
pp. 3162-3180 ◽  
Author(s):  
Carolyn Parkinson ◽  
Walter Sinnott-Armstrong ◽  
Philipp E. Koralus ◽  
Angela Mendelovici ◽  
Victoria McGeer ◽  
...  

Much recent research has sought to uncover the neural basis of moral judgment. However, it has remained unclear whether “moral judgments” are sufficiently homogenous to be studied scientifically as a unified category. We tested this assumption by using fMRI to examine the neural correlates of moral judgments within three moral areas: (physical) harm, dishonesty, and (sexual) disgust. We found that the judgment of moral wrongness was subserved by distinct neural systems for each of the different moral areas and that these differences were much more robust than differences in wrongness judgments within a moral area. Dishonest, disgusting, and harmful moral transgression recruited networks of brain regions associated with mentalizing, affective processing, and action understanding, respectively. Dorsal medial pFC was the only region activated by all scenarios judged to be morally wrong in comparison with neutral scenarios. However, this region was also activated by dishonest and harmful scenarios judged not to be morally wrong, suggestive of a domain-general role that is neither peculiar to nor predictive of moral decisions. These results suggest that moral judgment is not a wholly unified faculty in the human brain, but rather, instantiated in dissociable neural systems that are engaged differentially depending on the type of transgression being judged.



2020 ◽  
pp. 264-278
Author(s):  
Terence Irwin

Moore’s arguments begin a debate that revives sentimentalist and rationalist arguments. According to Moore, ‘good’ is indefinable, because there is no definition of it that mentions only ‘natural’ properties. Non-naturalist objectivists argue that we know about objective moral properties, but not in the way we know about other properties. Non-cognitivists argue that goodness is not an objective property at all; when we say that something is good, we are not stating a fact about it, but expressing an emotion, or issuing some prescription. Even if objectivism is correct about the meaning of moral judgments, we may still deny that any moral judgments are true, on the ground that we have no reason to believe that there are any moral facts of the sort that objectivists claim to describe. Further discussion of these arguments against objectivism requires closer attention to the difference between moral concepts and moral properties.



2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Indrajeet Patil ◽  
Giorgia Silani

Recent research with moral dilemmas supports dual-process model of moral decision making. This model posits two different paths via which people can endorse utilitarian solution that requires personally harming someone in order to achieve the greater good (e.g., killing one to save five people): (i) weakened emotional aversion to the prospect of harming someone due to reduced empathic concern for the victim; (ii) enhanced cognition which supports cost-benefit analysis and countervails the prepotent emotional aversion to harm. Direct prediction of this model would be that personality traits associated with reduced empathy would show higher propensity to endorse utilitarian solutions. As per this prediction, we found that trait alexithymia, which is well-known to have deficits in empathy, was indeed associated with increased utilitarian tendencies on emotionally aversive personal moral dilemmas and this was due to reduced empathic concern for the victim. Results underscore the importance of empathy for moral judgments in harm/care domain of morality.



2018 ◽  
Vol 22 ◽  
pp. 233121651881621
Author(s):  
Annett Szibor ◽  
Jarmo Lehtimäki ◽  
Jukka Ylikoski ◽  
Antti A. Aarnisalo ◽  
Antti Mäkitie ◽  
...  

Affective processing appears to be altered in tinnitus, and the condition is to a large extent characterized by the emotional reaction to the phantom sound. Psychophysiological models of tinnitus and supporting brain imaging studies have suggested a role for the limbic system in the emergence and maintenance of tinnitus. It is not clear whether the tinnitus-related changes in these systems are specific for tinnitus only, or whether they affect emotional processing more generally. In this study, we aimed to quantify possible deviations in affective processing in tinnitus patients by behavioral and physiological measures. Tinnitus patients rated the valence and arousal of sounds from the International Affective Digitized Sounds database. Sounds were chosen based on the normative valence ratings, that is, negative, neutral, or positive. The individual autonomic response was measured simultaneously with pupillometry. We found that the subjective ratings of the sounds by tinnitus patients differed significantly from the normative ratings. The difference was most pronounced for positive sounds, where sounds were rated lower on both valence and arousal scales. Negative and neutral sounds were rated differently only for arousal. Pupil measurements paralleled the behavioral results, showing a dampened response to positive sounds. Taken together, our findings suggest that affective processing is altered in tinnitus patients. The results are in line with earlier studies in depressed patients, which have provided evidence in favor of the so-called positive attenuation hypothesis of depression. Thus, the current results highlight the close link between tinnitus and depression.



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