THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN PSYCHOTHERAPIST’S MORAL DECISIONS AND EMOTIONS, PERSONALITY FEATURES

In clinical psychology literature, the topic of ethical decisions is limited to a couple of descriptive studies, with an exception of a single local study, exploring the conflicting issues that arise despite the existence of a professional moral code. Moreover, these studies investigated only demographic factors such as age, gender, experience etc., as possible correlates of these ethical decisions, but failed to propose consistent and meaningful results. The aim of the present study was to explore the relationship between psychotherapists’ ethical decisions – emotions and personal tendencies. The deontological/utilitarian decision-making tendencies of psychotherapists in psychotherapist moral dilemmas were compared with those of undergraduate psychology students. The relationship between deontological/utilitarian decision-making tendencies and frequently used personality features in international moral psychology studies such as empathic concern, psychopathy, analytical thinking and altruistic utilitarianism was explored as well as the correlation between negative mood of the participants and deontological decision-making tendencies. Regarding both conventional and process dissociation analyses, research results revealed that there wasn’t a significant relationship between mood of the participants in both groups and their deontological/utilitarian decision- making tendencies. Psychotherapists’ deontological decision-making tendency was found to be higher than that of the students. Two groups were not differentiated on the basis of empathic concern but psychology students’ both Machiavellist and antisocial tendencies were higher those the psychotherapists. Furthermore, the results indicated that investigated personality variables were not correlated with utilitarian/deontological decision-making tendencies in general independent of the calculation method used. These results seemed to indicate that the personality features related to moral decisions in these scenarios would be different than those of the classical moral dilemmas and further research is needed to explore these personality features. Key Words: Psychotherapist moral dilemmas, deontology, utilitarianism, process dissociation analysis

Moving beyond the Process-Dissociation procedure towards fine-grained memory and attitude measures in Evaluative Conditioning

Research on Evaluative Conditioning (EC) that relied on a Process Dissociation (PD) procedure supports the possibility of attitude learning effects acquired or maintained in the absence of explicit memory. In the present research we argue that basic assumptions inherent to the PD procedure are both theoretically and empirically unjustified. We introduce and empirically validate an alternative fine-grained assessment of subjective memory states. The data of the validation study (i) question central assumptions of the PD procedure, (ii) fail to support the assumptions posited in dual-learning models of attitudes that attitudes can be acquired or maintained without memory, and (iii) highlight the importance of distinguishing between objective and subjective memory. We discuss the implications of the present findings for attitude research.

Challenges in Process Dissociation Measures for Moral Cognition

The process dissociation procedure (PDP) for moral cognition was created to separately measure two dispositions of moral judgment based on the dual-process theory of moral reasoning: deontological and utilitarian inclinations. In this paper we raise some concerns from a psychometrics perspective regarding the structure, reliability, and validity of the moral PDP as a measure of individual differences. Using two simulation studies as well as a real sample of N = 1,010, we investigate the psychometric properties of the moral PDP. We present novel evidence showing that (1) some correlations between PDP parameters are mathematical artifacts, and as such cannot be taken as evidence in support of a theory, (2) there are severe response inconsistencies within dilemma batteries, and (3) reliability estimates for these scores seem to be far below the accepted standards. We discuss some potential theoretical and content-related reasons for these statistical issues and their implications. We conclude that in their current form, PDP measures of utilitarian and deontological tendencies are sub-optimal for assessing individual differences.

Testing the Process Dissociation Procedure by Behavioral and Neuroimaging Data: The Establishment of the Mutually Exclusive Theory and the Improved PDP

The process dissociation procedure (PDP) of implicit sequence learning states that the correct inclusion-task response contains the incorrect exclusion-task response. However, there has been no research to test the hypothesis. The current study used a single variable (Stimulus Onset Asynchrony SOA: 850 ms vs. 1350 ms) between-subjects design, with pre-task resting-state fMRI, to test and improve the classical PDP to the mutually exclusive theory (MET). (1) Behavioral data and neuroimaging data demonstrated that the classical PDP has not been validated. In the SOA = 850 ms group, the correct inclusion-task response was at chance, but the incorrect exclusion-task response occurred greater than chance. In the SOA = 850 ms group, the two responses were not correlated, but in the SOA = 1,350 ms group and putting the two groups together, the two responses were in contrast to each other. In each group, brain areas whose amplitude of low frequency fluctuations (ALFFs) in the resting-state related to the two responses were either completely different or opposite to one another. However, the results were perfectly consistent with the MET proposed by the present study which suggests that the correct inclusion-task response is equal to the correct exclusion-task response is equal to C + A1, and the incorrect exclusion-task response is equal to A2. C denotes the controlled response and A1 and A2 denote two different automatic responses. (2) The improved PDP was proposed to categorize the 12 kinds of triplets as delineating four knowledge types, namely non-acquisition of knowledge, uncontrollable knowledge, half-controllable knowledge, and controllable knowledge with the MET. ALFFs in the resting-state could predict the four knowledge types of the improved PDP among two groups. The participants’ control of the four knowledge types (degree of consciousness) gradually improved. Correspondingly, the brain areas in the resting-state positively related to the four knowledge types, gradually changed from the sensory and motor network to the somatic sensorimotor network, and then to the implicit learning network, and then to the consciousness network. The brain areas in the resting-state negatively related to the four knowledge types gradually changed from the consciousness network to the sensory and motor network. As SOA increased, the brain areas associated with almost all the four knowledge types changed. (3) The inhomogeneous hypothesis of the MET is best suited to interpret behavioral and neuroimaging data; it states that the same components among the four knowledge types are not homogeneous, and the same knowledge types are not homogeneous between the two SOA groups.

Deontological and Utilitarian Responses to Sacrificial Dilemmas Predict Disapproval of Sin Stocks

Investors sometimes invest in so-called ‘sin’ stocks that cause social harm as a byproduct of doing business (e.g., tobacco companies). Two studies examined whether people who demonstrate moral concerns in sacrificial dilemmas approve less of investing in sin (but not conventional) stocks. We employed process dissociation to assess harm-rejection (deontological) and outcome-maximization (utilitarian) response tendencies independently. Study 1 (N=337) assessed moral approval of sin stocks (e.g., fur and gambling industries) and conventional stocks (e.g., water utilities and semiconductor producers). People scoring higher on deontological and utilitarian response tendencies disapproved of sin, but not conventional, stocks. Study 2 (N=402) replicated this effect for willingness to invest in companies abandoning (vs. retaining) socially responsible policies to maximize profits. These findings align with studies showing that people who care about morality demonstrate sensitivity to both deontological and utilitarian considerations, and clarify the psychology involved in morally questionable investment decisions.

Challenges in Process Dissociation Measures for Moral Cognition

The process dissociation (PDP) procedure for moral cognition was created to separately measure two dispositions of moral judgment based on the dual-process theory of moral reasoning: deontological and utilitarian inclinations. In this paper we raise some concerns from a psychometrics perspective regarding the structure, reliability, and validity of the moral PDP as measures of individual differences. Using two simulation studies as well as a real sample of N = 1010, we investigate the psychometric properties of the moral PDP. We present novel evidence showing that 1) some correlations between PDP parameters are mathematical artefacts, and as such cannot be taken as evidence in support of a theory, 2) there are severe response inconsistencies within dilemma batteries, and 3) reliability estimates for these scores seem to be far below the accepted standards. We discuss some potential theoretical and content-related reasons for these statistical issues and their implications. We conclude that in their current form, PDP measures of utilitarian and deontological tendencies are sub-optimal for assessing individual differences.

A Process Dissociation Model of Implicit Rapid Revision in Response to Diagnostic Revelations

Previous research has demonstrated that implicit evaluations can be reversed with exposure to a single impression-inconsistent behavior. But what exactly is changing when perceivers encounter diagnostic revelations about someone? One possibility is that rapid changes are occurring in the extent to which perceivers view the person positively or negatively. Another possibility is that they override the expression of initial evaluations through control-oriented processes. We conducted three studies (one preregistered) that used multinomial process trees to distinguish between these possibilities. We find consistent support across two different implicit measures that diagnostic behaviors result in rapid changes in evaluative processes. We obtained only inconsistent evidence for effects on more control-oriented processes. These findings thus help to reveal the cognitive processes underlying rapid implicit revision. Implications for theoretical perspectives on implicit attitudes are discussed.

Why People With High Alexithymia Make More Utilitarian Judgments

Although recent studies have investigated the effect of alexithymia on moral judgments, such an effect remains elusive. Furthermore, moral judgments have been conflated with the moral inclinations underlying those judgments in previous studies. Using a process dissociation approach to independently quantify the strength of utilitarian and deontological inclinations, the present study investigated the effect of alexithymia on moral judgments. We found that deontological inclinations were significantly lower in the high alexithymia group than in the low alexithymia group, whereas the difference in the utilitarian inclinations between the two groups was nonsignificant. Furthermore, empathic concern and deontological inclinations mediated the association between alexithymia and conventional relative judgments (i.e., more utilitarian judgments over deontological judgments), showing that people with high alexithymia have low empathic concern, which, in turn, decreases deontological inclinations and contributes to conventional relative judgments. These findings underscore the importance of empathy and deontological inclinations in moral judgments and indicate that individuals with high alexithymia make more utilitarian judgments over deontological judgments possibly due to a deficit in affective processing.