To Engage or Not to Engage with AI for Critical Judgments: How Professionals Deal with Opacity When Using AI for Medical Diagnosis

Artificial intelligence (AI) technologies promise to transform how professionals conduct knowledge work by augmenting their capabilities for making professional judgments. We know little, however, about how human-AI augmentation takes place in practice. Yet, gaining this understanding is particularly important when professionals use AI tools to form judgments on critical decisions. We conducted an in-depth field study in a major U.S. hospital where AI tools were used in three departments by diagnostic radiologists making breast cancer, lung cancer, and bone age determinations. The study illustrates the hindering effects of opacity that professionals experienced when using AI tools and explores how these professionals grappled with it in practice. In all three departments, this opacity resulted in professionals experiencing increased uncertainty because AI tool results often diverged from their initial judgment without providing underlying reasoning. Only in one department (of the three) did professionals consistently incorporate AI results into their final judgments, achieving what we call engaged augmentation. These professionals invested in AI interrogation practices—practices enacted by human experts to relate their own knowledge claims to AI knowledge claims. Professionals in the other two departments did not enact such practices and did not incorporate AI inputs into their final decisions, which we call unengaged “augmentation.” Our study unpacks the challenges involved in augmenting professional judgment with powerful, yet opaque, technologies and contributes to literature on AI adoption in knowledge work.

Constructivism in Education

In light of the broad, multidimensional, and contestable nature of constructivism, a central debate concerns the object of construction. What do we mean when we say that a learner is constructing something? Three general categories, with overlaps in between, are: the construction of meaning, the construction of knowledge, and the construction of knowledge claims. To construct meaning is to make sense of something by understanding both its parts and overall message. To construct knowledge is to obtain what philosophers traditionally call “justified true belief.” There are three conditions in this formulation of knowledge: belief, truth, and justification. Beliefs are intentional, meaningful, and representational, directing a person to attain truth and avoid error with respect to the very thing that person accepts. As for the notions of truth and justification, there are three major theories of truth, namely the correspondence theory, coherence theory, and pragmatic theory; and seven main types of justification, namely perception, reason, memory, testimony, faith, introspection, and intuition. Finally, to construct a knowledge claim is to indicate that one thinks that one knows something. The crucial difference between knowledge and a knowledge claim is that the latter has not acquired the status of knowledge. There are two main implications for teaching and learning that arise from an epistemological exploration of the concept of constructivism: First, educators need to be clear about what they want their students to construct, and how the latter should go about doing it. Informed by learner profiles and other contingent factors, educators should encourage their students to construct meanings, knowledge, and knowledge claims, individually and collaboratively, throughout their schooling years. Second, educators need to guard against some common misconceptions on constructivism in the schooling context. Constructivism, contrary to popular belief, is compatible with direct instruction, teacher guidance, structured learning, content learning, traditional assessment, and standardized testing. In sum, there are no pedagogical approaches and assessment modes that are necessarily constructivist or anticonstructivist. A variety of teaching methods, resources, and learning environments should therefore be employed to support students in their constructing process.

Undone Science and Smart Cities: Civil Society Perspectives on Risk and Emerging Technologies

This study contributes to the analysis of civil society and knowledge by examining mobilizations by civil society organizations and grassroots networks in opposition to wireless smart meters in the United States. Three types of mobilizations are reviewed: grassroots anti-smart-meter networks, privacy organizations, and organizations that advocate for reduced exposure to non-ionizing electromagnetic fields. The study shows different relationships to scientific knowledge that include publicizing risks and conducting citizen science, identifying non-controversial areas of future research, and pointing to deeper problems of undone science (a particular type of non-knowledge that emerges when actors mobilize in the public interest and find an absence or low volume of research that could have been used to support their concerns). By comparing different types of knowledge claims made by the civil society organizations and networks, the study examines the conditions under which mobilized civil society generates positive responses from incumbent organizations versus resistance and undone science.

‘Good food’ in an Instagram age: Rethinking hierarchies of culture, criticism and taste

Through historical, economic and technological contextualisation and empirical data analysis, this article explores the cultural purchase the image-sharing app Instagram and the printed Michelin Guide have on contemporary food criticism. Both platforms contribute to popular understandings of ‘good food’. Yet, there are important functional and discursive distinctions in how culinary criticism is done in Instagram vis-à-vis Michelin. To that end, this article focuses on London’s restaurant scene and proposes the concept of the Instagram gaze as a means of understanding the representational repertoires and knowledge claims advanced by foodies on visual social media platforms. The Instagram gaze also facilitates insight into the relationship between Instagrammers’ culinary judgements and Michelin’ s.

Epistemic injustice and epistemic positioning: towards an intersectional political economy

This article introduces the concept of epistemic positioning to theorize the relationship between identity-based epistemic judgements and the reproduction of social inequalities, including those of gender and ethnicity/race, in the academia. Acts of epistemic positioning entail the evaluation of knowledge claims based on the speaker’s stated or inferred identity. These judgements serve to limit the scope of the knowledge claim, making it more likely speakers will be denied recognition or credit. The four types of epistemic positioning – bounding (reducing a knowledge claim to elements of personal identity), domaining (reducing a knowledge claim to discipline or field associated with identity), non-attribution (using the claim without recognizing the author) and appropriation (presenting the claim as one’s own) – are mutually reinforcing. Given the growing importance of visibility and recognition in the context of increasing competition and insecurity in academic employment, these practices play a role in the ability of underrepresented groups to remain in the academic profession.

Nonprobative Photos Inflate the Truthiness and Falsiness of Claims

<p>When people evaluate claims they often rely on what comedian Stephen Colbert calls truthiness, judging claims using subjective feelings of truth, rather than drawing on facts. Over seven experiments I examined how nonprobative photos can manufacture truthiness in just a few seconds. I found that a quick exposure to a photo that relates to, but does not provide any probative evidence about the accuracy of claims can systematically bias people to conclude claims are true. In Experiments 1A and 1B, people saw familiar and unfamiliar celebrity names and, for each, quickly responded "true" or "false" to the claim "This famous person is alive" or (between subjects) "This famous person is dead." Within subjects, some names appeared with a photo of the celebrity engaged in his/her profession whereas other names appeared alone. For unfamiliar celebrity names, photos increased the likelihood that subjects judged the claim to be true. Moreover, the same photos inflated the truth of "Alive" and "Dead" claims, suggesting that photos did not produce an "alive bias," but a "truth bias." Experiment 2 showed that photos and verbal information similarly inflated truthiness, suggesting that the effect is not peculiar to photographs per se. Experiment 3 demonstrated that nonprobative photos can also enhance the truthiness of general knowledge claims (Giraffes are the only mammals that cannot jump). In Experiments 4-6 I examined boundary conditions for truthiness. I found that the semantic relationship between the photo and claim mattered. Experiment 4 showed that in a within-subject design, related photos produced truthiness, but unrelated photos acted just like the no photo condition. But unrelated photos were not always benign, Experiment 5 showed that their effects depended on experimental context. In a mixed design, related photos produced truthiness and unrelated photos produced falsiness. Although the effect of related photos was robust across materials and variation in experimental context, when I used a fully between-subjects design in Experiment 6, the effect of photos (related and unrelated) was eliminated. These effects add to a growing literature on how nonprobative information can influence people’s decisions and suggest that nonprobative photographs do more than simply decorate, they can rapidly manufacture feelings of truth. As with many effects in the cognitive psychology literature, the photo-truthiness effect depends on the way in which people process and interpret photos when evaluating the truth of claims.</p>

Nonprobative Photos Inflate the Truthiness and Falsiness of Claims

<p>When people evaluate claims they often rely on what comedian Stephen Colbert calls truthiness, judging claims using subjective feelings of truth, rather than drawing on facts. Over seven experiments I examined how nonprobative photos can manufacture truthiness in just a few seconds. I found that a quick exposure to a photo that relates to, but does not provide any probative evidence about the accuracy of claims can systematically bias people to conclude claims are true. In Experiments 1A and 1B, people saw familiar and unfamiliar celebrity names and, for each, quickly responded "true" or "false" to the claim "This famous person is alive" or (between subjects) "This famous person is dead." Within subjects, some names appeared with a photo of the celebrity engaged in his/her profession whereas other names appeared alone. For unfamiliar celebrity names, photos increased the likelihood that subjects judged the claim to be true. Moreover, the same photos inflated the truth of "Alive" and "Dead" claims, suggesting that photos did not produce an "alive bias," but a "truth bias." Experiment 2 showed that photos and verbal information similarly inflated truthiness, suggesting that the effect is not peculiar to photographs per se. Experiment 3 demonstrated that nonprobative photos can also enhance the truthiness of general knowledge claims (Giraffes are the only mammals that cannot jump). In Experiments 4-6 I examined boundary conditions for truthiness. I found that the semantic relationship between the photo and claim mattered. Experiment 4 showed that in a within-subject design, related photos produced truthiness, but unrelated photos acted just like the no photo condition. But unrelated photos were not always benign, Experiment 5 showed that their effects depended on experimental context. In a mixed design, related photos produced truthiness and unrelated photos produced falsiness. Although the effect of related photos was robust across materials and variation in experimental context, when I used a fully between-subjects design in Experiment 6, the effect of photos (related and unrelated) was eliminated. These effects add to a growing literature on how nonprobative information can influence people’s decisions and suggest that nonprobative photographs do more than simply decorate, they can rapidly manufacture feelings of truth. As with many effects in the cognitive psychology literature, the photo-truthiness effect depends on the way in which people process and interpret photos when evaluating the truth of claims.</p>

Science for, in and with Society: Pragmatism by Default

To rethink the relation between science and society and its current problems authoritative scholars in the US and Europe, but also around the globe, have since 1980 implicitly and increasingly explicitly gone back to the ideas of American pragmatism. Pragmatism as conceived by its founders Peirce, James and Dewey is known for its distinct philosophy/sociology of science and political theory. They argued that philosophy should not focus on theoretical esoteric problems with hair-splitting abstract debates of no interest to scientists because unrelated to their practice and problems in the real world. In a realistic philosophy of science, they did not accept foundationalism, dismissed the myth of given eternal principles, the unique ‘scientific method’, absolute truths or let alone a unifying theory. They saw science as a plural, thoroughly social activity that has to be directed to real world problems and subsequent interventions and action. ‘Truth’ in their sense was related to the potential and possible impact of the proposition when turned in to action. Knowledge claims were regarded per definition a product of the community of inquirers, fallible and through continuous testing in action were to be improved. Until 1950, this was the most influential intellectual movement in the USA, but with very little impact in Europe. Because of the dominance of the analytic positivistic approach to the philosophy of science, after 1950 it lost it standing. After the demise of analytical philosophy, in the 1980s of the previous century, there was a resurgence of pragmatism led by several so-called new or neo-pragmatists. Influential philosophers like Hillary Putnam and Philip Kitcher coming from the tradition of analytic philosophy have written about their gradual conversion to pragmatism, for which in the early days they were frowned upon by their esteemed colleagues. This new pragmatist movement gained traction first in the US, in particular through works of Bernstein, Toulmin, Rorty, Putnam and Hacking, but also gained influence in Europe, early on though the works of Apel, Habermas and later Latour.

Some pupils should know better (because there is better knowledge than opinion). Interim findings from an empirical study of pupils’ and teachers’ understandings of knowledge and big questions in Religious Education

In this paper, we draw on interim findings of our research project on Religious Education (RE), knowledge and big questions. We have found Miranda Fricker’s concept of epistemic injustice useful in our analysis—that is, the notion that a person can be wronged “specifically in their capacity as a knower (Fricker 2007, 1). In interviews with Key Stage 3 pupils (aged 12–14) we found that for many pupils, their capacity to know was hindered by the prioritisation of respect for opinion. Where opinion is considered something not to be questioned, this seems to be a key indicator of epistemic disadvantage while some pupils valued and could employ criticality when considering knowledge claims (including opinions). Epistemic advantage in this way exacerbates epistemic injustice, broadening a gap between the epistemic haves and have-nots. This research is part of a larger project where we attempt to answer the question: ‘Does Religious Education have a distinctive contribution to make to the development of epistemic literacy?’. We begin with our account of epistemic literacy underpinned by Young’s powerful knowledge (Young and Muller 2010) and contextualise our data with discourses about knowledge and school education. We focus largely on the emergent theme of (respect for) opinions and we argue that the prioritisation of respect in RE is (for some pupils) a barrier to knowledge. We go on to explore why this matters for individuals, society and RE.

Introduction: Why Science Wars?

While all definitions are stipulative by nature and reflect alternative usages, the meaning of the word “knowledge” is especially ambiguous. It carries profound consequences for what we mean by truth, reality, and rationality, but most importantly for our understanding of scientific knowledge claims. Rhetorically, knowledge trumps belief and opinion, but it is not clear that knowledge, even scientific knowledge, is essentially different from and superior to belief and opinion. As to the questions of what scientists know and how they know it, no answers have stood up to critical scrutiny in the history of modern science. Despite this uncertainty, modern science has claimed a hegemony in our society on the production of knowledge as superior to belief and opinion.