scholarly journals Logical Form, Truth Conditions, and Adequate Formalization

Disputatio ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 12 (58) ◽  
pp. 209-222
Author(s):  
Mario Gómez-Torrente
Keyword(s):  
Logical Form ◽  
Truth Conditions ◽  
Logical Constants

Abstract I discuss Andrea Iacona’s idea that logical form mirrors truth conditions, and that logical form, and thus truth conditions, are in turn represented by means of adequate formalization. I criticize this idea, noting that the notion of adequate formalization is highly indefinite, while the pre-theoretic idea of logical form is often much more definite. I also criticize Iacona’s claim that certain distinct sentences, with the same truth conditions and differing only by co-referential names, must be formalized by the same formula (in the same context). I criticize this claim, noting that it imposes implausible demands on adequate formalization. Finally, I offer some brief remarks on the connection between Iacona’s ideas and the distinction between logical and non-logical constants.

Logical constants

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Timothy McCarthy
Keyword(s):  
Fundamental Problem ◽  
Logical Consequence ◽  
Logical Form ◽  
Logical Truth ◽  
Semantic Property ◽  
Truth Conditions ◽  
Property A ◽  
Logical Constants ◽  
Language L

A fundamental problem in the philosophy of logic is to characterize the concepts of ‘logical consequence’ and ‘logical truth’ in such a way as to explain what is semantically, metaphysically or epistemologically distinctive about them. One traditionally says that a sentence p is a logical consequence of a set S of sentences in a language L if and only if (1) the truth of the sentences of S in L guarantees the truth of p and (2) this guarantee is due to the ‘logical form’ of the sentences of S and the sentence p. A sentence is said to be logically true if its truth is guaranteed by its logical form (for example, ‘2 is even or 2 is not even’). There are three problems presented by this picture: to explicate the notion of logical form or structure; to explain how the logical forms of sentences give rise to the fact that the truth of certain sentences guarantees the truth of others; and to explain what such a guarantee consists in. The logical form of a sentence may be exhibited by replacing nonlogical expressions with a schematic letter. Two sentences have the same logical form when they can be mapped onto the same schema using this procedure (‘2 is even or 2 is not even’ and ‘3 is prime or 3 is not prime’ have the same logical form: ‘p or not-p’). If a sentence is logically true then each sentence sharing its logical form is true. Any characterization of logical consequence, then, presupposes a conception of logical form, which in turn assumes a prior demarcation of the logical constants. Such a demarcation yields an answer to the first problem above; the goal is to generate the demarcation in such a way as to enable a solution of the remaining two. Approaches to the characterization of logical constants and logical consequence are affected by developments in mathematical logic. One way of viewing logical constanthood is as a semantic property; a property that an expression possesses by virtue of the sort of contribution it makes to determining the truth conditions of sentences containing it. Another way is proof-theoretical: appealing to aspects of cognitive or operational role as the defining characteristics of logical expressions. Broadly, proof-theoretic accounts go naturally with the conception of logic as a theory of formal deductive inference; model-theoretic accounts complement a conception of logic as an instrument for the characterization of structure.

scholarly journals Introduction

Disputatio ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 12 (58) ◽  
pp. 199-208
Author(s):  
Diego Marconi
Keyword(s):  
Logical Form ◽  
Truth Conditions

Abstract This introduction is a short critical presentation of the topic and main arguments of Andrea Iacona’s book Logical Form. Furthermore, it summarizes the commentators’ views on two central issues: Iacona’s rejection of the uniqueness thesis, i.e. his claim that no single notion of logical form can be adequate to the tasks that logical form has been supposed to perform, and the relation between a sentence’s logical form and its truth conditions.

Dialogical logic

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Erik C.W. Krabbe
Keyword(s):  
Winning Strategy ◽  
Logical Consequence ◽  
Logical Form ◽  
Logical Constant ◽  
Critical Dialogue ◽  
Logical Constants ◽  
Dialogue Game ◽  
Dialogical Logic ◽  
Formal Dialogue

Dialogical logic characterizes logical constants (such as ‘and’, ‘or’, ‘for all’) by their use in a critical dialogue between two parties: a proponent who has asserted a thesis and an opponent who challenges it. For each logical constant, a rule specifies how to challenge a statement that displays the corresponding logical form, and how to respond to such a challenge. These rules are incorporated into systems of regimented dialogue that are games in the game-theoretical sense. Dialogical concepts of logical consequence can then be based upon the concept of a winning strategy in a (formal) dialogue game: B is a logical consequence of A if and only if there is a winning strategy for the proponent of B against any opponent who is willing to concede A. But it should be stressed that there are several plausible (and non-equivalent) ways to draw up the rules.

What is wrong with unarticulated constituents?

Human Affairs ◽  
2011 ◽  
Vol 21 (3) ◽  
Author(s):  
Marián Zouhar
Keyword(s):  
Alternative Explanation ◽  
Logical Form ◽  
Truth Conditions ◽  
Unarticulated Constituents

AbstractIt is quite popular nowadays to postulate various kinds of unarticulated constituents that have essential bearing on truth conditions of utterances. F. Recanati champions an elaborated version of contextualism according to which one has to distinguish two kinds of unarticulated constituents: those that are articulated at the level of the logical form of a given sentence and those that are truly unarticulated. Recanati offers a theory which explains the manner of incorporating truly unarticulated constituents into the propositions expressed. This theory invokes variadic functions. The present paper shows that variadic functions are unnecessary because no constituents are truly unarticulated in the sense assumed by Recanati. An alternative explanation is offered according to which all propositional constituents are either explicitly or implicitly represented at the syntactic level.

Aboutness

2014 ◽  
Author(s):  
Stephen Yablo
Keyword(s):  
Subject Matter ◽  
Philosophy Of Language ◽  
Mental States ◽  
Library Science ◽  
Philosophical Methodology ◽  
Major Advance ◽  
Truth Conditions ◽  
Ways Of Being ◽  
Made In

Aboutness has been studied from any number of angles. Brentano made it the defining feature of the mental. Phenomenologists try to pin down the aboutness features of particular mental states. Materialists sometimes claim to have grounded aboutness in natural regularities. Attempts have even been made, in library science and information theory, to operationalize the notion. However, it has played no real role in philosophical semantics, which is surprising. This is the first book to examine through a philosophical lens the role of subject matter in meaning. A long-standing tradition sees meaning as truth conditions, to be specified by listing the scenarios in which a sentence is true. Nothing is said about the principle of selection—about what in a scenario gets it onto the list. Subject matter is the missing link here. A sentence is true because of how matters stand where its subject matter is concerned. This book maintains that this is not just a feature of subject matter, but its essence. One indicates what a sentence is about by mapping out logical space according to its changing ways of being true or false. The notion of content that results—directed content—is brought to bear on a range of philosophical topics, including ontology, verisimilitude, knowledge, loose talk, assertive content, and philosophical methodology. The book represents a major advance in semantics and the philosophy of language.

Iconicity and Logical Form

1994 ◽  
Vol 16 (1) ◽  
pp. 53-64
Author(s):  
Chrsitopher Hookway
Keyword(s):  
Logical Form
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