What is wrong with unarticulated constituents?

Human Affairs ◽  
2011 ◽  
Vol 21 (3) ◽  
Author(s):  
Marián Zouhar
Keyword(s):  
Alternative Explanation ◽  
Logical Form ◽  
Truth Conditions ◽  
Unarticulated Constituents

AbstractIt is quite popular nowadays to postulate various kinds of unarticulated constituents that have essential bearing on truth conditions of utterances. F. Recanati champions an elaborated version of contextualism according to which one has to distinguish two kinds of unarticulated constituents: those that are articulated at the level of the logical form of a given sentence and those that are truly unarticulated. Recanati offers a theory which explains the manner of incorporating truly unarticulated constituents into the propositions expressed. This theory invokes variadic functions. The present paper shows that variadic functions are unnecessary because no constituents are truly unarticulated in the sense assumed by Recanati. An alternative explanation is offered according to which all propositional constituents are either explicitly or implicitly represented at the syntactic level.

scholarly journals Introduction

Disputatio ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 12 (58) ◽  
pp. 199-208
Author(s):  
Diego Marconi
Keyword(s):  
Logical Form ◽  
Truth Conditions

Abstract This introduction is a short critical presentation of the topic and main arguments of Andrea Iacona’s book Logical Form. Furthermore, it summarizes the commentators’ views on two central issues: Iacona’s rejection of the uniqueness thesis, i.e. his claim that no single notion of logical form can be adequate to the tasks that logical form has been supposed to perform, and the relation between a sentence’s logical form and its truth conditions.

Logical constants

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Timothy McCarthy
Keyword(s):  
Fundamental Problem ◽  
Logical Consequence ◽  
Logical Form ◽  
Logical Truth ◽  
Semantic Property ◽  
Truth Conditions ◽  
Property A ◽  
Logical Constants ◽  
Language L

A fundamental problem in the philosophy of logic is to characterize the concepts of ‘logical consequence’ and ‘logical truth’ in such a way as to explain what is semantically, metaphysically or epistemologically distinctive about them. One traditionally says that a sentence p is a logical consequence of a set S of sentences in a language L if and only if (1) the truth of the sentences of S in L guarantees the truth of p and (2) this guarantee is due to the ‘logical form’ of the sentences of S and the sentence p. A sentence is said to be logically true if its truth is guaranteed by its logical form (for example, ‘2 is even or 2 is not even’). There are three problems presented by this picture: to explicate the notion of logical form or structure; to explain how the logical forms of sentences give rise to the fact that the truth of certain sentences guarantees the truth of others; and to explain what such a guarantee consists in. The logical form of a sentence may be exhibited by replacing nonlogical expressions with a schematic letter. Two sentences have the same logical form when they can be mapped onto the same schema using this procedure (‘2 is even or 2 is not even’ and ‘3 is prime or 3 is not prime’ have the same logical form: ‘p or not-p’). If a sentence is logically true then each sentence sharing its logical form is true. Any characterization of logical consequence, then, presupposes a conception of logical form, which in turn assumes a prior demarcation of the logical constants. Such a demarcation yields an answer to the first problem above; the goal is to generate the demarcation in such a way as to enable a solution of the remaining two. Approaches to the characterization of logical constants and logical consequence are affected by developments in mathematical logic. One way of viewing logical constanthood is as a semantic property; a property that an expression possesses by virtue of the sort of contribution it makes to determining the truth conditions of sentences containing it. Another way is proof-theoretical: appealing to aspects of cognitive or operational role as the defining characteristics of logical expressions. Broadly, proof-theoretic accounts go naturally with the conception of logic as a theory of formal deductive inference; model-theoretic accounts complement a conception of logic as an instrument for the characterization of structure.

Epistemic Contextualism, Unarticulated Constituents and Hidden Variables

Dialogue ◽  
2015 ◽  
Vol 54 (2) ◽  
pp. 225-246
Author(s):  
AHMAD REZA HEMMATI MOGHADDAM
Keyword(s):  
Hidden Variables ◽  
Epistemic Contextualism ◽  
Truth Conditions ◽  
Epistemic Standard ◽  
Hidden Variable ◽  
Unarticulated Constituents

Epistemic contextualism was devised mainly to provide a solution to the problem of skepticism based on a thesis about the truth conditions of knowledge attributing sentences. In this paper, I’ll examine two possible semantic bases of epistemic contextualism i.e., (i) the epistemic standard is an unarticulated constituent, (ii) the epistemic standard is a hidden variable. After showing that the unarticulated constituent thesis is incompatible with epistemic contextualism, I’ll argue that the hidden variable account remains unconvincing. My aim in this paper is to show that questions remain that must be answered before epistemic contextualism can claim success in the project of resolving skepticism.

Scope and partitivity of plural indefinite noun phrases in Spanish

2017 ◽  
Vol 8 (1) ◽  
pp. 107-128 ◽  
Author(s):  
Juan J. Colomina-Almiñana
Keyword(s):  
Common Ground ◽  
Logical Form ◽  
Noun Phrases ◽  
Bare Plurals ◽  
Contextual Restriction ◽  
The Common ◽  
Unarticulated Constituents

Abstract It has been argued that European Spanish plural indefinite noun phrases including algunos convey a partitive effect because the restrictor alg- provides additional properties. The reason that algunos implicates a “non-all-things” effect is because it refers only to an indeterminate part of the whole. The scope of bare plurals and unos, in contrast, does not exhibit this characteristic. This article argues that, contrarily to this claim, the scope of bare plurals and unos also induces partitivity because occurrences of these words include unarticulated constituents. Therefore, European Spanish indefinite noun phrases pragmatically presuppose the relevant part of what the speaker intends to refer, which is also shared by the audience since it is part of the common ground both occupy. Hence, bare plurals and unos are always contextually restricted, since a covert (optional) variable present in the logical form cannot capture this contextual restriction.

scholarly journals Logical Form, Truth Conditions, and Adequate Formalization

Disputatio ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 12 (58) ◽  
pp. 209-222
Author(s):  
Mario Gómez-Torrente
Keyword(s):  
Logical Form ◽  
Truth Conditions ◽  
Logical Constants

Abstract I discuss Andrea Iacona’s idea that logical form mirrors truth conditions, and that logical form, and thus truth conditions, are in turn represented by means of adequate formalization. I criticize this idea, noting that the notion of adequate formalization is highly indefinite, while the pre-theoretic idea of logical form is often much more definite. I also criticize Iacona’s claim that certain distinct sentences, with the same truth conditions and differing only by co-referential names, must be formalized by the same formula (in the same context). I criticize this claim, noting that it imposes implausible demands on adequate formalization. Finally, I offer some brief remarks on the connection between Iacona’s ideas and the distinction between logical and non-logical constants.

‘Free’ Enrichment and the Nature of Pragmatic Constraints

2014 ◽  
Vol 6 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-28 ◽  
Author(s):  
Alison Hall
Keyword(s):  
Truth Conditions ◽  
Pragmatic Enrichment ◽  
Explicit Content ◽  
Contextualist Approach ◽  
Context Specific ◽  
Utterance Interpretation ◽  
Free Enrichment ◽  
Unarticulated Constituents

The contextualist approach to utterance interpretation posits processes of “free” pragmatic enrichment that supply unarticulated constituents of the explicit content of utterances. While this proposal is faithful to our intuitions about the truth conditions of utterances, and accommodates the optionality of these pragmatic effects, there remains a doubt about whether contextualism can account in any principled way for what pragmatically derived material enters into explicit content, and what does not. This gap in the theory leads to objections that the putative process of pragmatic enrichment would massively overgenerate interpretations of utterances, having no way to exclude from explicit content elements of meaning that are truth-conditionally irrelevant. Here I discuss how a derivational account can sort explicit content from implicatures, where the former is a result of “developing” the linguistically-encoded form, while implicatures are entirely inferred, from fully propositional premises. Using the idea that enrichment is constrained to the minimum necessary to inferentially warrant the implications of the utterance, I show how the derivational account can address existing examples of alleged overgeneration, and that these rest on a failure to properly appreciate that the occurrence of such “free” pragmatic processes depends on the details of the particular context in which the utterance was tokened. I conclude with a discussion of what kind of systematicity should be expected from an account of processes whose outcome is inevitably context-specific.

scholarly journals Evolved Mechanisms Versus Underlying Conditional Relations

2015 ◽  
Vol 40 (1) ◽  
pp. 241-253 ◽  
Author(s):  
Miguel López Astorga
Keyword(s):  
Mental Models ◽  
Social Exchange ◽  
Alternative Explanation ◽  
Logical Form ◽  
Human Reasoning ◽  
Social Contracts ◽  
The Social ◽  
Conditional Relations ◽  
Social Contracts Theory ◽  
Mental Models Theory

Abstract The social contracts theory claims that, in social exchange circumstances, human reasoning is not necessarily led by logic, but by certain evolved mental mechanisms that are useful for catching offenders. An emblematic experiment carried out with the intention to prove this thesis is the first experiment described by Fiddick, Cosmides, and Tooby in their paper of 2000. Lopez Astorga has questioned that experiment claiming that its results depend on an underlying conditional logical form not taken into account by Fiddick, Cosmides, and Tooby. In this paper, I propose an explanation alternative to that of Lopez Astorga, which does not depend on logical forms and is based on the mental models theory. Thus, I conclude that this other alternative explanation is one more proof that the experiment in question does not demonstrate the fundamental thesis of the social contracts theory.

Association of pituitary adenoma with neuronal christoma: A TEM study

1994 ◽  
Vol 52 ◽  
pp. 232-233
Author(s):  
Eva Horvath ◽  
Kalman Kovacs ◽  
B. W. Scheithauer ◽  
R. V. Lloyd ◽  
H. S. Smyth
Keyword(s):  
Growth Hormone ◽  
Pituitary Adenoma ◽  
Pituitary Tumor ◽  
Nervous Tissue ◽  
Alternative Explanation ◽  
Growth Hormone Releasing Hormone ◽  
Cell Hyperplasia ◽  
Releasing Hormone ◽  
Secretory Neurons

The association of a pituitary adenoma with nervous tissue consisting of neuron-like cells and neuropil is a rare abnormality. In the majority of cases, the pituitary tumor is a chromophobic adenoma, accompanied by acromegaly. Histology reveals widely variable proportions of endocrine and nervous tissue in alternating or intermingled patterns. The lesion is perceived as a composite one consisting of two histogenetically distinct parts. It has been suggested that the neuronal component, morphologically similar to secretory neurons of the hypothalamus, may initiate adenoma formation by releasing stimulatory substances. Immunoreactivity for growth hormone releasing hormone (GRH) in the neuronal component of some cases supported this view, whereas other findings such as consistent lack of growth hormone (GH) cell hyperplasia in the lesions called for alternative explanation.Fifteen tumors consisting of a pituitary adenoma and a neuronal component have been collected over a 20 yr. period. Acromegaly was present in 11 patients, was equivocal in one, and absent in 3.

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