scholarly journals A Dynamic Epistemic Logic with Finite Iteration and Parallel Composition

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Andreas Herzig ◽  
Frédéric Maris ◽  
Elise Perrotin

Existing dynamic epistemic logics combine standard epistemic logic with a restricted version of dynamic logic. Instead, we here combine a restricted epistemic logic with a rich version of dynamic logic. The epistemic logic is based on `knowing-whether' operators and basically disallows disjunctions and conjunctions in their scope; it moreover captures `knowing-what'. The dynamic logic has not only all the standard program operators of Propositional Dynamic Logic, but also parallel composition as well as an operator of inclusive nondeterministic composition; its atomic programs are assignments of propositional variables. We show that the resulting dynamic epistemic logic is powerful enough to capture several kinds of sequential and parallel planning, and so both in the unbounded and in the finite horizon version.

Author(s):  
Davide Grossi ◽  
Andreas Herzig ◽  
Wiebe van der Hoek ◽  
Christos Moyzes

In this paper we attempt to shed light on the concept of an agent’s knowledge after a non-deterministic action is executed. We start by making a comparison between notions of non-deterministic choice, and between notions of sequential composition, of settings with dynamic and/or epistemic character; namely Propositional Dynamic Logic (PDL), Dynamic Epistemic Logic (DEL), and the more recent logic of Semi-Public Environments (SPE). These logics represent two different approaches for defining the aforementioned actions, and in order to provide unified frameworks that encompass both, we define the logics DELVO (DEL+Vision+Ontic change) and PDLVE (PDL+Vision+Epistemic operators). DELVO is given a sound and complete axiomatisation.


Author(s):  
Alexandru Baltag ◽  
Aybüke Özgün ◽  
Ana Lucia Vargas Sandoval

2020 ◽  
Vol 49 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Arkadiusz Wójcik

The dynamic epistemic logic for actual knowledge models the phenomenon of actual knowledge change when new information is received. In contrast to the systems of dynamic epistemic logic which have been discussed in the past literature, our system is not burdened with the problem of logical omniscience, that is, an idealized assumption that the agent explicitly knows all classical tautologies and all logical consequences of his or her knowledge. We provide a sound and complete axiomatization for this logic.


Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document