Bridging the Gap between Rationality,  Normativity and Emotions

Frédéric Minner

doi:10.25180/lj.v21i1.171

Bridging the Gap between Rationality, Normativity and Emotions

Labyrinth ◽

10.25180/lj.v21i1.171 ◽

2019 ◽

Vol 21 (1) ◽

pp. 79

Author(s):

Frédéric Minner

Keyword(s):

Social Norms ◽

Epistemic Norms ◽

Intentional Explanation ◽

Rational Actions

This paper argues that emotions play a key role in intentional explanation, because they can be conceived as rational. Furthermore, their rationality is specific as they make agents act and react with respect to values and norms. Indeed, emotions have cognitive bases and are reactions to the presence of values and are regimented by epistemic norms that can be constrained by social norms. Additionally, thanks to their action and cognitive tendencies emotions ground rational actions by providing, among other features of rationality, intentions to promote values through norms of action that can also be constrained by social norms. In that sense, emotions seem to bridge the gap between rationality and normativity by articulating the rational detection and production of values related to epistemic and action norms that can be both regimented by social norms.

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Are Epistemic Norms Fundamentally Social Norms?

Episteme ◽

10.1017/epi.2019.49 ◽

2020 ◽

Vol 17 (3) ◽

pp. 281-300 ◽

Cited By ~ 3

Author(s):

David Henderson

Keyword(s):

Social Norms ◽

Common Good ◽

State Of The Art ◽

Epistemic Norms ◽

Epistemic Practice ◽

Veritistic Value

AbstractPeople develop and deploy epistemic norms – normative sensibilities in light of which they regulate both their individual and community epistemic practice. There is a similarity to folk's epistemic normative sensibilities – and it is by virtue of this that folk commonly can rely on each other, and even work jointly to produce systems of true beliefs – a kind of epistemic common good. Agents not only regulate their belief forming practices in light of these sensitivities, but they make clear to others that they approve or disapprove of practices as these accord with their sensibilities – they thus regulate the belief forming practices of others in an interdependent pursuit of a good – something on the order of a community stock of true beliefs. Such general observations suggest ways in which common epistemic norms function as social norms, as these are characterized by Cristina Bicchieri's (2006) discussion of various kinds of norms. I draw on this framework – together with an important elaboration in Bicchieri (2017) – as it affords an analysis of the various related ways in which normative sensibilities function in communities of interdependent agents. The framework allows one to probe how these normative sensibilities function in the various associated choice situations. I argue that epistemic norms are fundamentally social norms, and, at the same time, they also are widely shared sensibilities about state-of-the-art ways of pursuing projects of individual veritistic value. The two foundations suggest the analogy of an arch.

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Epistemic Norms as Social Norms

The Routledge Handbook of Social Epistemology ◽

10.4324/9781315717937-42 ◽

2019 ◽

pp. 425-436

Author(s):

David Henderson ◽

Peter J. Graham

Keyword(s):

Social Norms ◽

Epistemic Norms

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Assertions, Handicaps, and Social Norms

Episteme ◽

10.1017/epi.2019.53 ◽

2020 ◽

Vol 17 (3) ◽

pp. 349-363

Author(s):

Peter J. Graham

Keyword(s):

Social Norms ◽

Speech Acts ◽

Alternative Mechanism ◽

Epistemic Norms ◽

Handicap Principle ◽

Human Communication ◽

Technical Sense ◽

The Stability ◽

Mitchell Green

AbstractHow should we undertand the role of norms – especially epistemic norms – governing assertive speech acts? Mitchell Green (2009) has argued that these norms play the role of handicaps in the technical sense from the animal signals literature. As handicaps, they then play a large role in explaining the reliability – and so the stability (the continued prevalence) – of assertive speech acts. But though norms of assertion conceived of as social norms do indeed play this stabilizing role, these norms are best understood as deterrents and not as handicaps. This paper explains the stability problem for the maintenance of animal signals, and so human communication; the mechanics of the handicap principle; the role of deterrents and punishments as an alternative mechanism; and the role of social norms governing assertion for the case of human communication.

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Cooperation and obligation in early parent-child relationships

Behavioral and Brain Sciences ◽

10.1017/s0140525x19002474 ◽

2020 ◽

Vol 43 ◽

Author(s):

Ross A. Thompson

Keyword(s):

Social Norms ◽

Moral Psychology ◽

Close Relationships ◽

Social Agency ◽

Infant Survival ◽

Peer Experiences ◽

Early Experiences ◽

Early Parent ◽

Collaborative Skills ◽

Parent Child Relationships

Abstract Tomasello's moral psychology of obligation would be developmentally deepened by greater attention to early experiences of cooperation and shared social agency between parents and infants, evolved to promote infant survival. They provide a foundation for developing understanding of the mutual obligations of close relationships that contribute (alongside peer experiences) to growing collaborative skills, fairness expectations, and fidelity to social norms.

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The Structure Among Measures of Personality, Social Attitudes, Values, and Social Norms

Journal of Individual Differences ◽

10.1027/1614-0001.28.4.240 ◽

2007 ◽

Vol 28 (4) ◽

pp. 240-251 ◽

Cited By ~ 28

Author(s):

Lazar Stankov

Keyword(s):

Factor Analysis ◽

Individual Differences ◽

Social Norms ◽

Social Interactions ◽

Correlation Matrix ◽

Social Attitudes ◽

Group Differences ◽

Factor Scores ◽

Ethnic Group Differences ◽

Inside Out

Abstract. This paper presents the results of a study that employed measures of personality, social attitudes, values, and social norms that have been the focus of recent research in individual differences. These measures were given to a sample of participants (N = 1,255) who were enrolled at 25 US colleges and universities. Factor analysis of the correlation matrix produced four factors. Three of these factors corresponded to the domains of Personality/Amoral Social Attitudes, Values, and Social Norms; one factor, Conservatism, cut across the domains. Cognitive ability showed negative correlation with conservatism and amoral social attitudes. The study also examined gender and ethnic group differences on factor scores. The overall interpretation of the findings is consistent with the inside-out view of human social interactions.

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Accentuating Your Masculine Side

Social Psychology ◽

10.1027/1864-9335/a000144 ◽

2013 ◽

Vol 44 (2) ◽

pp. 103-108 ◽

Cited By ~ 16

Author(s):

Chongzeng Bi ◽

Oscar Ybarra ◽

Yufang Zhao

Keyword(s):

Social Norms ◽

Gender Role ◽

Cultural Context ◽

Self Esteem ◽

Western Countries ◽

Self Evaluation ◽

Two Samples ◽

Agency And Communion

Recent research investigating self-judgment has shown that people are more likely to base their evaluations of self on agency-related traits than communion-related traits. In the present research, we tested the hypothesis that agency-related traits dominate self-evaluation by expanding the purview of the fundamental dimensions to consider characteristics typically studied in the gender-role literature, but that nevertheless should be related to agency and communion. Further, we carried out these tests on two samples from China, a cultural context that, relative to many Western countries, emphasizes the interpersonal or communion dimension. Despite the differences in traits used and cultural samples studied, the findings generally supported the agency dominates self-esteem perspective, albeit with some additional findings in Study 2. The findings are discussed with regard to the influence of social norms and the types of inferences people are able to draw about themselves given such norms.

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